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

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

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A MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN CULTURE

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On Quebec

Kenneth McDonald's article ("The French Revolution in Canada," April) illustrates why Quebec may secede from Canada. The legal mechanisms have been explained, but the political dynamics need to be understood.

First, McDonald complains that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (in Sections 16-22 of the Constitution Act of 1982) has entrenched French and English as the official languages of Canada. And this, he supposes, is an injustice, for he thinks Quebec was always bilingual, but not Canada. Let us set the record straight: Canada was originally New France, and so was French only. Canada was then reformed as a confederation of French and English peoples. Canada and Quebec have been bilingual by fundamental law since Section 133 of the British North America Act of 1867. Obviously, it is important that the public officers of Canada should if possible be proficient in French and English, as those of Belgium should be proficient in French and Flemish, and those of Switzerland should be proficient in French, German, and Italian.

Second, McDonald blames the Canadian Charter on the need to accommodate Quebec. The Constitution Act of 1982 was imposed on Quebec, over the protest of her elected government, at the demand of the nine English-speaking provinces and the federal government of Canada. This was done contrary to a constitutional understanding that the legislative powers of a province could not be altered without the consent of that province. The Constitution Act imposed limitations on Quebec's right to protect her unique language and culture, and Quebec thereby became a colony of Anglo-Canada.

Third, McDonald does not mention the Meech Lake Accord which would have corrected the imposition of the Charter upon Quebec in 1982. The Meech Lake Accord was signed by the prime ministers of the dominion and all ten provinces. It was approved by Quebec and enough provinces to become part of the fundamental law of Canada, had it been proposed as a single amendment. It was approved by all parties in Parliament and by all of the greatest leaders of Canada. If it had passed, separatism would be dead in Quebec. But it was sabotaged, on a pseudo-technicality, because two English-speaking premiers went back on their word. The effect was as disastrous to Canada as the repeal of the Missouri Compromise was in the United States.

Fourth, McDonald does not understand why Quebec should be given constitutional safeguards to protect her language and culture. If he lived in an English-speaking province surrounded by nine French-speaking provinces, he might get the point. Meanwhile, I suggest he read John Calhoun's *Disquisition on Government*.

Fifth, McDonald complains that Trudeau overcentralized the government of Canada with unfortunate effects. He is right, because such consolidation of power over a large territory has never worked anywhere in any age. Trudeau constructed this weighty excess mainly by forming an alliance with English-speaking politicians to overwhelm Quebec. Why then blame Quebec for protesting the injustice which came about from Trudeau's deception in 1982?

Sixth, it is time for Anglo-Canada either to repair the damage done to Quebec in 1982 or to permit Quebec to secede in peace. I would prefer to see Canada united in friendship and loyal to the Crown, which is why I favor reconciliation and oppose secession. The necessary adjustments would be rather easy; for example, adopting the distinct society clause in the Meech Lake Accord as a new constitutional amendment. The question is whether Anglo-Canada is willing to make the effort. If the answer is no, the secession of Quebec is only a matter of time. If Quebec secedes and Anglo-Canada resists by sending in the army or by other warlike acts, the country will be ungovernable. If a good faith effort is made, however, a settlement will be reached, Quebec will continue to be "*le bijou*" of Canada, and Canada will eventually develop the finest constitution in the world.

—John Remington Graham
St. Agapit, Quebec, Canada

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Mr. McDonald Replies:

Mr. Graham repeats the myth that Canada was confederated in 1867 as two peoples in a bilingual nation. Then Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald called it "the Confederation of one people and one government instead of five peoples and five governments." Constitutional authority Senator Eugene Forsey said that "[Canada] was certainly not intended to be two political nations. Over and over again the 'Canadian' fathers of the Confederation, French, English, Irish and Scots, declared emphatically that they were creating a new nation." Section 133 of the British North America Act states that either English or French "may be used" in debates of the federal parliament and the Quebec legislature and that both languages "shall be used" in the written records of those houses. Either language "may be used" in a federal court or a court of Quebec.

English Canada's leaders opposed the Charter because it was to be "Canada's supreme law," denying the historic supremacy of Parliament. Trudeau's "compromise" was to insert a "notwithstanding" clause which enables federal and provincial governments to pass a law even if it contravenes certain provisions of the Charter. Provisions that *can* be overridden include the freedoms of conscience and religion, thought, belief, opinion and expression (including freedom of the press, freedom of peaceful assembly, and freedom of association), and legal and equality rights. Provisions that *cannot* be overridden include the people's democratic and mobility rights, the entrenchment of English and French as official languages, and the rights of minorities to be taught them.

Pierre Trudeau declared afterwards: "We've got all the aces. . . . We've got the entrenchment of both official languages, which can never be removed. We've got French in the educational system of every province." In his *Memoirs*, he wrote: "On the whole the Constitution Act largely enshrined the values I had been advocating since I wrote my first article in *Cité libre* in 1950."

The Meech Lake Accord was sandbagged by Pierre Trudeau when he attacked it in a nationally published article five days before the accord reached Ottawa. He wrote: "Those Canadians who fought for a single Canada, bilingual and multicultural, can say goodbye to their dream: we are henceforth to have two Canadas, each defined in terms of its language." Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa responded that he was "in profound disagreement with [Trudeau's] analysis of federalism."

This remains the Canadian paradox. Trudeau imposed the French system of centralized authority and legislated rights on the whole of Canada. For all but two of the past 30 years, the near dictatorial power of a Canadian prime minister has been vested in politicians from Quebec, who see nothing wrong with a system which is the political opposite of federalism and which denies Quebec's original, and exclusive, power over property, civil rights, and education. I suggest Mr. Graham read my article again, as well as my 1995 book, *His Pride, Our Fall: Recovering from the Trudeau Revolution* (Key Porter).

On Casablanca

Well, thank Heavens! Someone has finally labeled *Casablanca* what it has always been: puerile war propaganda ("Restless Natives," March). I wish I could say that I recognized this film for what it was when I was a young schoolboy in the 1940's. Then, I endlessly pestered my parents to "sign" so I could run off to the palm-fringed Pacific islands and "fight Japs!" (They never signed.) But I do remember disliking the film because it was a mushy love story. And what about Bogart? Casting him as a former "American idealist" was a stretch. Bogie had only two modes of character: he was tough and cynical, and tougher and more cynical. For this guy to be crying in his beer over being stood up by Ingrid was overly Hollywoody—even for 1940's Hollywood. Any war-intoxicated schoolboy who lost his own share of "true loves" could see how *unmanly* that was.

But even today Hollywood (oops!), I mean the Turner p.r. machine, goes on hyping the un-hypable. Great American classic, indeed! "Restless Natives" was right on target, and a good read.

—J.R. Wheeler
Port St. Lucie, FL

On Samuel Francis

I interrupt my work to express great praise for Samuel Francis's article, "The Other Face of Multiculturalism" (April). In a word, it is superb. As an intellectual analysis, it has a clarity that knows no equal, and it is truly a work of art. Would that we could persuade every congressman and school administrator to read it in the quiet of their studies. (If they have such!)

—Garrett Hardin
Santa Barbara, CA

On Errors and Bishops

Paul Gottfried's "Fascism and Anti-Fascism" (March) was a fine piece, but gremlins attack even the best. The *primas Galliae* is the archbishop of Lyons, not Paris.

—Duane L.C.M. Galles
Minneapolis, MN

CULTURAL REVOLUTIONS

SANCTIONS are a favorite instrument of U.S. foreign policy, but the Clinton administration seems to be having second thoughts. Recently, at a White House meeting with evangelical leaders, the President told the group that well-intentioned sanctions were getting in the way of U.S. interests. His statement echoes a report issued last July by the President's Export Council, which recommended the elimination of unilateral sanctions against Cuba, Iran, Libya, Burma, Sudan, and other countries.

If the assembled "Billy Bibles" were confused, they may have begun to get the point when a National Security Council document obtained by the *Washington Times* revealed the administration's plans to speed up the export of missile technology to China. Michael Chapman, writing in *Investor's Business Daily*, points out that the United States has already supplied China with a nuclear fission reactor, even though CIA

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sources say "China was the single most important supplier of equipment and technology for weapons of mass destruction worldwide . . . and . . . a key supplier of nuclear technology to Iran."

Critics of sanctions do have a valid point. Foreign policy should be based on national interest, rather than on idealistic theories of human rights. But the administration is caught on the horns of a dilemma that it has helped to create. In recent years, sanctions have been used against Iran, Yugoslavia, Libya, Iraq, China, Burma, and Cuba (among other countries), usually on the grounds of human rights violations. In fact, however, sanctions are often used not as an instrument of human rights but as a tool of American foreign policy. The governments of Cuba and Burma have both committed atrocities against their own citizens, but their record of abuse is trivial compared with what the rulers of China have done over the past 50 years. And yet China has received Most Favored Nation status.

China's defenders like to focus on the Tiananmen Square massacre and argue that, since then, the Chinese government has pursued a program of liberalization. But the attack on the pro-democracy protesters was a minor incident in a history of oppression that includes tens of millions of Chinese citizens killed during the Cultural Revolution, to say nothing of the Chinese government's program of forced sterilization, compulsory abortion, and infanticide.

Some sanctions have been aimed at aggressor nations that invade their neighbors or export terrorism—Libya and Iraq, for example. But China is unexcelled in aggression. Since the 1960's, the Chinese have been involved in border clashes with the Russians, and they have aided the bellicose North Koreans. They shelled Taiwanese islands and tried to eliminate traditional Mongol and Turkish cultures within their own territory. After conquering Tibet, they have done their best to destroy the religion and culture of its people.

But whatever its crimes, China is forgiven because it offers opportunities to American military industrialists down on their luck. Iraq and Yugoslavia are not so lucky. In those countries, the people are held accountable for the crimes of their leaders. Food and medicines have been subject to a de facto blockade. The results in Iraq have been catastrophic—perhaps a million civilian deaths since the end of the Gulf War, half of them children.

Let us be honest. "Sanction" is now a euphemism for embargo, and the U.S. government uses the two words interchangeably. An embargo is either an act of war or a preparation for war. It has nothing to do with human rights or humanitarianism. A real sanction is "the specific penalty enacted in order to enforce obedience to a law." But the United States does not have the authority to impose, unilaterally, a legal penalty on foreign countries. Nonetheless, our government not only declared its own sanctions against Yugoslavia, over and above the U.N. sanctions, but it also reserves the right, as a member of the Security Council, to reimpose the U.N. sanctions that have been suspended.

Yugoslavia's recent attempt to repress a rebellion in Kosovo has resulted in the call to reactivate sanctions, but Turkey, which is carrying out a wholesale extermination of the Kurds, is not even criticized. The Turks are, after all, our allies—and good customers, too.

In calling for a more pragmatic approach to sanctions, Bill Clinton is once again throwing sand in the eyes of the American people. The truth is, he wants to sell military technology to the bloodiest regime of the 20th century. At the same time his government is denying food and medicine to the children of Iraq. Will he get away with this brutal hypocrisy? Of course. Missiles to China mean jobs and votes, and if there is any moral dimension to the deal, that is strictly between the President and his wife.

—Thomas Fleming

JEAN-MARIE LE PEN is in trouble again. Imagine if Pat Buchanan had just scored a major political success, which had put him within reach of real political power—and then, just as he was reaching out to taste the fruits of years of hard work, political opponents threw a minor legal charge at him. Conviction on this charge would disqualify Buchanan from holding any political post, lumber him with a suspended prison sentence of three months, and strip him of his civic rights for two years. Would not the timing seem a little too convenient to be coincidental? This is what Jean-Marie Le Pen's friends, and liberal Frenchmen of all parties, are now saying about the *ancien régime*'s latest assault on the National Front (FN).

In the last general election, Le Pen was helping his daughter, Marie-Caroline, to canvas in the Mantes-la-Jolie district. During a walkabout, the FN contingent was spotted by a Socialist mob, who showed their commitment to freedom of expression by threatening the much smaller FN group. In the front row of the mob was the Socialist candidate, a harpy named Peulvast-Bergeal who, according to Le Pen, was threatening and lunging at his daughter. Le Pen, an impulsive and chivalrous man, claims that he merely tried to fend off the Amazon, who was not hurt at all by the "assault," just even more aggrieved than usual.

The TV cameras which follow Le Pen everywhere in the hope of just such images captured the undignified moment. Because this was Le Pen, and not just a run-of-the-mill member of what has virtually become the Gaullist-Socialist-Communist coalition, nobody was willing to overlook this minor (if undoubtedly unpleasant) incident, in which there was fault on both sides. Inherently disposed in favor of litigation (like all leftists), Peulvast-Bergeal gleefully sued Le Pen for assault and won the case.

Le Pen's legal setback, if it is upheld, will mean—in addition to a brief jail term—that he will be unable to hold office or take part in politics. He does, however, retain his "civic rights" until his appeal can be heard. This latest legal attack on Le Pen is an obvious attempt to undermine the FN and to weaken his own position within the party—although some journalists, like the London *Times*' Ben Macintyre, find the prospect of an FN run by Bruno Mégret, Le Pen's obvious successor, even more terrifying (see "Softly, Softly, Speaks the Fascist," *Times*, April 22, 1998).

This assault charge is but the latest politically motivated frame-up in a number of unedifying attempts to close down the FN and disenfranchise the 15 percent of the French population who now regularly vote for it. The voting system was altered in 1988, cutting the number of FN members of parliament from 35 to just one; more recently, the left and so-called "right-wing" parties created the "Republican Front" in an attempt to defeat the FN at Strasbourg and elsewhere (they failed). The Republican Front was revived in March, when the FN became

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kingmakers in many French regions after local elections. Local Gaullist politicians were threatened with expulsion from their respective parties if they held onto their places through FN assistance. Most of them obeyed orders, and as a result, the Gaullist parties lost large chunks of territory they would otherwise have held comfortably—a brilliant political strategy.

These contemptible challenges have been accompanied and inspired by an unremitting, multilayered campaign of hatred against the FN, even to the extent of blaming them for the destruction of the Jewish cemetery at Carpentras. It is no wonder that FN members say bitterly that France is a one-party state—although there are now signs that the "respectable" right may soon split over attitudes to the FN.

It is of course immensely enjoyable to see the establishment horrified and frightened, but it will not be toppled overnight. Its acolytes will use every legal, emotional, cultural, financial, and—ultimately—physical weapon in its possession to enforce its globalist views and retain its privileges. The establishment does not see this epic confrontation as a crude battle for power, but as part of a holy crusade against "racism," "darkness," etc. This is what makes it so ruthless—and so very unpleasant. In modern France, it is all too easy to see who are the real haters, and which party really exemplifies the republican virtues.

—*Derek Turner*

SCHOOL UNIFORMS are back in the news. The school board of the nation's largest school system, that of New York City, voted unanimously this March to recommend uniforms for elementary school students. President Clinton endorsed the notion, though Norman Siegel, executive director of the New York City Civil Liberties Union, predictably threatened to sue if any student is forced to wear a uniform or ostracized for not doing so. When asked about the changes that occurred in schools in Long Beach, California, after uniforms were instituted in 1994—suspensions fell dramatically and the number of fights was reduced by half—Siegel said, "In Long Beach, they did a lot of other things that were educationally sound in addition to dress."

Perhaps some personal experience could shed light on this debate. In 1935, I was student at a Transylvanian *lycée*. The town belonged to Rumania (having been Hungarian up to the Versailles Treaty) and the schools taught in Rumanian (although there were sections in Hungarian, too). We all benefited from the French *lycée* system that I still regard as the best in the world. As far as the relationship between Rumanians and Hungarians, it was aloof, generously sprinkled with hostility . . . like everything else in Eastern Europe, then and now.

In 1935, a liberal politician, Petre Petrescu, was assassinated in Bucharest, most probably by nationalist students. In a matter of weeks, the government decreed that henceforward all students in the country must wear a uniform (by the way, a very becoming one); it was also decreed that between six and eight P.M. no student, in uniform or not, may walk the length of the Corso, the usual promenade of the population. Neither of these rules affected girls, so we boys were mad that we were not allowed to escort them during those precious hours.

The uniforms, however, we did not mind. First, they equalized our respective states of wealth or modest condition—although well-to-do boys had theirs prepared from better material. But none of us minded wearing a uniform, and the more mature ones understood the wisdom of the government decree. Moreover, it was exciting to avoid detection from six to eight, and the girls secretly appreciated that the boys were running a great risk—for them.

End of story. Such are my memories when I read about the silly cries of "human rights" or that "uniforms are not democratic" in our media. Their machine-minded authors know nothing of what boys and girls really think. They are still children of Dr. Spock.

—*Thomas Molnar*

THE ROCKFORD SCHOOLS controversy, approaching its tenth anniversary, is taking on the mythic stature of the Little Rock, Cleveland, and Kansas City cases. While still in its infancy (as desegregation cases go) and relatively inexpensive (*only* $166 million through the end of the 1997-98 school year, compared to $2 *billion* in Kansas City), the Rockford case is notable for both the determination of its opponents and the rapidity with which the city is being destroyed.

The determination of its opponents was evident at The Rockford Institute's second annual "Rally for Rockford" at the Rockford Woman's Club in February. Over 500 people braved a late winter rainstorm to join Rockford Institute president and *Chronicles* editor Thomas Fleming, Congressman Don Manzullo, legal scholar Stephen Presser, local lawyer Michael O'Brien, and three Rockford School Board members in their call for an end to judicial taxation. Despite attempts by the local chapter of the NAACP to scuttle the rally—including intimidating the school board members—enthusiasm was high, as audience members sported buttons reading "Welcome to Occupied Rockford—P. Michael Mahoney, Presiding."

Pleased with the response to his speech at the previous rally, Congressman Manzullo requested to be on the program again, to update Rockfordians on his legislative efforts to restrict the ability of judges to raise taxes. In addition, he has introduced a new bill which would require federal courts to pay any costs associated with a desegregation "master" ordered by the courts—an idea developed by John Stoeffler, president of the Madison Forum, whose article, "Judicial Taxation: The States Respond," appeared in the February 1998 issue of *Chronicles*.

Michael O'Brien, the local attorney who represents—*pro bono*—Rockford's 16,000 tax protesters, discussed the progress of his suit, which is now headed for the Illinois Supreme Court. Mr. O'Brien argued that judicial taxation results from the destruction of the separation of powers, a theme that was echoed by Stephen Presser, who discussed the federal courts' abuse of the 14th Amendment to federalize a whole range of issues—from abortion to religion to education—that are properly the province of states and local communities.

For some Rockfordians, the rally was their first opportunity to hear school board members Ted Biondo, Patti Delugas, and David Strommer explain their opposition to the federal court's "remedies." In speeches that belied the local Gannett paper's attempt to portray them as "rabble-rousers" unconcerned with education, the board members eloquently set forth a plan to regain local control of Rockford's schools, and to return a sense of sanity to both curriculum and student discipline.

The evening was capped off by Thomas Fleming's rousing speech re-

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counting the political and legal victories of the past year. Lambasting the local Gannett paper (LGP) for its biased coverage of those opposed to federal control of Rockford's schools, Dr. Fleming remarked, "If you can believe the paper, you would think this crowd is a lynch mob." Recalling the slogan of the previous rally—"Vote, Organize, and Protest"—Dr. Fleming urged Rockfordians to continue their battle at the ballot box, in the courts, and on the streets.

The response of the LGP was predictable. After refusing to provide advance coverage of the rally (even though advance coverage of much smaller events is routine), the LGP printed a short story on page three, which quoted Dr. Fleming as saying simply, "You would think this crowd is a lynch mob." But the LGP's *coup de grace* was still to come. A month after the rally, the paper ran a two-part, front-page series on the League of the South (of which Dr. Fleming is a founding board member), under the ridiculous headline, "New Confederates Spark Outrage in Rockford." Replete with lies and distortions (as well as excerpts from a Ku Klux Klan website!), the articles and the accompanying editorial were clearly meant to stifle opposition to the desegregation case. But the LGP quickly discovered that its strategy had backfired, as the citizens of Rockford rallied to the Institute's side, both on talk radio and in letters to the editor. Perhaps in part because of the contempt that the citizens of Rockford have for the LGP, the *Chicago Tribune* is now considering a Rockford bureau and a Rockford edition, welcome news for a town that's been "chained" to one newspaper for too long.

But amid the signs of hope, the case goes on, and Rockford may be approaching the breaking point. For the 1997-98 school year, blacks and Hispanics made up 40 percent of the public school population. The school district's initial estimate for 1998-99 was a 44 percent minority population, but the final number is over 46 percent, and the current projection for 1999-2000 is a 50/50 split. Historically, when the minority student population in a district under a desegregation order hits 50 percent, middle-class flight (both white and minority) becomes unstoppable. But that doesn't necessarily mean that "For Sale" signs will be popping up like mushrooms here in Rockford. With the third-highest property tax rates in the nation and some of the lowest property values, many homeowners may find it cheaper and easier to default on their mortgages and walk away.

—*Scott P. Richert*

BOB SANTAMARIA was not a name familiar to most Americans. But when he died in Melbourne, Australia, on February 25, 1998, he was mourned within his country and beyond as one of the greatest Australians of the century and as one of the world's leading champions of freedom.

Born in 1915, the son of Italian immigrants, Bartholomew Augustine Santamaria grew up during the Depression and the rise of totalitarian ideologies and empires. At the state funeral accorded him in St. Patrick's Cathedral in Melbourne, Archbishop George Pell focused on the influence of the Spanish Civil War in the young Santamaria's life. With admiration, he cited Santamaria's words at the end of an historic 1937 debate on the war at Melbourne University: "When the bullets of the atheists struck the statue of Christ outside the cathedral in Madrid, for some that was just lead striking brass, but for me those bullets were piercing the heart of Christ my King."

This young man soon became the protégé of Melbourne's famed Irish archbishop, Dr. Daniel Mannix. In Santamaria, Mannix found the kind of lay leader who could mobilize people in the struggle against totalitarianism, not only with a clear mind, but through deep faith. This combination of faith and intellect later influenced the spiritual journey of friends such as Malcolm Muggeridge.

In an era when being Italian was not the way to "get on" in Australian WASPdom, Bob Santamaria was always proud of his ethnic roots. It is said that he was told that if he changed his surname he would surely end up prime minister. But he scorned the enticements of the establishment and ultimately came to exercise deeper influence on the nation than most prime ministers. Although he never was a member of a political party, his abilities in political, social, and economic analysis were matched by his skills as a strategist and organizer.

He was the mind behind the network of anti-communist cells or "industrial groups" set up within the powerful Australian trade unions during and after the war, when the Comintern had targeted Australia. But the left resorted to sectarianism in an attempt to destroy Santamaria and his friends. The result was the 1955 split in the Australian Labor Party, an event that drove many Catholics out and led to the formation of an anti-communist Democratic Labor Party, which held the balance of power and kept the conservative Liberal Party in office for nearly 20 years. A positive outcome was the granting of government aid to independent (mainly Catholic) schools, a feasible policy in a nation where the sep-

Aristotle, *Politics*. Autarky as the goal of political community.

Pat Choate, *Agents of Influence* (Knopf). A classic work on how foreign economic and political interests have undermined American sovereignty.

Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., *Opening America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776* (University of North Carolina). Places NAFTA, GATT, and other recent free trade measures in historical perspective.

The Big One. The latest movie by inveterate leftist Michael Moore may have to be taken with a grain of salt, but conservative critics of big business and free trade won't want to miss it.

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aration of Church and State is not a dogma.

Santamaria's role in the Labor Party split made him a household name, hailed or reviled, but rarely ignored. When Rome responded to his foes in the Catholic hierarchy, he could no longer work within official Church structures. The Catholic Social Movement he headed was transformed into the independent National Civic Council. This think tank eventually included people of all faiths and some prominent agnostics, a particular advantage in this era of ecumenism.

Bob skillfully guided Catholic social thought through the Cold War and beyond, steering a course that never alienated working people from the Church yet helped Catholics and others to resist the totalitarians of the right and left. As the leading Australian opponent of communism and a loyal friend of the Diem brothers, he supported Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War. He claimed it could have been won, had it not been for treachery and ineptitude on the part of American politicians and evident sabotage by the left.

In later years, he turned his attention to the internal struggles of Christianity. His widely read monthly *AD 2000* still gives hope to those who resist the incursions of modernism and politically correct globalism into religion.

Thousands responded to his oratory. With a familiar, slightly staccato voice (easy target for mimics), he steadily marshaled rational arguments and laced his analysis with homely analogies. His sternest critics followed his "Point of View" on television, reprinted in his own journal *News Weekly*. He could be ironic, but always with charity. His humble self-effacement was proverbial.

My first recollections of Bob Santamaria are of a small patient man who warmly welcomed a nervous young convert, just returned from Oxford in mid-1969. He asked me to speak about the Oxford "Slant" group and "Catholic Marxism," the European grassroots of what later became Liberation Theology. A subsequent excursion with his family revealed a beloved husband and father, challenged in argument by his children (and enjoying every minute of it). He was also an unabashed devotee of Australian-rules football.

When Bob Santamaria ended his earthly journey, he was respected, even admired, by former foes, including old communists. He was recognized as an effective critic of economic rationalism who gave prophetic warnings of the disastrous effects of the unbridled power of the banks. Yet there was continuity of thought here, a consistency that marked his whole life. Bob taught us to see beyond the standard categories of left and right to what matters: the struggle for freedom, morality, family, and civilization.

In Australia, we mourn the passing of our captain and guide. But Bob Santamaria lives on in thousands of men and women formed and encouraged by this champion in the perennial struggle for freedom. He showed us what one man and much faith can achieve.

—Msgr. Peter J. Elliott

EPICYCLES:

• On the Shoulders of Giants: Apparently, not everything is bigger in Texas. In April, Lenoria Walker, the director of the Office of Affirmative Action and Contract Compliance for the city of Houston, was forced to resign after referring to a Republican city councilman as a "midget." According to the *New York Times*, Councilman Joe Roach is a dwarf and proud of it (a midget is small of stature but well proportioned, while a dwarf's features are out of proportion). It appeared that Ms. Walker might weather the storm until transcripts of her remarks revealed that she considered her minority employees to be more committed to **affirmative action** than her white ones. Discussing her role in defeating a ballot measure to end affirmative action, she stated, "I didn't use everybody in my office. I mean, I have whites, Hispanics, whatever. I used the ones that I knew was genuine and the ones that I knew wanted to save affirmative action."

• Delmarva, My Delmarva? During the War of Northern Aggression, Southerners hoped that Maryland—historically a Southern state—would join in their fight for freedom. Now, 135 years later, nine counties in Maryland are taking up the cause of **secession**. The *Boston Globe* reports that Maryland State Senator Richard Colburn, who represents a portion of Maryland's Eastern Shore, has sponsored a bill to allow its residents to "decide whether they want to ask Congress and the Maryland General Assembly for permission to leave the state." Colburn has also invited Delaware's Kent and Sussex counties and Virginia's Accomack and Northampton counties—all situated on the Delmarva peninsula—to join the new state. Showing his true colors, Colburn has proposed that Delmarva adopt the Bonnie Blue flag as its state banner. While he admits that the chances of Delmarva becoming a state are slim, Colburn hopes that his secessionist movement will convince Annapolis that the Eastern Shore can no longer be ignored.

OBITER DICTA: The plans for the ninth annual meeting of the **John Randolph Club**, to be held in Dallas in September, have been finalized. This year's meeting will be the least expensive in recent memory, and Randolph Club members will receive an additional discount. For details, please see the ad on the inside back cover. For further information, call Shelly Benson at (815) 964-5811.

North Dakota poet **Alan Sullivan** has contributed two new poems to this issue. A novelist who turned to poetry three years ago, Mr. Sullivan's work has appeared in many journals in the United States and the United Kingdom, including *Poetry*, the *Dark Horse*, and the *Spectator* of London.

Igor Kopelnitsky, a Russian artist living in Brooklyn, provides our art once again. Mr. Kopelnitsky's work has appeared in the *New York Times*, the *Daily News*, and the *Washington Post*, as well as in *Chronicles*.

Why not buy an extra copy of *Chronicles* for a friend? In **Illinois**, look for *Chronicles* at City News, 4013 N. Milwaukee Avenue, #422, Chicago; B. Dalton Booksellers, 222 Merchandise Mart, #204, Chicago; Borders, 49 S. Waukegan Road, Deerfield; Borders, Oak Brook Court, Oak Brook; The Newsstand, 309 W. State Street, Geneva; Zines & Beans, 360A W. Army Trail Road, Bloomingdale. In **Indiana**, *Chronicles* can be found at the Little Professor Book Centers, 6360 W. Jefferson Boulevard and 525 DuPont Road, Fort Wayne; Book Corner, 100 N. Walnut Street, Bloomington; and Barnes & Noble Superstore, 624 S. Green River Road, Evansville.

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

Igor Kopelnitsky

Selling the Golden Cord

by Thomas Fleming

Free trade, according to the usual pundits, is an issue that divides the right. The usual pundits are, as usual, wrong. Free trade, which has never been more than an undocumented alien on the right, is an ideal that does unite much of the left. It is a point on which socialism converges with both individualism and globalism—three roads that lead to world government.

This late in the 20th century, even libertarians have no excuse for not seeing the resemblance between international socialism and the multinational corporate state that is emerging, but free-traders, as opposed to those who advocate free markets and low tariffs (among whom I count myself), are a set of true believers every bit as impervious to argument and evidence as any cultist who thinks he knows God's first name or takes his scriptures from a fantasy novel.

Like most hot political issues in the United States, the trade debate is carried on with more posturing than argument. As in the debate over abortion or guns or immigration, one side misrepresents the problem and relies primarily on an argument from misdefinition: if you can believe the left, abortion is not infanticide, only a pregnancy termination; the Second Amendment was written only to arm the National Guard; and America is uniquely a nation of immigrants whose citizens have no right to control their borders or determine their future. There are people calling themselves conservative who want to kill babies, disarm the population, and swamp the country with 25-30 million immigrants a decade. As citizens, they have a right to their opinion, but they will take the first step toward credibility when they are willing to speak honestly about their aims.

The same sort of dishonesty goes on in the trade debate. The proponents of NAFTA and GATT insist they are supporters of something they call free trade, and they castigate their opponents as advocates of protection. In fact, the issue is not about free trade at all. Free trade is a myth, a will-o'-the-wisp in the minds of economists, who are the least practical men on earth. The dishonesty begins with calling economics a science (or a social science—a contradiction in terms), implying that it is not merely a systematic body of knowledge, like, say, the rules of prosody, but an exact science like physics. As Richard Neuhaus used to say, theology is an exact science. Economics is only playing with numbers. Whatever else economics might be, it is not a discourse about the proper ends of human existence.

Economists have much to say about the most "efficient" means of reaching a goal, but they have nothing of any value to say about either the goals themselves or the route we choose to reach them. If I choose to go to San Francisco, it is none of their business if I decide to drive rather than fly, or if I hunt and peck my way, from friend to friend, wasting time, money, and gas. Nations have their own goals, their own peculiar characters, and if the French were to decide to ban Coca Cola or Hollywood films, I cannot imagine a useful comment that an economist might offer on their decision, although it is amazing how easily these scientific economists slip from questions of "is" to matters of "ought."

Every scholar is a prisoner of his discipline, and many economists think they can explain virtually everything in human life by their abstract and simplistic analyses. I, on the other hand, am a philologist, a student of language, and therefore I think that the first step in solving a problem is to define terms correctly. We all have some idea of what trade is: you have something to sell that I want, and we strike a deal over the

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price—$2.00 for a gallon of milk, $30,000 for a Lexus, 15 cows for your daughter.

Whether we cut the deal for a pound of pork chops in my backyard, go to market, to market, to buy a fat pig, or speculate on pork belly futures at the Chicago Board of Trade, the transaction is, hypothetically, between two individuals. But how free is it? Apart from the imaginary state of nature that no rational philosopher can take seriously, men everywhere live in societies that impose rules on these transactions. They enact restrictions on who can trade and prohibitions on trading certain goods, such as drugs, weapons and strategic materiel, and historical treasures. One way or another, there are usually charges for the use of the marketplace. Trade is never free, whether it is domestic or international. There is always some group—the king and his council, the Church, a craft guild, a trade commission, the WTO—that takes it upon itself to make rules and set limits. And if these official imposts were not sufficiently burdensome, there is always a corrupt executive asking for kickbacks, a bureaucrat demanding baksheesh, a mobster collecting weekly payments for protection.

Suppose the impossible for a minute. Suppose that instead of the thousands of pages of jury-rigged international trade agreements (including GATT and NAFTA) the governments of the world took themselves out of the picture and said that borders no longer mattered. Would trade be free? Of course not, because every level of government, from neighborhood associations to the feds, regulate every aspect of trade. They fix wage rates, regulate competition, impose safety, health, and environmental standards. Some small part of this regulation may be in the public interest. The beneficiaries of most of it, however, are the bureaucrats themselves and the larger businesses that can influence the writing of the regulations. It was in this sense that libertarian free-trader Lew Rockwell endorsed Pat Buchanan in 1992 as the nearest thing to a free trade candidate, precisely because Pat was the only Republican promising to cut the size of the federal bureaucracy.

Who is so naive as to think that multinational businesses are any less eager to cartelize and monopolize their market? So far, in fact, no serious policymaker has actually made a proposal for free foreign trade. Whatever else NAFTA and GATT might do, they do not increase the freedom of buyers and sellers. Even while reducing tariffs, they impose a mare's nest of regulations, prohibitions, and international tribunals that undermine both the sovereignty of the United States and the constitutional order established by the Founding Fathers.

In recent months, the World Trade Organization has struck down American laws banning the importation of seafood from countries that are casually exterminating turtles and dolphins. "Good," say the free-traders, "turtles and dolphins don't buy or sell camcorders or baby food." In the same vein, a libertarian economist once responded to Chilton Williamson's appeal for a sense of environmental stewardship by declaring, "The best use for the Grand Canyon would be to turn it into a toxic waste dump." We should not be surprised when people who despise all creation turn out to despise their neighbors and fellow citizens.

At first, it seems like a paradox—that the very people arguing for free trade are in fact calling for greater regulation and at a level more distant from businessmen and consumers. But the free trade religion is nothing but a paradox—if that is the right word for talking out of both sides of your mouth. Radical free-traders cannot even make up their minds about their basic principle. One minute they are taking the high ground that free trade is an ultimate good, the *summum bonum* of human existence, but in the next minute they are claiming that the real bottom line, so to speak, is the welfare of the consumer.

How do we answer such an argument? If you think that "getting and spending" is all there is in life, I have nothing to say to you. You need prayers, not arguments. When an economist like Gary Becker tries to analyze the family as a set of competing individualists, he only reveals his ignorance of human nature and his superstitious reverence for a science (sociobiology) that he does not understand. The problem, in Becker's case at least, is not lack of principle or intelligence (he clearly has both), but starting with counter-factual assumptions—crudely put, they are individualism and materialism—he cannot understand man as a social animal. Putting his faith in economic theory and in the reductionist abstractions of biologist Robert Trivers, Becker constructs a picture of man in which only individuals exist. When economists put social relations under the microscope, groves and copses (families and communities) disappear; forests (or nations) are defined out of existence.

Economics, however, is not a religion, and markets are not gods, much less God. They are a human mechanism to provide for human needs. Even in the ideal, the purpose of a market is not to produce the greatest "efficiency," because markets are not an end in themselves; they are supposed to serve the convenience and happiness of human beings. This is one of many valuable lessons I have learned from Austrian economists like Murray Rothbard, who rejected a conception of value based on labor and stuck to the central point: that value is subjective and should always be translated to mean "valuable to someone." It would have been much more "efficient" for Murray to write on a computer, and his friends persuaded a genius to design a system just for Rothbard. After spending some time in consultation with the retrograde libertarian, the computer wiz gave up in despair, telling Murray's friends, "I've just designed the manual typewriter."

This is a roundabout and crude way of suggesting that there is no one trade policy that fits all situations, just as there is no one political system that is best for all peoples, no ice cream flavor to please every individual. In many situations, low tariffs, even no tariffs, are a good idea for a country, particularly when the benefits are shared by the majority of the citizens. When a nation is building an empire or dominates world trade or is in a very strong position, as Britain was in the early 19th century and the United States was after World War II, free trade may be sound nationalist doctrine. But when a nation wants to defend its cultural and political independence, its people might well wish to erect a tariff barrier around it—particularly when, like the United States today, it is experiencing an identity crisis.

Even in purely economic terms, low tariffs are not inevitably a blessing. During the current period of lowered tariffs, since 1973, real household income appears to have been steadily going down. I say "appears," because I do not trust economic statistics any more than I trust opinion polls. Whatever else can be said, American workers—and consumers—are not better off than they were 25 years ago. Of course, there may be other reasons for the dismal trajectory of lowering expectations, but more than a few economists—even those believing in global free trade—concede that competition from the more cheaply paid workers of Asia and Latin America have helped to keep real wages from keeping pace with the rising cost of living.

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The slide in real income since 1973 has been described by some economists as the longest in American history. Average Weekly Earnings (a Department of Labor statistic that covers 80 percent of employees, but excludes physicians and executives) have been declining steadily since 1975, and the fall is even steeper if increased Social Security rates and higher sales taxes are taken into consideration.

On the other hand, while the great majority (the percentage depends on which calculations one accepts) of American families have suffered an economic decline, the top one percent have gained tremendously. "So what?" say the free-traders. Here's what: America, as Rush Limbaugh reminds his listeners every day, is already torn apart by the politics of envy. Widening income disparity is an open invitation to liberal Democrats to take over the middle classes. Simply on the practical level of getting votes and winning elections, Republican strategists act as if they are part of an insane plot to alienate the Reagan Democrats: their vision of free trade and open borders has cost them the White House twice, and here in Illinois it looks as if the first Democratic governor in over 20 years will be Glenn Poshard, a Buchananist who opposes abortion, gun control, unrestricted immigration, and free trade.

The income gap is turning into a chasm, but at least that top one percent of economic winners are nominally Americans. The real scandal of free trade is the rise of transnational corporations which now dominate world trade (according to the World Bank, 70 percent of international trade is in the hand of transnationals). In 1990, the top 500 transnationals controlled two-thirds of world trade, and almost 40 percent of world trade is carried out *within* transnationals themselves. In fact, the top 15 have incomes greater than the GDPs of 120 countries. Some of these transnationals are not so much corporations as pirate states with no loyalty to any of the countries in which they operate. Some years ago, a chairman of NCR said he did not worry about the balance of trade because NCR was not an American company, only a transnational that happened to be located in the U.S., and both Sam Francis and Pat Buchanan can cite a string of similar anti-national platitudes uttered by "American" CEOs.

But let American-based transnationals have a problem—a revolution in the Persian Gulf or labor violence at a plant—and they will come screaming to Washington for help from the friends in Congress they have so generously supported. Having their cake and eating it, these pirate states are not only protected by the laws and the Armed Forces of the United States, but they are also given privileged access to our consumer markets.

When free-traders hear these arguments, they will either find a million reasons to show how we really are better off—freer to choose one pair of cheap shoes over another—or, if they are candid, they might tell you that frankly they do not give a damn. "The world is shrinking," they will say, "and we can no longer afford to care more about our neighbors than about strangers on the other side of the globe." For them, man *does* live by bread alone, and in this age of packaging and preservatives it does not matter whether the Wonder Bread is manufactured in Maryland, in Mexico, or on the moon.

Looking down from the moon, James Bovard has concluded that religion and nations, as well as history, are bunk: "Our great grand-children may look back at the trade wars of the 20th century with the same contempt that many people today look at the religious wars of the 17th century—as a senseless conflict over issues that grown men should not fight about." What this bit of lunacy comes down to is an unreasoning worship of free trade coupled with contempt for other religions as issues "that grown men should not fight about." I suppose this is why free-traders take a similar view of immigration. If America becomes a Muslim or a Buddhist country, what is the difference? So long as the only real God is Mammon and the only real nation is the great international marketplace that makes no distinctions between peoples or nations.

In Trade there is no East or West,
In Trade no South and North,
But one great multi-national
Throughout the whole wide earth.
Pols on the take and bureaucrats
Shall comfy nest-eggs find
When they have knit the golden cord
To strangle all mankind.

The real heart of the trade debate is not income or prices but sovereignty. The free trade agreements entered into by the United States not only violate our Constitution—a small thing, perhaps, since our own government does that every day—but they also erode our sovereignty. This is obvious from the global apparatus of rigged trade established by NAFTA and GATT, but the World Trade Organization set up in the last round of GATT alarmed even some knee-jerk free-traders.

The WTO is a secret organization whose meetings are closed to the press, and it has the right to settle trade disputes between the U.S. and other nations and the power to enforce its decisions. If two nations have a disagreement over trade, the Dispute Settlements Panel appointed by the WTO can strike down any federal or state law that is ruled inconsistent with free trade principles. In other words, it will act as an international supreme court of trade that supersedes our national and state courts and legislatures.

The Office of Management and Budget estimates that the regulations imposed by the most recent GATT phase (Uruguay round) will increase the federal deficit by $40 billion over 10 years. As Paul Craig Roberts, an honest free-trader, has written: "I would prefer my fate to be in the hands of the people—including textile magnates—than in the hands of a bureaucracy." If Mr. Roberts will some day extend his analysis to the international welfare bureaucrats who run IBM and Royal Dutch Petroleum, he could be Pat Buchanan's Secretary of Commerce.

The trade dispute, as I suggested at the beginning, is not about numbers but about words, and radical free-traders work hard to conceal the truth. (Bruce Fein describes their tactics as a mixture of "glibness and dissembling.") Free-traders are fond of denouncing national (and local) governments for corruption, inefficiency, stupidity, and here they are clearly on solid ground. I fully share their opposition to the federal government's growing power to regulate every aspect of our commercial life. I am even willing to agree with them that many American industries—automobile manufacturing, for example—may deserve their fate, and economic nationalists might well consider linking automobile tariffs to across-the-board cuts in the salaries of corporate management and the return of jobs and factories from Mexico to Detroit.

But what would the free-traders substitute for the current corrupt system of competing nations? Not no government, but world government. This is where their radical individualism

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leads them: to the destruction of every barrier between us, the American people, and a gangster world-state owned and operated by George Soros, Boris Berezovsky, and K. Rupert Murdoch.

But so long as Boris is free to trade with George and Rupert, the free-traders are content. In the grim Looney-Toons world of James Bovard, no government can restrict any intercourse between one nation and another: "If the government prohibited Americans from corresponding with citizens in the rest of the world, no one would deny that citizens' liberties had been trampled." What he does not seem to know is that virtually every country in history has taken an interest in its citizens' foreign connections with potential or actual enemies. The Logan Act, for example, explicitly prohibits Americans from practicing what we now call citizen diplomacy—the best example being Jesse Jackson's freelance trips all over the world, claiming to conduct economic and political negotiations with foreign nations. We allow Mr. Jackson to go on flirting with treason only because we are too cowardly to stop his game of racial politicking.

Many policies restricting foreign contacts went too far, but anti-nationalists would like to deny in principle a nation's right to protect itself by controlling intercourse with foreign nationals, sealing the border against the invasion of illegal immigrants, or punishing Asian businesses that, with the connivance of their governments, not only take advantage of our gullibility but have even managed to buy into the Democratic Party and the Clinton administration.

John Huang and Johnnie Chung believe in free trade—for the United States at least—except that this trade is not really free: it costs the governments and businesses of Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and Indonesia billions of dollars in lobbying. Asked if he was working for the Red Chinese government, Johnnie Chung explained that he thought it was normal for people to be loyal to their ethnic heritage. Compared with the politicians who take foreign money and sell out their country's interest, Johnnie Chung is an honorable man.

When it comes down to it, the free-traders believe that men and women are not really French or American, not really Christians or devil-worshippers; they are only rational producers and consumers, rootless hedonists and utility-maximizers who could just as well be born from a test tube as from a mother's womb. They acknowledge no social ties except that of the contract for mutual exploitation. Concepts like "loyalty" and "treason" are as alien to them as they were to Red capitalists like Armand Hammer.

During the Cold War, conservatives liked to tell a fable of Lenin, who had spoken of hanging the capitalists. Asked where he was going to get the rope, the humorless dictator replied, "They'll sell it to us." When the questioner persists and asks, "Where will we get the money?" Lenin answers, "They'll lend it to us."

The big-money boys of the capitalist West (in and out of government) have changed their rivals but not their attitudes. They will sell arms to both sides in an African civil war and poison gas to Saddam Hussein; and if a tin-pot dictator bankrupts his country buying fighter planes, computer systems, and one-way railroads, the New York banks will be happy to give him a loan backed by the World Bank and the American taxpayer.

Money, in their view, is an amoral force of nature like sex or the *libido dominandi*. A rutting elk will battle his father for the privilege of bedding his mother, and a man who lives for money only will call you a fool or a liar if you speak the language of friendship and patriotism, because nothing should be allowed to interrupt the free flow of money. Religion and culture, families and nations, are just so many unnecessary earthen dams vainly trying to hold back the onrushing tide of global trade. Try to stop it, and you will be crushed and swept into the great muddy river of progress.

In the good old days, American conservatives had to do battle with an evil globalist ideology called communism. They had their differences, but they agreed on what they were against. Today, they are confronted by a different evil globalism, the ideology of free trade and open borders and world government. If conservative Republicans refuse to stand up to this menace, then the only way they are going to get into the White House is by buying a ticket and taking the tour.

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Sandcastles

by Alan Sullivan

"History is a child building a sandcastle by the sea, and that child is the whole majesty of man's power in the world."

—Heraclitus

We always build beside a rising tide.
At the first surge we scramble on our knees,
Buttressing every turret of our pride.
No work of man stands long against the seas.

At the first surge we scramble on our knees:
So legions shored the crumbling walls of Rome.
No work of man stands long against the seas,
Barbaric horses plumed with streams of foam.

So legions shored the crumbling walls of Rome,
And China raised her ramparts taller still.
Barbaric horses plumed with streams of foam
Tumbled across the dark horizon's sill,

And China raised her ramparts taller still.
Today the ruins look impregnable
Tumbled across the dark horizon's sill.
The Mongols found them no great obstacle.

Today the ruins look impregnable,
Buttressing every turret of our pride.
The Mongols found them no great obstacle.
We always build beside a rising tide.

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Toward One Nation, Indivisible

A Course of Action

by Patrick J. Buchanan



Igor Kopelnitsky

It is time we looked at the world from a new perspective, one of enlightened nationalism. Clichés about a "new" global economy aside, there has always been an international economy—ever since Columbus stumbled onto the Western Hemisphere while seeking new trade routes to the East, in the hire of a nation-state, Spain. The Dutch East India Company was founded in 1602 to displace the Portuguese in the lucrative Far Eastern trade; and the Dutch West India Company, in 1621, to capture the American trade.

The American economy, however, is more than simply a part of the international economy, and its purpose is not to benefit mankind but to benefit Americans first: our workers, farmers, businessmen, and manufacturers. What is good for the global economy is not automatically good for America, any more than what is good for our transnational elite is necessarily good for the United States.

A Revenue Tariff

America should declare to the world that the present global regime *must* be revised, that we no longer intend to make the world prosperous at the expense of our own country. A 15 percent revenue tariff on all imported manufactures and goods in competition with American-made goods would be a fitting way to declare our economic independence.

As part of the "Nixon Shock" of August 15, 1971—to jolt the world into understanding that the United States could no longer continue under the Bretton Woods agreement—a 10 percent tariff was imposed on Japan. Thus, we need not go back to the Tariff of 1816 to find a precedent for unilateral American action in defense of our economic security. Unlike Clinton's threat of a 100 percent tariff on Lexus cars, a 15 percent tariff would not destroy American businesses set up in good faith. The tariff could be imposed in stages: five percent immediately, five percent in six months, and the final five percent a year later, giving merchants 18 months to adjust. If Ronald Reagan could impose a 50 percent tariff to save Harley-Davidson, surely we can impose a 15 percent tariff to inaugurate a new industrial age in the United States.

The revenue tariff should be high enough to generate a powerful stream of revenue, but low enough not to destroy trade. With American merchandise imports now exceeding $700 billion a year, this 15 percent tariff would yield a cornucopia of revenue while giving American products a marginal new advantage in their home market. Every dollar in tariff revenue, in

This article is adapted from Patrick J. Buchanan's new book, The Great Betrayal: How American Sovereignty and Social Justice Are Being Sacrificed to the Gods of the Global Economy *(Little, Brown).*

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fact, could be used to cut taxes on income, savings, and investment.

Bismarck built the German nation by shifting taxation away from incomes and onto foreign goods. In a December 15, 1878, letter to the Reichstag, the chancellor spoke of a crisis in the German middle class, similar to our own, and proposed to emulate the Americans: "Reform of the taxation . . . must begin with the revision of the tariff on as broad a basis as possible so as to benefit this class of the community. *The more money that is raised from tariffs the greater can—and must—be the relief in direct taxes.*" (Emphasis added.) High tariffs, argued Bismarck, would also give Germany leverage in "fresh negotiations with foreign countries concerning new commercial treaties."

Bismarck was an apt pupil of the economic nationalists who made America the world's greatest industrial power. Under Bismarck's policy, Germany increased its share of world production from 8.5 percent in 1880 to 14.8 percent by 1913; in 1880, Germany and the United States together had less than a fourth of world output, but by 1913 the two countries had nearly half, while free-trade Britain's share was sliced from one-fourth to one-seventh. The great unacknowledged truth of the second half of the 19th century—and of the second half of the 20th—is that the nations that followed the free trade dogma of the classical liberals lost ground to the nations that pursued the Hamiltonian policy of economic nationalism.

Reciprocity With the European Union

Europe would howl, but even under the old GATT rules a nation running a chronic trade deficit may use tariffs to end the hemorrhaging. And our response should satisfy Europe. Believing in fairness, we accept full reciprocity: a 15 percent EU tariff on all manufactured goods made in the United States.

Lincoln called the cost of ocean transport "useless labor." Much of this useless labor can be done away with if European companies that wish to sell in America produce in America, and vice versa. Ford and GM have always built cars in Europe; Europeans forced them to. When American companies feared a protectionist Common Market, they created European subsidiaries to avoid being frozen out. Turnabout is fair play. Let BMW and Mercedes make their parts and assemble their cars here in the United States if they wish to sell here on equal terms. As for those who prefer the cachet of European-made goods, they ought not be denied the freedom to buy. But a 15 percent tariff does not amount to persecution of elites who call 55 percent inheritance taxes "progressive." That new BMW can be built in South Carolina as easily as in Bavaria.

Americans may face a social crisis, a racial crisis, a crime crisis. We do not face a crisis of consumer goods. There is nothing made anywhere that we cannot make here. America-Canada and the EU are huge and self-sufficient markets, with similar laws and regulations. Their standards of living and wage rates are comparable. A reciprocal trade agreement could strengthen and solidify both blocs.

But would reduced imports cost us our technological edge? History proves otherwise. The telegraph, electric light bulb, telephone, "horseless carriage," and airplane affected society as dramatically as the computer. Yet Americans invented and exploited them as no other nation, behind a tariff wall built by Justin Morrill, Bill McKinley, and "Pig Iron" Kelley.

With the American market alone almost as large as the European Union, we can support and sustain a diversity and level of production no other country can match. The small and medium-sized nations of Europe and Asia have no alternative but to create interdependencies. Germany is, after all, smaller than Oregon and Washington; the United Kingdom is smaller than Mississippi and Alabama; and Japan is smaller than Montana and less endowed with natural resources.

Canada and Japan

Should any country be exempt from the 15 percent tariff? Yes, Canada—if Canada adopts the same external tariffs. In NAFTA, Canada married her economy to ours, to the economic benefit of Ottawa. The United States today takes 80 percent of Canadian exports, and Canada's merchandise trade surplus with the United States in 1996 was $23 billion.

However, Canada would have to remain inside the U.S.-Canada free trade zone and accept American tariffs, or go outside. If Canada chose to depart, the 15 percent tariff on all manufactured goods would be applied to Canadian goods as well. With the United States far and away Canada's biggest customer, and with that surplus on the line, Canada would surely choose to remain inside an American free trade zone. But Canada would have to choose.

As the United States strengthens ties to Canada, we should put an early end to our huge, chronic trade deficits with Japan. The Japanese are a proud people. It is unseemly and destructive to be hectoring them endlessly to open their markets, buy our rice, remove non-tariff barriers, adopt free trade. Japan does not practice free trade for a simple reason: Japan does not believe in free trade. Japan puts its national interest in manufacturing and technology ahead of a free trade ideology that has America in its grip. Japan is different because it prefers to be different. We should respect that. But while Japan's economic structure is no business of the United States, our trade deficits are our business. We should notify Japan that if an end to these trade deficits cannot be achieved through negotiation, it will be attained through unilateral U.S. action.

An horrendous imbalance in autos and auto parts is central to the American trade deficit with Japan. The United States should follow the Harley formula and impose a special tariff on imported Japanese autos and auto parts on top of the 15 percent revenue tariff. The Japan Tariff would enable the United States to recapture much of Japan's 30-percent share of the American auto market.

To avoid the tariffs, Japan could shift production of parts and the assembly of autos to the United States. These Japanese cars would be treated exactly like Fords or Chevrolets made in Michigan. Toyota, Nissan, BMW, and all foreign car makers would be welcome here, but to avoid tariffs they would have to produce here. The same would hold for GM, Chrysler, and Ford. Fords made overseas would face the same tariff as Mazdas made overseas. America would have the most competitive auto market on earth, but every company, foreign-owned or domestic, would play by the same rules, pay the same taxes, abide by the same laws, employ the same high-wage, high-quality North American labor. Jobs in the American auto industry would explode.

Japan is a great nation, and its people have wrought a great miracle. But the present unequal relationship cannot continue. Our sales to Japan in 1995, $65 billion, were one percent of our GDP; Japan's sales to us, $125 billion, were four percent of its GDP. With an economy twice as large as Japan's, we still

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spend six times as much on defense. We remit annually to Tokyo tens of billions of dollars in interest payments on the hundreds of billions of dollars of Treasury debt that Tokyo now holds as a result of having run up decades of trade surpluses at the expense of American workers. Historians will marvel that America let this happen.

Even the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan (ACCJ) is showing signs of despair. According to the ACCJ, only 13 of 45 U.S.-Japan trade agreements since 1980 were successful in helping American businesses penetrate Japan's market. Ten were total failures. Said ACCJ President Bill Beagles:

> For many years, the American view was that a trade agreement with Japan spoke for itself. . . . However, the U.S. Government and American industry came to realize that this is not the case. An apparently successful negotiation may not necessarily produce the expected market result.

This is unhealthy. As a First World nation, Japan has much in common with the United States. Our strategic interests are in harmony, and the possibility remains for a close relationship.

But it is not 1950 anymore. Reciprocity is required. If Japan can begin to harmonize her trade policies with ours, open her markets to our manufactures and agricultural products as we do for Japan's, there is no reason we cannot establish with Tokyo the same defense and trade relationship we have with Europe. There is no reason we cannot grow closer rather than drift farther apart.

Our China Problem

China is fast becoming America's number one trade problem. In its drive for dominance in Asia, Beijing has exploited slave labor, consumed all the Western credit it could extort, stolen intellectual property, and strong-armed American companies like Boeing and McDonnell Douglas to manufacture in China as the price of a deal. "Forced technology transfers" are a routine demand in dealing with China. "When you invest in China," says one auto company executive, "China assumes it owns all of your intellectual property." The Manufacturing Policy Project puts the piracy rate of U.S. intellectual property in China at 98 percent: "Three days after Microsoft introduced Windows 95 in the United States for $89.95, copies were available throughout Asia for $4 or less."

Following the path to power laid out by Friedrich List, China treats the United States, the world's most advanced nation, like a colony, a source of raw materials and a dumping ground for manufactures. China sends us up to 40 percent of its exports—much of it high-tech manufactured goods—but buys less than two percent of our exports. While China runs a trade surplus in manufactures with the United States of more than $35 billion yearly, prominent among American exports to China are fertilizers, food residue and waste, ore slag and ash, wood pulp, animal and vegetable fats, meats, live animals, and cereals. The one high-tech export for which America runs a large trade surplus is aircraft; but once China masters the American technology it has extorted, Beijing will begin building its own planes. That is the way of economic nationalists.

From 1991 through 1996, China piled up $157 billion in surpluses trading with the United States. Its 1996 surplus of $40 billion was almost as large as the Pentagon procurement budget. In October 1996, China invested $11.8 billion of its surplus in U.S. bonds, making China the third-largest buyer of U.S. debt, after Japan and Britain. By September 1997, China had amassed more than $130 billion in foreign currency reserves, the world's largest hoard after Japan.

For a century Americans have been transfixed by the great "China market"; it was one of the reasons business groups urged McKinley to annex the Philippines. But the China market proved a mirage then, and it is a mirage now, a corporate illusion. If China vanished, the American economy would not feel a breeze. Our sales to China in 1996 ($11.9 billion) were one-fifth of one percent of our GDP. We sold more to Singapore. But China's sales to the United States—$52 billion worth of toys, textiles, shoes, bikes, computers, etc., in 1996—were a crucial share of its entire economy and were the primary source of China's hard currency reserves.

The United States has the whip hand in this relationship, and it is time we used it. China is not only a trade problem, it is a national security problem. China is using the hard currency from its trade surpluses and international bank loans to buy submarines, destroyers, anti-ship missiles, and fighter aircraft from Russia, and to build long-range missiles to reach the West Coast of the United States. Yet we permit China to launch American satellites on Long March rockets, thus subsidizing the development of the Chinese strategic missile force.

America is taking a terrible risk feeding a regime whose character may be seen in its treatment of dissidents, Tibetans, Christians, and women pregnant in violation of China's barbaric one-child policy. While America should seek no confrontation with China, we should treat Beijing as the great power it has become.

We cannot practice true free trade with a nation that has no independent judiciary, where labor is conscripted, corruption is endemic, American goods face a 17 percent value-added tax and a 23 percent tariff, and many of whose corporations are government fronts. The United States should cancel China's Most Favored Nation status and negotiate a reciprocal trade agreement that recognizes our different societies and conflicting interests.

What About Mexico?

Mexico is another special case. We share a 2,000-mile border, ten million Americans trace their ancestry to Mexico, and our destinies are not separable. But NAFTA is not sustainable. NAFTA puts blue-collar workers from America into competition with Mexican workers who earn ten percent as much. American farm labor, paid a minimum wage near five dollars an hour, competes with Mexican farm labor paid 50 cents an hour. American employers now hang over the heads of their workers this constant threat: accept reduced pay, or we go to Mexico!

What makes the threat credible is that hundreds of companies have already done so. Under the *maquiladora* program, tax concessions are offered to American companies that place factories in Mexico to ship products back to the United States. New plants are opening at the rate of two a day. From San Diego to Brownsville, the Mexican side of the border is littered with signs of Fortune 500 corporations. Xerox, Zenith, Chrysler, GM, Ford, IBM, Rockwell, Samsonite, and GE have all opened plants south of the Rio Grande. By moving to Mexico, they evade American laws on child labor, worker safety,

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minimum wages, and health and pollution standards, as well as U.S. taxes; their products come back to undercut those made in factories that stayed in America and obeyed the laws of the United States.

The Japanese are also exploiting NAFTA. Matsushita, Hitachi, Sony, and Sanyo have assembly plants in Tijuana. Toshiba's plant is in Ciudad Juárez. Japanese and Korean companies are building auto plants. This Japanese investment in Mexico represents a shift of capital away from the United States. The CEO of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Mexico describes how it works: "Japanese investments reaching Mexico do not come directly from Japan. It is the United States [subsidiaries], the son, who is investing in Mexico, the grandson, of the main office."

President Clinton points with pride to the growth of American exports to Mexico. But prominent among those exports are parts for assembly into products for shipment back to the United States and capital equipment for factories being built in Mexico. Such "exports" destroy American jobs.

NAFTA must be renegotiated, or America's new Sun Belt will be south of the Rio Grande, and the consequences will be social and political as well as economic. Export the future of our working young, and those whose dreams have been destroyed will be heard from. America's merchandise trade deficit, an all-time record of $191 billion in 1996, is a cancer. Either we cut it out, or it will kill America. History teaches that when a nation's manufacturing sector has entered a period of relative decline, that nation will decline.

Our forefathers broke all ties with the mother country and risked their lives to achieve the economic independence we are piddling away. We need less of the gauzy spirit of globalism and more of the patriotic spirit of old George Meany:

> Practically every country in the world . . . has some type of restriction, some type of barrier, some type of subsidization for their own people, that gives their own manufacturers and workers an unfair advantage over the American worker. . . . When have we ever retaliated against the unfair barriers put up by these other countries which go back many, many years? And if we are to have a trade war, if that's the only answer, I imagine if we had an all-out trade war we would do quite well for one simple fact: We have the market. We have the greatest market in the world right in this country.

Amen. Let us emulate our greatest leaders and use our control of that national market to achieve our national aims. After the Revolution, the War of 1812, the Civil War, and World War I, tariff revenue helped erase America's deficits and pay off America's debt. The alternative is more years of receding wages and rising tempers among American workers until the social fabric is torn irreparably, the bonds of patriotism no longer hold, our vitality vanishes, and our economic divisions manifest themselves in class conflict between Industrial America and Third Wave America. We have nothing to lose by trying, except those policies that have put us on the slippery slope to national decline.

What About the WTO?

The World Trade Organization was erected on ideas American patriots must reject. It subordinates everything to the demands of trade. It exercises a supranational authority in conflict with our forefathers' vision of an America forever sovereign and independent. Its dispute-resolution procedures shift to Geneva decisions that ought to be made in Washington. And if we refuse to abide by the WTO's edicts, America can be chastised and fined.

Run by nameless, faceless, foreign bureaucrats, the WTO is the embryonic trade ministry of a world government. There is no place for such an institution in a world where free nations negotiate their trade agreements in good faith and oversee the execution of those agreements themselves. The WTO is a monument to the one-world vision of Wilson and FDR. Our withdrawal—after the required six months' notice—would be an unmistakable signal that America is back and that this nation is again the independent self-reliant republic which the Founding Fathers intended it to be.

Keeping Capital at Home

In a 1952 address to the University Club of Milwaukee, Ludwig von Mises declared that the "essence of Keynesianism is its complete failure to conceive the role that saving and capital accumulation play in the improvement of economic conditions." He admonished Americans to appreciate the role that capital had played in creating their unrivaled prosperity:

> The average standard of living is in this country higher than in any other country of the world, not because the American statesmen and politicians are superior to the foreign statesmen and politicians, but because the per-head quota of capital invested is in America higher than in other countries . . .
>
> Do the American voters know that the unprecedented improvements in their standard of living that the last hundred years brought was the result of the steady rise in the per-head quota of capital invested? Do they realize that every measure leading to capital decumulation jeopardizes their prosperity?

Mises, a free trade libertarian, is toasting a century in which the United States was the most protectionist nation on earth. Hamilton was right: protectionism went hand-in-hand with record capital accumulation. A primary reason that America's growth rates have been anemic in recent decades, and our recoveries not as robust as they once were, is the $2 trillion in trade deficits this generation has run up. Too much of the seed corn of the American economy is now being exported all over the world. As Sir James Goldsmith warned:

> Today, capital is being transferred to the developing world in massively increasing amounts. In the period 1989-1992, the average capital transferred per year to emerging countries was 116 billion dollars. In 1993, the figure was 213 billion dollars and in 1994 it was an estimated 227 billion dollars. East Asia leads the field, with a rise in the annual rate of direct investment between 1984 and 1994 of 1100 percent.

How can the United States halt the hemorrhaging of capital? First, consider how America's capital goes abroad. There are several primary vehicles for the "decumulation" of American capital: imports ($2 trillion in trade deficits in 20 years); U.S.

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private bank loans; foreign investments by corporations, pension funds, etc.; foreign aid (perhaps $1 trillion in the Cold War) and IMF, World Bank, and international bank loans; U.S. overseas defense expenditures; illicit trade (drugs); illicit wealth transfers to evade taxes. Each of these problems can be dealt with by strong action.

IMPORTS: A 15 percent tariff on all products that compete with American-produced goods and a wage-equalization tariff on manufactures from low-wage countries would rapidly erase American merchandise trade deficits. Instead of capital going abroad to build plants for the assembly of goods to be sent back to the United States, capital would come home to expand our domestic industries and create American jobs. The deep tax cuts on investment and savings that the new customs revenue would finance would make America the most attractive investment site of all the industrial democracies.

PRIVATE BANK LOANS: Although America cannot and ought not impose controls on the foreign loans or investments of America's big banks, all investment banks, mutual funds, and pension funds should be put on notice: the next time there is another default, another Mexico, another meltdown in Asia, those who made the profits take the loss. This is neither harsh nor punitive. Private banks and overseas investors must begin to realize that there is no global bankruptcy court to bail them out. Once they know their investments are no longer risk-free, the market will solve this problem.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND FOREIGN LENDING: Again, the tariffs, which would wipe out the admission-free access that foreign countries now have to the American market, would have a chilling effect on the plans of transnational corporations to invest abroad or to move factories abroad. Comparative advantage would come home.

FOREIGN AID: Annual wealth transfers to foreign regimes like Egypt ($18 billion in cash reserves), Israel (a median income above $16,000), Greece, Turkey, Russia, and Pakistan make little sense. The Cold War is over; it is time for relics like foreign aid to be entombed. We cannot bribe nations to embrace free enterprise, and we ought not to pay nations not to fight one another. Far more serious is backdoor foreign aid, the tens of billions of dollars funneled yearly to foreign regimes through the IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, etc. These relics of our "Marshall Plan mentality" have become global-socialist centers for the redistribution of American wealth. Why should American taxpayers guarantee loans to India or China, the leading beneficiaries of the World Bank? If these governments have worthwhile projects, let them finance the projects themselves, like we did when we were a developing nation. American-taxpayer guarantees for World Bank and IMF loans reward nations whose policies rarely merit such rewards.

OVERSEAS DEFENSE EXPENDITURES: John Foster Dulles once said that a day was coming when the United States would have to conduct an "agonizing reappraisal" of commitments to defend nations that refused to bear their fair share of the cost of their own defense. With the Cold War over, that reappraisal is long overdue. NATO should not be expanded; new nations should not be added to the roster of those we are already committed to defending. And Europe should begin to bear the full economic cost of its own defense. While the United States retains a vital interest in preventing a hostile regime—that of a Hitler or Stalin—from overrunning Europe, that threat has never been more remote: England and France have nuclear deterrents; Germany is united and democratic; Russia is smaller than it was in the days of Peter the Great. No threat to any vital American interest remotely exists in Europe. It is time to bring American troops home and revise NATO so that America is no longer committed to go to war because some ancient border has been breached or because a forgotten trip wire has been activated in some forsaken corner of the old continent. The proper role of America in Europe is not to be a front-line fighting state but to be the "strategic reserve" of the West. America must restore to itself full constitutional freedom to decide when, where, and whether to involve itself in Europe's 21st-century wars.

The new relationship of America with Europe should be modeled on our *military* relationship with Israel. Where the Israelis provide the troops to maintain their own defense, the United States provides access to advanced weapons. Israel gives us no veto over what it does in its own interests, and we give Israel no ironclad guarantee that any war that Israel decides to fight will be our war as well.

In Asia, the great threat to stability and security is almost certain to come from China. But Beijing is already contained by geography: Islam to the west; a nuclear-armed Russia to the north; India and Vietnam to the south; Korea, Japan, and the American fleet to the east. Any Chinese military move would trigger an arms race across East Asia. Here, again, the United States should play the role of the arsenal of democracy and sell to the nations of Asia the modern weapons they need to resist intimidation or defend against Beijing's encroachments—while those nations provide the troops themselves. No more Koreas, no more Vietnams.

When the nations of Europe and Asia understand that they, not we, are primarily responsible for their security, they will cease acting like dependencies and begin acting like independent nations. It is past time for prosperous allies to begin paying the cost of their own defense. Defense of the West can thus begin to enhance, rather than drain, America's vitality.

ILLICIT DRUGS: Seventy to eighty percent of the marijuana and cocaine entering the United States, to destroy the soul of America's young, passes through Mexico. To secure our southern border from this deadly traffic, we should cancel that provision of NAFTA which permits Mexican trucks on America's highways. Second, we should expand the U.S. Border Patrol. Third, we should lengthen the triple fence already built at San Diego, which has begun to cut back illegal immigration and complicate life for drug smugglers. Fourth, we should demand of Mexico greater cooperation in running down narcotics traffickers, and greater freedom and protection for American agents operating in Mexico. Finally, though the U.S. military does not belong in a policing role, American troops brought home from abroad should be moved to a southern border that is certain to be a crisis area in the 21st century.

ILLICIT WEALTH TRANSFERS TO EVADE TAXES: The scores of billions of dollars in tariff revenue should be used to eliminate taxes on savings, capital gains, and inheritances. With taxes on capital at zero in the United States, departed capital would come running home and new capital would come pouring in. Finally, the Republican Party should heed Mises' advice:

> No party platform is to be considered as satisfactory that does not contain the following point: As the prosperity of the nation and the height of wage rates depend on a con-

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tinual increase in the capital invested in its plants, mines and farms, it is one of the foremost tasks of good government to remove all obstacles that hinder the accumulation and investment of new capital.

Strategic Independence

At the end of World War II, the United States had a nearly autarkic industrial base; we produced everything needed for our national defense. That day is gone. In 1982, we began to run manufacturing trade deficits; by 1986, deficits in the trade of high-technology goods. American dependence on foreign sources for items critical to our advanced weapons systems has created a vulnerability unknown since doughboys had to use French artillery and tanks, British machine guns, and Allied planes—even though our own Wright brothers had invented the airplane. A decade ago, Admiral James Lyons, commander of the U.S. Pacific forces, warned, "All of the critical components of our modern weapons systems, which involve our F-16s and F/A 18s, our M-1 tanks, our military computers—and I could go on and on—come from East Asian industries. . . . Some day, we might view that with concern and rightly so." Lyons was echoed five years later by a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe, Jr.:

> The Gulf War was unique because America enjoyed the unanimous support of all its allies. Even so, cooperation was difficult. . . . The U.S. defense industrial base is already in danger of becoming too dependent upon foreign sources for strategic supplies. What if the next time we are called upon to respond, our allies decide it is in their best interest to sit it out?

Former Commerce official Erik R. Pages writes of the difficulties to which Crowe alluded:

> The Bush Administration was forced to intervene with foreign governments on over thirty occasions to guarantee delivery of critical military parts. As one high-level administration official commented, "If the foreign governments were neutral or were not disposed to help us out, we could have run into some real problems. We were sweating bullets over it and the military was sweating bullets too."

Peacetime America may ignore such concerns; but it is a dangerous vulnerability when technology is vital to national power, crucial to military victory, and essential to saving the lives of Americans sent into combat. (We got a glimpse of what might happen during Vietnam, when Japan withheld the transfer of Sony TV cameras for missile guidance.) Foreigners today control the American companies responsible for the heat shield of the D-5 Trident missile and the flight controls of the B-2 bomber, the F-117 Stealth, and the F-22—the backbone of the 21st-century Air Force.

Overseas factories are far more vulnerable to espionage, labor problems, sabotage, political dictation, and attack by enemy or terrorist forces. There is no guarantee that American secrets are safe abroad. A clear and present danger exists when corporations with allegiance to no country gain virtual monopolies over items critical to American security. During World War II, Stalin's spies and our own homegrown traitors looted vital defense secrets, including those related to the atom bomb. Given this experience, for us to allow technology indispensable to our security to be kept outside the United States, vulnerable to theft or denial, is foolhardy. The time to end foreign military dependence is when new weapons systems are in the design stage. America should guarantee that no foreign dependency is built into any future generations of weapons. When it comes to technology vital to national defense, "Buy American" and "Made in the USA" are the rules that should apply.

The world is a dynamic place. No nation can ground its security in existing technological superiority. Superpowers that rest on their laurels invite the fate of the first global powers of the modern era: Holland and Spain. When former Treasury Secretary Richard Darman blurted, "Why do we want a semiconductor industry? We don't want some kind of industrial policy in this country. If our guys can't hack it, let 'em go," his was the smug voice of the elites of numerous nations that are no longer counted as great.

Unfortunately, President Clinton subscribes to the Darman view. His administration is outsourcing to foreign producers more components of American weapons systems than ever before. This penny-wise, pound-foolish policy strikes at the heart of American security and independence and ignores a truth taught by Adam Smith: "The great object of the political economy of every country is to increase the wealth and the power of that country." ©

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American Nationalism and Western Civilization

The Limits of Buchananism

by John O'Sullivan



Igor Kopelnitsky

Any exploration of American nationalism must begin with the National Question: "Is there such a thing as the American people? And if so, what is it?" Most people do not ask such questions. A Frenchman does not wonder if he is French, nor the Pole if he is Polish, nor—notoriously—the Serb if he is Serbian. He knows very well that he is what he is, and he has little or no difficulty in distinguishing himself from somebody else with a different national identity.

Such questions of identity typically signal a conflict—whether a conflict within the individual soul or an actual donnybrook in the streets. When an Ulsterman declares defiantly that he is British, it is probably in response to the assertion of Irish nationalists that to be an Ulsterman signifies not a national identity different from the Irish one but merely a cultural or regional "tradition" within it. Similarly, when a Canadian intellectual describes his national identity as consisting of the landscape and extensive social services—what might be called soil and bloodlessness—it is because he is papering over a conflict between two real national identities, the French Quebecker and the English Canadian. And when someone describes himself as a European, it means either that he is in Asia or Africa at the time, or that he is an employee of the European Commission in Brussels.

These three cases are, of course, very different. The Ulsterman is resisting an identity that is being thrust upon him; the Canadian intellectual has lost an identity and is looking for a replacement, preferably one without any embarrassingly "patriotic" or provincial overtones; and the "European" has invented a new one and is trying to impose it on other people. But all three cases illustrate that a national identity, however real and deeply rooted, can suddenly find itself up against a question mark. It can go from the realm of necessity into that of freedom—in everyday language, it can cease to seem natural and taken for granted and come to seem artificial and a matter of choice.

When it does so, the result will be inner doubt and unhappiness and social, political, legal, and constitutional conflict. Existing institutions that were props of the old national identity will be criticized as the *ancien régime*, and new institutions will be brought into being to express the new identities that are being shaped and perhaps pressed upon people. Something very like this is now happening in the United Kingdom with the proposals for a Scottish parliament, for judicial review on the American model, and for the subordination of Parliament to a European legal system being introduced by Mr. Blair's Labour government. Indeed, Britain's serviceable unwritten constitution is now routinely dismissed as the *ancien régime*, and Mr. Blair boasts that Britain is being "re-branded" internationally as "Cool Britannia." All of which suggests that the British are being transformed from a nation of shopkeepers into one of advertising copywriters.

The national question in the United States is now very evidently on the political agenda—though no politician will admit it openly. We can tell this easily enough by reading the newspapers or watching television. Let me take a few examples, chosen at random:

1) A rally in Los Angeles opposing Proposition 187 four years ago featured thousands of people waving Mexican flags. Proposition 187 nonetheless passed by a large majority. It was then held up until last December by a federal judge who first refused to rule upon it at all—which meant that her ruling could not be reversed on appeal—

John O'Sullivan is the former editor of National Review. *This article is based on a speech he gave at last year's John Randolph Club meeting.*

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and then declared it unconstitutional. In March of this year, she not only confirmed but extended her ruling; she mandated the governor of California to send letters to the managers of public services instructing them that the law was invalid. This scarcely seems necessary. Proposition 187 has not yet been enforced anywhere, and the likelihood is that it never will be.

2) Legislation has been introduced to outlaw the African practice of female genital mutilation, unknown in America until a few years ago. A correspondence in the *New York Times* pitted feminist critics of this practice against multiculturalists who defended it on the familiar grounds of cultural relativism. Of course, clitorectomy is entirely inconsistent with traditional American cultural norms. But the multiculturalists reply that American culture is merely one participant in a national conversation now marked by cultural diversity. It can no longer expect a privileged position. Their argument failed on this occasion because it was opposed by the even more powerful cultural force of feminism.

3) A federal appeals court on the West Coast declared unconstitutional an Arizona law (passed by popular referendum) that English should be the sole language used in official state business. Judge Stephen Reinhardt ruled absurdly that a civil servant had a right under the First Amendment to deal with her colleagues and members of the public in her own language, namely Spanish. The Supreme Court later overturned this decision, but the law is still under challenge in the state courts. And we can take little comfort from the fact that manifest cultural absurdities go all the way to the Supreme Court before being slapped down.

4) The *Wall Street Journal* ran an op-ed in March supporting the concept of dual citizenship—and pointing to the fact that millions of Americans now claim it. "Beginning this Saturday, a new Mexican law will enable Americans of Mexican ancestry to regain or retain Mexican citizenship. The law will shortly create an estimated five million dual nationals, mainly in California." This example is spawning imitators. Large immigrant communities, the article goes on to tell us, from Asian nations like South Korea and India are pressing their home governments to do the same.

5) The U.S. soccer team, defeated in its gold cup match against Mexico in Los Angeles, was showered with water bombs, beer, bottles, and garbage by a crowd of 90,000 people. Whistles, horns, hooting, and booing drowned out the national anthem. People rooting for the U.S. team or waving the Stars and Stripes received angry stares and had garbage thrown at them. One team-player remarked: "We were treated better when we played down there [in Mexico City]."

What these examples suggest is that the American nation is being replaced by a plethora of little nations, with their own cultures and identities and—most significant of all—languages. The common culture and common sense of nationhood which once served to unite Americans are now beginning to decay. And the law and politics are limping along behind these new social realities.

Immigration, Americanism, and the New Class

How has this come about? The first cause is the high and continuing level of immigration that began in the late 60's following the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act. Since I have written at length elsewhere on the effects of immigration on national identity (see in particular "Why Kemp and Bennett are Wrong on Immigration," *National Review*, November 21, 1994), I will not dwell extensively on the same points here. Briefly, however, continuing high levels of immigration undermine America's identity in three ways.

First, immigration strengthens and reinforces ethnic subcultures in American society. The arrival of more people who speak languages other than English, for instance, means that non-English-speakers already here will have less incentive to learn the language of Americans. Cultural ghettoes that might otherwise be absorbed into the surrounding American culture survive and even expand.

Second, the arrival of more people from different cultures sharpens the sense of ethnic difference among native-born Americans. Historically, high levels of immigration have stimulated the rise of movements and ideologies that emphasize differences among non-immigrant ethnics, notably Horace Kallen's cultural pluralism and today's "diversity." And these tend to be hostile to the concept of a distinctive but encompassing American identity.

Third, by juxtaposing American culture to immigrant cultures, immigration can make it seem arbitrary, irrational, and even oppressive. It becomes merely the "Anglo" culture whose rules and conventions are thought to be alien to immigrants and cannot be imposed upon them. Nor is this argument wholly fanciful: some immigrants have been harshly treated for following the rules of their traditional societies, such as the two Pakistani husbands whose arranged marriages with under-age brides led to their imprisonment. But placing immigrant cultures on the same level as American culture produces still worse results. We gradually drift in the direction of a society in which only a few abstract legal rules unite a variety of peoples who, culturally speaking, live in different worlds.

These problems highlight the second underlying cause of the erosion of America's national unity—foolish and unhistorical concepts of American nationhood. I am not referring to multiculturalism—the theory that America is a legal and constitutional umbrella which shelters not individual Americans but different ethnic groups and nationalities. On this theory, the American people as such does not exist; in its place are the American *peoples*—the ethnic identities which properly attract the primary allegiance of U.S. citizens. This doctrine is now taught in American schools under the new (and only slightly amended) history standards, and its consequences are now clear. For instance, Lani Guinier argues for a constitution which vests rights not in individuals but in ethnic groups, and which therefore requires the assent of a majority of each group for major legislation. The constitutional implication of such a theory would be, as our Vice President has wittily put it, that *e pluribus unum* means "out of one—many."

But multiculturalism—though undoubtedly foolish and unhistorical—is not the *cause* of America's Balkanization. It would be more accurate to say that multiculturalism is part of

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the *process* of Balkanization—one aspect of the deconstruction of the country, even perhaps an epiphenomenal response to a dissolution that was already occurring. The owl of Minerva takes flight at dusk, and multiculturalism is, if anything, a lagging indicator of the country's plight.

The theory of American nationhood responsible for this collapse is the idea that America is an idea. On this view, Americans are not Americans by virtue of being born into the community of Americans and thereafter shaped by American upbringing and culture. Indeed, it is commonly said that there is no common American culture, still less an American ethnicity, to shape and unite them. Rather, Americans are defined by their allegiance to a set of liberal political principles, notably liberty and equality, outlined in the Declaration of Independence and embodied in the Constitution.

Thus Edward Luttwak writes in *The Endangered American Dream*:

> Americans have no shared national culture to unite them as the French or Italians have—there are many different cultures in our pluralist society. Nor can Americans rely on ethnic solidarity alone, as the Japanese say they can—we have many different ethnic origins. What Americans have in common are their shared beliefs, above all in equality of opportunity in the pursuit of affluence.

Robert Bartley, the editor of the *Wall Street Journal*, recently wrote in *National Review* that "America is a nation-state united not by ethnicity but by truths we assert to be self-evident." And Mark Falcoff summed up this view in *Commentary* as follows: "Uniquely among nations, America is a 'proposition country'; it has no history and identity apart from certain eighteenth-century political notions embodied in its Constitution and Common Law."

> The national question in the United States is now very evidently on the political agenda—though no politician will admit it openly.

But if your identity is defined by a constitution, what happens when the constitution changes? A famous *Punch* cartoon shows an Englishman in a public library asking for a copy of the French constitution. "I am sorry, sir," the librarian replies, "but we do not stock periodicals." Now, the French have resolved any dilemma here with characteristic Gallic logic: their constitution has no influence on how France is governed. But in America, the Constitution is held in reverence—which has enabled the courts in particular, and the political system in general, to embark upon a re-shaping of American society and American nationhood. Thus, as Michael Lind reports in *The Next American Nation*, the Office of Management and Budget in 1973 promulgated Statistical Directive Number 13, which divided Americans into five ethnic groups for the purpose of allocating benefits and disadvantages under affirmative action. Over time, these have become the basis for everything from racial preferences in college admissions to FBI statistics on "Hate Crimes" to the drawing of election districts under the Voting Rights Act. And in multiculturalist theory, they are the first faltering steps toward a vision of America as a federation of ethnic and national groups.

In short, the theory of America-as-an-idea is a Trojan horse concealing the concept of a multiculturalist America. If Americans are united not by a sense of common nationhood and a common culture but merely by liberal political ideas, then there is no reason why American culture should be privileged as the culture of the entire people. It would merely be the culture, language, customs, etc., of one ethnic group—one ethnic group among many competing for attention and respect in the public square. And all that would be required of another ethnic culture seeking equal recognition in schools, the voting booth, and the workplace would be that it conform broadly to the liberal political ideas of the Declaration.

But what would happen to American ideas in the process? You cannot sever philosophy from its surrounding culture and expect it to develop along the lines of that culture. The ideas of liberty and equality in the Declaration of Independence were the distilled essence of a much broader and richer culture including songs, stories, poems, customs, folkways, shared historical experience, and the mystic chords of memory. Americans who had no interest in political ideas as such were nonetheless shaped by that culture—by the lived experience of a free life—into a different sort of people from the inhabitants of closed, traditional, or despotic societies. As Paul Johnson points out in his recent history of the American people, in the century up to 1776, a man might earn enough by his labor to buy a family farm and establish his independence. In these circumstances, Lockean liberty and the words of the Declaration were simply an eloquent statement of the common sense of ordinary Americans, and the U.S. Constitution constituted their standing orders.

All this would change in a political environment of multiculturalism. Liberal ideas would be increasingly deprived of the cultural soil in which they grew and which gave them meaning in political debate, court decisions, and local customs. They would develop new meanings, sometimes radically at odds with their old ones. They would be increasingly defined by the courts so as to reconcile them with new versions of common sense—namely, that all cultures have equal status except when one clashes with feminism, or that separation of church and state means separation of religion and society, or that political equality means different rights for different classes of people.

In the end, the ideas of the Declaration and the clauses of the Constitution would conform to the tenets of multiculturalism rather than the other way around. The task of redefining America's ideas would place enormous power in the hands of those whose business is words and ideas. And here we come to the third underlying cause of America's identity crisis: multiculturalism is more than merely a lagging response to a Balkanized America; it is also a political strategy employed by the New Class of liberal social regulators to divide and rule other Americans.

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The New Class is a term that was invented by Yugoslav writer (and former apparatchik) Milovan Djilas. It described the bureaucratic class which ruled and prospered under communism by taking state and "public" property for its own private use. This concept—also known later as the nomenklatura—was capable of more general application, and Irving Kristol, Seymour Martin Lipset, and other (generally neoconservative) social critics in the 1970's applied it to the United States and to the conditions of late capitalism to describe the non-technical "intelligentsia" which controls the bureaucracy, the courts, federal agencies, the media, and cultural institutions. This class is united not only by common interests but also—and more importantly—by a common concept of those interests. In everyday life, these are the imperatives of liberal politics.

One of the most prominent analysts of this class and its politics, to whom I must pay tribute, is Samuel Francis. In *Chronicles* and in his most recent book, *Revolution from the Middle*, Dr. Francis describes his theories as being based on those of Donald Warren, but one can also detect the strong influence of James Burnham, in particular his once-famous book, *The Managerial Revolution*. The managerial class which Burnham identified has changed its politics in numerous ways since the early 40's, when he first sketched out his thesis, but it has steadily increased its power and influence. Burnham correctly analyzed this trend at the time, but he was mistaken about its short-term direction, and he exaggerated the degree to which it had already succeeded in conquering society. Overall, however, the Burnhamite analysis, especially in the hands of Dr. Francis, has proved extremely prescient and fruitful.

Recently, this New Class has seen that the way to extend its power is to divide Americans into different tribes so that it can then step forward as the mediator of their disputes, keeping the peace by transferring resources from one tribe to another as necessity dictates. This policy of divide-and-rule is perhaps most explicit and most entrenched in the structures of affirmative action. But it achieved a *reductio ad absurdum* in the reactions of the Democrats when the Democratic National Committee was caught soliciting funds illegally from Asian donors and laundering them through Asian-Americans. The Democrats sought to avoid responsibility for their own crimes by accusing their critics of hostility to Asians. To an extent, they succeeded—but at the heavy cost of adding to the ethnic tensions of American society.

America's distinctive nationhood, therefore, is being subverted by three factors in combination: a widely accepted theory of American nationality, which leaves it vulnerable to multiculturalist attacks; continuing high levels of immigration, which *inter alia* make multiculturalism plausible to ordinary people; and the existence of a class with a political interest in dividing America along ethnic and other lines. If these are the problems, then the answer seems reasonably clear: we must restore a traditional understanding of the American people as a distinct nation—with its own history, language, culture, and institutions—as the basis for a new nationalist politics.

My Nationalism—Right and Wrong

Any attempt to forge a new nationalist politics will naturally reveal our differences. After all, nationalist postures have been struck at various times by people as strikingly different as Bill Clinton, Ross Perot, Edward Luttwak, Dick Gephardt, and Norman Podhoretz. But none of these has devised a package of nationalist policies that could be convincingly presented to voters as the solution to America's identity crisis. Only Patrick Buchanan has done this, with his "America First" agenda. It consists of three basic appeals: protectionism; the restriction of immigration (and opposition to multiculturalism and bilingualism); and a foreign policy restricting America's participation in international organizations such as NATO and the United Nations in order to preserve American sovereignty.

This package of measures has already shown considerable (if minority) appeal in the Buchanan campaigns of 1992 and 1996. It was originally bolstered by the rise of Ross Perot, who echoed some of Buchanan's themes (if somewhat timidly and incoherently). It has recently been given fresh energy by the arrival of a new labor union leadership which is more aggressive, more prepared to spend money, and more willing to back protectionist policies than was the George Meany/Lane Kirkland leadership of the AFL-CIO. Above all, Buchananite nationalism has been given a major boost by the defeat of fast-track legislation in the closing months of 1997. So it seems likely that nationalist politics—at least on the right—will go down the Buchanan route. And because much of what follows will be critical of Buchananism, I should acknowledge that (in his *National Interest* article, "America First—and Second, and Third") Pat Buchanan was the first major figure to see that post-Cold War politics would be radically different from what went before, that nationalism would revive almost everywhere following the collapse of the last great secular religion, and that it would have to be accommodated by Western governments and political parties, especially those on the right.

The main problem, unfortunately, is that Buchananism has got its priorities wrong. It has consistently emphasized its weakest policy (protectionism) over its strongest (restricting immigration). It has ignored the likely consequences of protectionism, pointing instead to its popularity—even though a popular policy that cannot deliver the goods will soon become unpopular and ruin the larger politics of which it is an expression. It is building a political coalition which is not only riven by more serious disputes than both the existing parties but which has elements that are hostile to the revival of American nationhood on every issue outside the narrow and secondary realm of economics. And its foreign policy of "America First" is a response to a temporary situation of American predominance in world affairs and does not take into account the dangers posed by a future of five or six competing superpowers. These are serious flaws. Do they look so disabling in detail?

Take immigration. Together with the related issues of multiculturalism and bilingualism, immigration is potentially the strongest card in nationalist politics. Its great advantage as a political issue is that it is directly and visibly linked to America's crisis of nationhood. That link is a matter of common observation and common sense, and it does not have to be established by a long chain of reasoning—except, of course, to intellectuals. Moreover, it is an issue where the cure is plainly the opposite of the cause. Restricting immigration would rapidly begin to cure America's crisis of identity, as it did in the inter-war years, by shrinking linguistic and cultural enclaves and giving their inhabitants a strong practical incentive to assimilate. Above all, restricting immigration is a policy which imposes no serious costs on the American people. The recent report of the National Academy of Sciences found that the net economic benefit of immigration to native-born Americans was extremely low—between one to ten billion dollars annually in an almost

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eight-trillion dollar economy. But the fiscal loss to Americans from immigration ranges from about $250 per family annually in New Jersey to well over $1,200 per average Californian family. And poor Americans are more likely to be economically hurt by immigration than are the rich.

It is not surprising, therefore, that mass immigration is an unpopular policy. Going back well over 40 years in opinion polls, two-thirds of the American people have been consistently in favor of less immigration, with one-tenth favoring more, and one-fifth happy with the existing level. More significantly, however, the better informed people are about the level of immigration, the less likely they are to support it and the more likely they are to favor a reduction. And finally—the mark of a very strong political issue—there is no competition lurking in the wings ready to swoop in and seize the issue once it has been shown to be a vote-winner. As with racial preferences, the Democrats are deterred by the nature of their coalition from embracing immigration reform.

Even better from a Buchananite standpoint, the GOP—which seemed likely a few years ago to take up the cause of immigration restriction—has now reversed positions completely. In recent months, it has legalized the status of hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants, and Senator Spencer Abraham (R-MI) now proposes to increase the immigration quota for skilled workers without reducing other quotas. As a recent article in the *New Republic* conceded, if high levels of legal immigration are now politically entrenched, the GOP must be given the credit. So Mr. Buchanan has monopolistic control of the powerful immigration issue if he cares to raise it.

Yet he and his supporters have placed much less stress on immigration than on protection. So how well does *that* play as an issue?

Let me concede at once that a conservative in good conscience can still be a protectionist. Indeed, in the hundred years up to 1945, protectionism was almost the defining characteristic of conservatism, since a conservative was someone who disliked the social upheavals caused by liberal economics and who sought tariff protection as one defense against them. But even classical liberals were prepared to allow some tariff protection; many regarded it as simply another tax—undesirable like all taxes but not to be sharply distinguished from them; and Adam Smith accepted that some industries might have to be protected for strategic reasons. So I sympathize with those conservatives who resent being told by establishment conservatives that they are illegitimate because they favor protectionism. They may indeed be mistaken—as I think they are—but they have every right to call themselves conservatives. After all, conservatives believe that most of us are mistaken most of the time.

But what kind of political allies will protectionist conservatives attract? The main candidates are John Sweeney and the left wing of the labor movement. But examine the kind of labor movement Mr. Sweeney represents. Far from rebuilding American nationhood, he is rebuilding the labor movement along multicultural lines by recruiting immigrant workers into the public sector. In these circumstances, the success of protectionism would strengthen not the American worker but the left wing of the Democratic Party, which is actively hostile to the idea of a united American people and to any serious kind of nationalist politics. At the same time, protectionism divides the American right—and not just the grassroots from the establishment, as the comforting myth has it. Many good conservatives—notably Peter Brimelow—are free traders as well as nationalists. They believe that protectionism will weaken the American economy in the long run; that other measures, notably immigration reform, would better strengthen the social fabric; and that a protectionist campaign would be politically quixotic. It makes neither political nor economic sense for nationalist conservatives to divide the right in order to become the junior partner in an unpopular coalition.

It's the Civilization, Stupid

There is an alternative approach which should commend itself to nationalists who have studied the real history of protectionism. This is for the United States to forge a transatlantic free trade agreement with the European Community and Eastern Europe (the so-called TAFTA), perhaps leading eventually to a full-scale Atlantic Economic Community. Like the expanding continental economy of 19th-century America, such a bloc would in effect combine the benefits of free trade and protectionism (at least insofar as the member-states maintained their existing levels of protection). Since the levels of income, regulation, and welfare are broadly comparable on both sides of the Atlantic, free trade between them would not cause significant job loss, factory closings, or other economic upheavals (though, by the same token, the gains in economic efficiency would be lower). And the trading bloc thus created would represent such a large percentage of world trade—more than half—that it could virtually dictate trading practices to China, Japan, and the rest of the world in return for easier access to its market.

Almost the only economic objection to such a deal—though Mr. Buchanan might not see it as one—is that it would obstruct progress to genuinely global free trade achieved through the World Trade Organization. But the idea that global free trade is likely to be achieved in the next quarter-century was wildly optimistic even before the recent Asian crashes. It is now utopian and therefore no longer a serious objection to Atlantic free trade in the medium-term. Of course, if and when an Atlantic Economic Community is created, the argument between free traders and protectionists will presumably re-emerge around such questions as whether it should have a common external tariff and, if so, at what level. My own sympathies will be with the free traders. But no conservative should feel himself obliged to solve the hypothetical problems of future generations. We have to leave our children something to do.

Nor is the case for an Atlantic Community limited to trade and economics. It would have healthy effects in at least three other areas of policy. First, it would strengthen the defense and diplomatic links with our European allies in NATO, links which in recent years have been undermined by frequent trade disputes across the Atlantic. Second, by strengthening those links, it would re-affirm America's identity as the second great branch of European civilization and weaken as well the fissiparous pressures of multiculturalism described above. And, third, although an Atlantic Community would not mandate free movement of labor on the European model, its provisions would probably include some kind of immigration preference for the citizens of member-states. This, in turn, would increase the percentage of immigrants with good education and valuable work-skills. It should not be (but is) necessary to add that none of this has any racial implications since neither cultures nor skills are genetically transmitted, and since most Atlantic countries already have substantial ethnic minorities which are

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culturally assimilated and whose members would be eligible for any immigration preference equally with other citizens.

But nationalist conservatives, especially those attracted by Mr. Buchanan's "America First" foreign policy, will be suspicious that a combination of NATO and TAFTA would be a potentially entangling alliance. They will want to know if such a long-term strategic commitment is in America's interest—especially since the United States faces no serious threats with the end of the Cold War. Would it not encourage America to embark on a policy of global intervention in a crusade for democracy, and inevitably infringe on American sovereignty already under threat from Clinton's multilateralism and such U.N. ventures as the Kyoto treaty on carbon emissions?

These are reasonable questions. But the answers point in some surprising directions. To begin with, the belief that—with the end of the Cold War—the United States should retreat from its former alliances is itself a variant of the "lonely superpower" hubris which nationalist conservatives rightly criticize in neoconservatives. America's current predominance is artificial and temporary. New superpowers such as China, a resurgent Russia, a federal Europe, and possibly an Islamic bloc will emerge in the course of the next century. No one of them will be the equal of America, but several of them together could pose a threat. The danger of such a world will be greatly magnified if a federal Europe pursues an independent course (and alliances) in foreign policy. On the other hand, an Atlantic Community, built upon NATO and TAFTA, would be sufficiently powerful to deter any threat to its interests and to discourage any alliance against itself. It would not be a departure from past American diplomacy, but the continuation and "deepening" of a bipartisan foreign policy pursued since 1949.

As for global interventionism, an American-led Atlantic bloc would deter it by making it unnecessary. After all, intervention is an admission of failure—the failure of diplomacy, threats, and superpower prestige. The aim of statesmanship should be to safeguard American interests without intervention (which is often costly and unpopular at home). But the more powerful the bloc—and an Atlantic Community would be extremely powerful—the less likely any member of it would need to safeguard its interests by military means. Ideological interventionism ("making the world safe for democracy") would face a different obstacle: the restraining opposition of America's allies. Nations dislike adventurism by their allies because it might involve them in trouble. Their cautionary restraints can be frustrating at times. This explains why some neoconservatives were impatient with NATO during the Cold War and today are, in effect, global isolationists. But a conservative statesman should welcome the fact that allies are available to urge second thoughts, to offer mediation, and to suggest alternative remedies to force—provided he retains the national sovereignty to reject those restraints when he deems action vital.

But would not a Leviathan as large as an Atlantic Community represent a threat to American sovereignty? Although superficially plausible, this argument glosses over a vital distinction between *inter*nationalism and *supra*nationalism. Organizations like the European Union (even when they are weak) and treaties like the Kyoto treaty on carbon emissions (even when they are tentative) are nonetheless hostile to national sovereignty in principle because they seek to bind member-states to accept their decisions on unknowable matters in advance. They make nation-states into their agents. That is the essence of *supra*nationalism. Organizations like NATO, however, either define narrowly and in advance the areas in which future collective decisions will be binding or allow member-states either to block, or to abstain from, such future decisions. International organizations remain the agents of nation-states. That is the essence of *inter*nationalism. The two concepts are as different as chalk and cheese. An Atlantic Community, like NATO itself, would be an international organization rather than a supranational one. The reasons for this are practical, political, economic, and civilizational.

It simply would not be practical to construct a tightly administered, supranational organization out of more than 20 countries of varying levels of economic development stretching from San Francisco to the Ukrainian border. Even the supranational ambitions of the much smaller and more homogeneous European Union—a single currency, harmonization of taxes and regulation, regional subsidies—have imposed enormous costs on member-states, delayed the accession of Central and Eastern Europe, and may yet cause the EU to founder. No one wants another Maastricht for Europe; it would be sheer fantasy as the basis for an Atlantic Community.

Politically, an Atlantic Community is attractive to both Europe and America precisely because it would be a liberal structure of inter-governmental cooperation in which each nation would control its own affairs. Europeans know from their experience of NATO that the United States has no hegemonic ambitions for itself (indeed, the main anxiety of Europeans is that the Yanks will go home), but that its presence is a guarantee against the potential hegemony of—let's pick a nation at random—the Germans. And as the world's leading power, the United States has no interest in subordinating its sovereignty to any international institution. (The State Department may, of course, take a different view.)

Economically, an Atlantic Community would mean, as Adam Smith pointed out, that "the different states into which a great continent was divided would so far resemble the different provinces of a vast empire." For free trade means that the larger market required for economies of scale does not itself require a larger state. Economic efficiency can be combined with political decentralization. Only socialists believe that the market and the state must be co-terminous. The member-states of an Atlantic free trade group would therefore be economically sovereign. Of course, if they exercised that sovereignty foolishly (e.g., by imposing regulations or raising taxes above the Atlantic norm), they would suffer for it with either capital flight or a brain drain. But under conditions of political decentralization, that would be left for the national government to solve.

Finally, an Atlantic Community would be the current expression of a civilizational reality. After almost 50 years of American leadership of a more or less united West (with Eastern Europe looking enviously on from the wrong side of the barricades), both Americans and Europeans have developed a sense of common kinship and destiny. Nor does it hurt that our defense and diplomatic interests are likely to coincide in the coming century. Of course, any civilizational loyalty is bound to be thin gruel in comparison with the hard stuff of patriotism and national allegiance—and rightly so. But there is no contradiction between them; rather, they are at different points of a progression from family loyalty to ultimate religious obligation. Both American nationalism and the Western cultural identity are historically and culturally well grounded, and their current erosion would quickly be halted by sensible public policy and courageous civic leadership.

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Cowboy Capitalism

Lessons From the Asian Meltdown

by Alfred E. Eckes

Igor Kopelnitsky

As the Asian financial and currency crisis spun out of control, the world glimpsed the dark side of the new international economic order. It is highly efficient—linking global markets for goods and money—but dangerously unstable and asymmetrical.

For speculators, traders, bankers, and tycoons, there are unlimited opportunities to make money in the global economy. They buy and sell currencies, lend and invest in equity markets and real estate. For many of them, whatever the risks, it is a win-win situation. They profit from their gains, and when the bubble bursts, as it did in Thailand and South Korea, the International Monetary Fund steps in with bail-outs. Anxious to restore stability and market confidence, the IMF allows local officials to collectivize private losses and cushions lenders from the consequences of their mistakes.

For the common people, the global system works quite differently when things go wrong. The IMF prescribes a deflationary program for the debtor country that forces up interest rates, cuts government spending, and boosts unemployment. Since the IMF typically insists that developing countries open capital markets and privatize industries, many in developing countries consider it a front for expanding Wall Street influence and American interference.

Of course, the economic internationalists who back the Clinton administration's efforts to make the world safe for Wall Street and multinationals have a different interpretation. In times of economic crisis, they say, the world's most powerful economy has special responsibilities for managing the global economic system. America has a duty, they assert, to act as both the lender and importer of last resort. The first obligation means making dollars available to underwrite the IMF, restore confidence in currencies, and avoid widespread defaults. The second—strict adherence to unilateral free trade—offers a way for debtors to export their way to financial recovery and to pay off debts.

In the current financial crisis, this means that the United States, with a huge current-account deficit of $166 billion, will shoulder most of the adjustment burden. Although Western Europe and Japan have current account surpluses totaling over $200 billion, only America is prepared to act as the locomotive for the global economy. When the subject of burden-sharing comes up, European and Japanese officials drag their feet. Citing Europe's 18 million unemployed and the problems of expanding the European Union and adopting the euro currency, Jacques Santer, president of the European Commission, bluntly told Asia: "Everyone has to put his own house in order."

Japan seems incapable of action. Despite extensive investment and trade ties with Southeast Asia, Japan has been slow to stimulate its economy in a way certain to boost imports from other Asian countries. Part of the problem is that both the Europeans and the Japanese know that America's internationalist leadership will pay any price and accept any burden for the sake of sustaining the open economic order. Washington has done that since 1945.

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It is no different in 1998. In February, Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat explained our "special responsibilities" to the Senate Finance Committee. Referring to the "burdens" of American leadership, he warned that "leadership is not divisible. We cannot lead on critical security issues, or in opening markets, while abdicating the lead in the sometimes messy work of maintaining the international financial system."

What does this "messy work" mean for ordinary Americans? The economic internationalists like to boast about individual Americans reaping vast short-term consumer benefits from cheaper imports. With low unemployment rates in the United States, they foresee little negative impact on American workers when imports flood the domestic market.

The test of this faith will come during the second half of 1998, as imports soar. Imports dislocated 10-12 million workers over the last quarter-century, and if history holds, many unskilled American workers will have little to cheer. Large numbers of them will pay for the Asian economic debacle with their own jobs.

An Economic Policy Institute study estimates that the Asian crisis will have "severe economic consequences for the United States." It is likely to increase America's merchandise trade deficit from nearly $200 billion in 1997 to $300 or $400 billion within 24 months. If so, the United States will lose from 700,000 to 1.5 million jobs in manufacturing and other tradable goods industries. The EPI study anticipates losing as many as 337,468 jobs in industrial machinery and equipment, 244,051 jobs in electronic and electrical equipment, and 196,387 positions in textiles and apparel.

From 30 years of intense import competition, America's blue-collar workers know full well that they pay the costs of America's global leadership. Since 1970, surging imports have ravaged one industrial sector after another, forcing lay-offs and plant closings while suppressing earnings. Wages and earnings have stagnated. While wage stagnation has many roots, most Americans believe—correctly, in my view—that cheap imports are a significant part of the problem.

For the professional class, which strongly espouses economic internationalism, globalization has had no apparent down side—yet. Professionals—like college professors—are generally insulated from the cold winds of global competition, or have the skills to adapt easily to new opportunities. The result is a more skewed pattern of income distribution, with the top fifth of families increasing their share of total income from 40.9 percent in 1970 to 46.5 percent in 1995. All other quintiles have experienced a decline in their shares, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.

No wonder so many middle-class Americans have grown disenchanted with the American political system, and cast presidential votes for Ross Perot, Jerry Brown, and Pat Buchanan in recent presidential elections. Public opinion polls show that a majority of Americans soured on free trade 30 years ago, at the end of the Kennedy Round. But the majority in Congress did not awaken to this reality until the NAFTA debate in 1993 made free trade votes radioactive.

Four years later, in the autumn of 1997, trade skeptics finally won a key round, and their bipartisan victory ricocheted around the New World Order. Congress declined to surrender more trade negotiating authority to the White House, voted down a proposal to extend NAFTA benefits to Caribbean Basin countries, rejected $3 billion in funding for the IMF, and refused to pay money supposedly due to the United Nations.

These setbacks did not discourage President Clinton and Wall Street. Having committed a half-century to creating the New World Order, economic internationalists had no disposition to abandon their agenda without more political combat. Corporate America's response to Congress's declaration of independence was an unusual *démarche*. It carried the signatures of two ex-Presidents (Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford), two former Secretaries of State (Warren Christopher and Henry Kissinger), two ex-chairmen of the Federal Reserve, and 100 of the corporate elite. Buying two full pages in the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*, they demanded "American leadership on key global issues." They insisted that Congress fund the IMF with $18 billion, pay another $1 billion in back dues to the United Nations, impose no restrictions on the use of the Treasury's $40 billion exchange stabilization fund, and approve new "fast track" trade negotiating authority to help President Clinton "maintain, strengthen, and expand market-opening initiatives." In effect, this elite group sent a blunt message to grassroots democracy: don't interfere with the global market; don't challenge America's global leadership responsibilities; don't mess with the United Nations system.

Such bulldozer tactics may prevail in the short run. But protracted instability in Asia suggests that the financial crisis was neither an aberration nor an isolated incident. It is part of an emerging pattern of vulnerabilities that surfaced in the early 1980's and intensified after the United States and Western Europe deregulated financial markets and embraced the New World Order.

Paradoxically, the IMF, the designated vehicle for rescue operations, has exacerbated problems with cookie-cutter solutions intended to hasten the spread of global financial markets and harmonize standards. The Asian crisis erupted in July 1997 after the IMF publicly counseled Thailand to allow some currency depreciation. This advice raised questions among debtors in Thailand about the government's continuing commitment to a fixed exchange rate with the dollar. Not surprisingly, local banks and companies with dollar debts promptly began buying dollars, turning an orderly depreciation into a rout.

In November, when the IMF insisted on higher interest rates in Indonesia, a similar panic ensued. This set off a flight to safety that crippled the banking system and had disastrous social consequences—panic buying, hoarding, food and race riots, and strikes. Later, the IMF conceded its prescriptions had backfired and attempted to modify the adjustment program. From an historical perspective, it is ironic that the New World Economic Order, the brainchild of cerebral internationalist lawyers and economists, has proven so brittle and vulnerable. With the memory of earlier economic crises—the Great Depression and the economic nationalism that preceded World War II—on their minds, these internationalists set out during World War II to build the structure for a more stable international system. Under the United Nations' flag, they created the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) to address exchange rate and payment issues, and pressed for a World Trade Organization to facilitate trade liberalization.

The incremental internationalists argued that nations must cede some sovereignty in order to avoid the types of political and economic instability that ignited the last global war. To contain dysfunctional nationalism, they proposed to create a

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peaceful and prosperous world based on the twin foundations of free trade in money and goods, and mandatory dispute settlement mechanisms. These would bind nations together, making war impossible, while achieving the blessings of economic specialization and growth. Run by professional lawyers and economists, the New World Order would be a utopia benefiting mankind and promoting peace, growth, and prosperity. Or so they thought.

As the Asian crisis unfolded over the past year, Karl Marx must have been laughing in his grave. Unlike the economic apologists for the New World Economic Order, he forecast long ago that the free trade panacea would produce chaos and the collapse of capitalism. Speaking in Brussels in 1848, he argued that the free trade system was "destructive." "It breaks up old nationalities and pushes the antagonism of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie to the extreme point. In a word, the free trade system hastens the social revolution." Hoping to overthrow the capitalist system, Marx himself *endorsed* free trade. Of course, Marx's rigid, dialectical analysis contained many flaws. Based on the European experience, it over-emphasized class antagonism between workers and employers. It neglected other sources of conflict such as race, ethnicity, and nationalism. Perspicacious as he was, Marx could not foresee that rapid advances in technology would so improve communications and transportation that global corporations would succeed in transforming and extending the capitalist system in a global economy.

Nonetheless, Marx—far better than most modern economic theorists—grasped the dark side of the free trade order. He understood that unregulated capitalism produced, along with great efficiency and dynamic growth, disruptions and dislocations. This volatility presented unique opportunities for revolutionaries like himself to mobilize the disaffected. In his own way, he thus anticipated some of the fundamental problems of an open global economy in which vast multinational corporations and speculators shift plants, jobs, and money from country to country to arbitrage differences in labor costs and interest rates. In the New World Economic Order, unskilled labor becomes a fungible, disposable commodity subject to the whims of corporate managers obsessed with the need to boost shareholder value and to satisfy huge investment funds. Stakeholders—workers, families, communities, and nations—have diminished standing.

Three significant lessons emerge from the Asian financial crisis. First, like the protectionists and isolationists of the interwar period who carried nationalism to excess, the incremental economic internationalists have created an unnecessary glut of globalism. Ordinary people do want the freedom to travel abroad, sample other cultures, and buy foreign goods, if they choose. But they have little desire to abandon national sovereignty, relinquish their own culture, integrate markets, and harmonize standards simply for the convenience of rootless traders, speculators, and multinational corporations. This is the message from Canada, where citizens want to preserve their distinctive culture from assault by American media giants; from Germany, where the public is skeptical of a single European currency; and from Southeast Asia, where leaders like Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia play to nationalistic sentiments in denouncing the disruptive actions of foreign speculators.

Even some international economists are coming to recognize that globalization has gone too far. Dani Rodrik of Harvard University notes that globalization can lead to social disintegration. He concedes that the efficiency benefits of further reductions in existing trade barriers are "unlikely to be large." He admits that "the dirty little secret of international economics is that a tiny bit of protection reduces efficiency only a tiny bit." Blaming a "Wall Street-Treasury complex" for pushing its agenda of unregulated capital mobility, Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University notes that this form of free trade is inherently crisis prone.

A second lesson is that the open global system is no utopia. Along with beneficial gains from wider markets and greater efficiency come asymmetrical burdens and pernicious consequences. For well-paid and well-educated bureaucrats who work for the IMF and help manage the system, the global economy may seem a win-win situation. The global bureaucrats have considerable job security; the international lawyers prosper in good times and bad; the IMF endures from one crisis to the next, helping to preserve the system. But for common people vulnerable to boom-and-bust cycles, the economic gains come with substantial down-side losses and social disruption.

For the American people, the hidden burdens of global leadership are especially heavy. Losses include suppressed real economic growth and incomes, as well as social dislocations of workers, families, and communities. America's persistent current-account deficit, which has exceeded $1.5 trillion in the last 15 years, is a future vulnerability. More dollars now circulate outside the United States than within. Over the long term, the glut of dollars may become a measure of weakness far more than a symbol of strength. It is possible to imagine a situation in the early 21st century when the overvalued dollar ignites a flight to safety. Investors may prefer to diversify their reserves with the new European currency, or a new Asian regional currency, or even scamper back to gold.

Finally, the Asian crisis offers a broader lesson regarding the relevance of the state in an era of market economics. True, some laissez-faire enthusiasts interpret recent events as demonstrating the triumph of free markets over Asian-style crony capitalism and regulated markets. *Business Week* has asserted that "Asians have confused corruption and cronyism with capitalism and 'Asian values' for too long." It was time "for Asia to transform its autocratic, command-and-control societies into democratic, flexible, market-driven economies." The *Wall Street Journal* offers a similar interpretation. But many Asians have second thoughts about the march to globalism. They note that the economies least touched by the conflagration—China and India—control capital flows. Their conclusion: governments can, and must, regulate capital markets. As a result, China is likely to move slowly in pressing its claim for membership in the World Trade Organization and in deregulating its economy to the whims of the global market. In Southeast Asia, countries talk of regional clearing arrangements to facilitate trade in local currencies rather than the dollar.

Looking back at the present period from the vantage point of another generation, the great irony may be a simple one. Economic internationalists, who relentlessly pressed for creation of an international economic order during the half-century after World War II, may awaken to discover that the real enemy of peace and prosperity was not a revival of 1930's-style protectionism but an open, volatile, and unregulated system that invited the excesses of cowboy capitalism. Without effective national buffers, global markets became a transmission belt for disruptive forces. In effect, the economic internationalists met the enemy and discovered, as Pogo did, that "they is us."

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Buchananism: Two Opinions

The Great Betrayal: How American Sovereignty and Social Justice Are Being Sacrificed to the Gods of the Global Economy
by Patrick J. Buchanan
New York: Little, Brown;
376 pp., $22.95

Free Trade, Free Slaves
by William R. Hawkins

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The United States owes its origin to the trade wars of early modern Europe but its success to the Industrial Revolution, which filled America with productive, largely self-sufficient people. The history of the United States is testimony that economic growth has not occurred uniformly around the world. Some nations and empires have risen, some have fallen; others have done both, while yet others have stagnated. Compare the Pacific Rim with sub-Saharan Africa, or the countries on either side of the Rio Grande. Not only the prosperity but the security and independence of communities have depended on their relationship to a turbulent economic world. This endless struggle is the subject of Pat Buchanan's *The Great Betrayal.*

Buchanan's title refers to the irresponsible management of American policymakers who believe "free trade" will automatically allocate capital and other resources fairly and efficiently across the globe. Some commentators embrace

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this naive notion with a passion bordering on religious idolatry; others employ free trade rhetoric as a mask for their pursuit of power, while managing trade policy to their own benefit. Yet free trade has never been very persuasive on its merits. What Alexander Hamilton wrote over two centuries ago remains true today: "There are some who maintain that trade will regulate itself, [but] this is one of those speculative paradoxes . . . rejected by every man acquainted with commercial history." Buchanan traces the effect of free trade not only on the United States but on Europe and Asia as well.

The "invisible hand" does not brandish the flag of any nation in particular; it is the responsibility of statesmen to devise economic policies that support national objectives against the ambitions of rivals. The abandonment of this duty by American policymakers, the switch from protectionism and internal improvement to "free trade" and interdependence, does not proceed solely from the New Deal and Franklin Roosevelt's successors; its great impetus has come from the reorientation of finance and industrial capitalism. When corporations were national in character, they had a symbiotic relationship with government. Generally, whatever produced an increase in private wealth augmented national wealth as well. Firms used exports to supplement their dominance of the home market and directed foreign investment to secure raw materials and gain access to overseas markets, assuring that trade, indeed, followed the flag. Beginning in the 1970's, however, this system was altered by the rise of the "global factory" directed by transnational firms spreading their operations across numerous countries: in the new economic era, maximizing a firm's profits no longer means maximizing the wealth of any particular country. These transnational corporations are the power promoting the political shift from "protectionism" to "free trade"; they have even abandoned such words as "trade" and "exports" and speak instead of "integration," implicitly rejecting the notion of separate national economies. Walter Wriston, former chairman of Citicorp Bank, has argued that since business no longer respects territory, sovereignty is of diminishing value. Buchanan quotes from Wriston's book *The Twilight of Sovereignty*: "When a system of national

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economies linked by government-regulated trade is replaced . . . by an increasingly integrated global economy beyond the reach of national regulation, power changes hands." Unfortunately, the new hands care nothing about America.

Production networks, joint ventures, and other business alliances no longer parallel geopolitical alliances as they once did. A century ago, the French government could support its national firms and investors in their development of Russia's infrastructure within a system of alliances. Fifty years ago, the United States could do the same with the Marshall Plan and NATO. Today, American firms are lured to China, a strategic rival of the United States. Beijing then pressures American businesses to advocate appeasement policies to protect their investments, and so the flag is now expected to follow trade—even when that trade is manipulated by a foreign power.

Business today operates outside the bounds of the national community. Yet the duty of government remains what it has always been: to maximize the wealth, security, and well-being of its citizens. A permanent, reciprocal relationship between service and allegiance continues to exist. The nation-state has its roots in history, culture, and mutual security—interests far more comprehensive and essential than anything a private corporation can know or acknowledge. Indeed, while few things are as transient as a business deal or workplace loyalty, democracy strengthens national bonds by making the government directly responsible to citizens of the territorial state.

It does, that is, if democracy is allowed to work. Shutting Congress out of trade negotiations with executive agreements and "fast track" procedures has cleared the field for corporate domination. The transnationals fill trade policy advisory committees. President Clinton's first Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade, Jeffrey Garten, acknowledges that "the executive branch depends almost entirely on business for technical information regarding trade negotiations." A government having no independent capabilities will end up as the junior partner in any endeavors with transnationalists, who do have an agendum. No wonder talks are focused on broad regional or global pacts that give corporations maximum room to maneuver, rather than on bilateral negotiations to secure exclusive advantages for producers based in the United States.

Buchanan cites Wilhelm Röpke's statement that "The market is not everything. It must find its place in a higher order of things. . . . It must be firmly contained within an all-embracing order of society." Conservatives, who once revered Röpke, should also remember his fellow Austrian economic philosopher, Joseph Schumpeter, who warned that "the ledger and the cost calculation absorb and confine. . . . [The businessman] is ill equipped to face the problems, both domestic and international, that have normally to be faced by a country of any importance." Even the largest corporations seem small by comparison with the greater American society and its economy. Yet their lobbies exert enormous power within the smaller society of the Washington Beltway: here is the Achilles' heel of the American polity. That a few million dollars spread around between political campaigns, think tanks, and lobbyists can influence the leadership of a superpower with an eight trillion dollar economy should give pause to the most enthusiastic believer in representative government.

Buchanan's policy prescriptions are meant to redirect economic activity from overseas to America. Given the magnitude of the task, they are actually quite modest. The core of his proposal is a 15 percent across-the-board revenue tariff on manufactured goods intended to give domestic producers a small advantage over foreign imports. This would be supplemented by a wage-equalization tariff imposed on products whose main competitive advantage comes from the use of cheap labor—an idea that goes back as far as Teddy Roosevelt. Though Buchanan's program is being denounced by critics as "extreme," the real problem is that it may not go far enough.

Robert Bartley of the *Wall Street Journal* attacks a straw man in asserting Buchanan's tariffs to be "new taxes." In fact, Buchanan plans to use the revenue gained from foreign imports to replace taxes levied on American wages and salaries. This strategy would provide a double incentive: with production overseas more heavily taxed than production in the United States, transnational firms would find encouragement to locate operations here. Buchanan wants to reverse the trend begun by Woodrow Wilson when he imposed the income tax while cutting tariffs. Indeed, every new

The Great Betrayal

"No site better captures yesterday's America than Detroit, forge and furnace of the arsenal of democracy. Detroit is the burned-out case of American cities. The Empire of the Sun has its revenge. Japanese imports helped kill the city that built the weapons that destroyed the empire. Now grandsons of soldiers of the imperial army work at high-paying manufacturing jobs once held by the fathers of ten-dollar-an-hour retail clerks in Macomb County.

"But why blame the Japanese? We did it to ourselves. . . . It is not Japan's fault, China's fault, or Mexico's fault that Middle America has been abandoned, that our manufacturing base has shriveled, that foreigners make the things Americans once made for themselves. It is our fault. Like rich and pampered children who never worked for their inheritance, we listened to cloistered academics peddling pet theories and squandered an estate that was the awe of mankind. As we noisily boast of America's 'leadership,' tough-minded rivals laugh behind our backs and loot us blind on the road to the end of the American Century."

—*Patrick J. Buchanan on the end of the American Century.*

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trade agreement implemented by Congress requires higher domestic taxes to stay within the budget plan.

The new mobility of capital has nullified the argument that "protectionism" reduces competition. Companies can set up factories nearly anywhere. Buchanan's program would not discriminate between competing firms: "Toyotas made here would compete with Fords made here, and Toyotas made in Mexico would compete with Fords made in Mexico." Buchanan is in accord with Daniel Webster who said, "I am looking not for a law such as will benefit capitalists—they can take care of themselves—but for a law that shall induce capitalists to invest their capital in such a manner as to occupy and employ American labor."

Foreign firms which develop a better product or process can still gain a competitive edge—thereby goading their American rivals to greater efforts of their own. Persuading foreign firms to locate in the United States will actually speed the dissemination of new technology faster than importing goods will—an insight other nations incorporated in their trade policies years ago. By contrast, competition based on cheap foreign labor may retard technological progress by discouraging necessary investment in research and development.

John O'Sullivan, former editor of *National Review*, has branded "post-nationalism" as "a religion of the New Class elites." According to this creed, multiculturalism, transnational institutions, and the global economy have made nations and patriotism obsolete. "Republicans are tempted toward post-nationalism," warns O'Sullivan, "because they feel dimly that it is implied by the logic of free trade." O'Sullivan would like to break this tie, but "free trade," embodying every flaw in the liberal doctrine, has been a central tenet of liberalism from the time of Voltaire and Kant to that of Wilson and Clinton. Buchanan addresses each of these flaws in turn and exposes them. His book is necessary reading for all those who want to conserve our sovereign United States. ◈

Utopia Incorporated

by Justin Raimondo

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In *The Great Betrayal*, Pat Buchanan vividly recalls the genesis of his transformation from Reaganite free-trader to prophet of protectionism. The scene is the James River Paper Mill in New Hampshire, in the depths of the 1991 recession: presidential candidate Buchanan, arriving to shake hands with the workers, learns that new layoffs have just been announced. "As I walked the line, they said nothing. Then I extended my hand to a hard-looking worker about my own age who was staring at the plant floor. I grabbed his hand and told him who I was; he looked up, stared me in the eye, and said in an anguished voice: 'Save our jobs!'" The incident haunted him for days, but "what could I do?" Then, like a ray of light through parted clouds, the answer came in the form of a news story in the *Manchester Union Leader* about plans being made by the U.S. Export-Import Bank to finance a new paper mill in Mexico. "*What are we doing to our own people*? I asked myself."

A good question, but one having nothing to do with free trade versus protectionism. For the injustice is not that the

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paper mill owner is laying off workers (one hopes that the author's hostility to capitalism has not reached the point where he would dispute the owner's right to hire and fire), but that American workers are being forced to subsidize their own competition. Buchanan's anecdote points to one reason why the Ex-Im Bank should be abolished, without suggesting anything about the benefits of protectionism. Indeed, although his book ostensibly deals with economic issues, Buchanan admits that he is not concerned chiefly—or even primarily—with economics. "If there is a lesson central to this book," he avers, "it is this: The economy is *not* the country, and the country comes first." Forget about the accumulated insights of Bastiat, Mises, Hayek, and Rothbard; forget economic science, he bids us, and behold the Vision of the James River Paper Mill. Buchanan's disdain for economics is one of the main themes of the book: "While an unfettered free market is the most efficient mechanism for distributing the goods of a nation," he writes, "there are higher values than efficiency."

If the higher good Buchanan has in mind is the national well-being, it will not be served by building a tariff wall. The imposition of tariffs will not raise productivity or increase the general wealth, since trade barriers favor only certain producing interests and their employees at the expense of the rest of us. American Company X, selling computers at $2,000 apiece, must compete with Japanese Company Y, which sells computers of comparable quality for half that price. The lobbyist for Company X, threatening the loss of his workers' jobs, demands a tariff. With the tariff passed, the owners of Company X are now part of a cartel enjoying monopoly prices, while its employees also are better off, for the time being at least: they are still employed, and at wage rates that compare favorably with the national average. Everyone else, however—buyers of computers in particular—is out of the $1,000 he might have saved had the tariff not been enacted. The effect of this $1,000 loss is dispersed and unseen, consisting of the purchases *not* made, the jobs *not* created, the resources *not* allocated to a particular economic area—these having been previously redistributed to the owners and employees of Company X. If 10,000 jobs were "saved" by the tariff, then 10,000 jobs in other areas were lost.

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But the "saving" of Company X is a visible result, whereas the corresponding loss to other areas of the economy is invisible: thus the demagogic appeal of protectionism.

What of the "infant industries" argument, which holds that new industries cannot survive to maturity if left unprotected by a tariff wall? American consumers, forced to subsidize this privileged cartel, would still be out the difference between monopoly prices and free market rates. These young industries would survive, but at the price of diminished productivity and efficiency. Labor, land, and capital would be diverted away from their most efficacious uses to areas in which they are less efficient, producing in this way major structural distortions in the economy. In the end, even the owners and employees of Company X, caught up in the economic downturn, would lose out.

But this is just "theory," Buchanan insists: experience tells a different story. Referring us to history, he claims that the greatest surges in American economic development occurred during the protectionist era, roughly 1865 to 1914. This period, however, was also a time untroubled by war, untouched by regulators, and unfamiliar with the social pathology characteristic of modern life. The coincidence of tariffs with general prosperity proves nothing.

The Great Betrayal

"Do we Americans believe in . . . a world of open borders and untrammeled trade, where nations fade away in the brilliant dawn of a new world order? Or do we hold to the grand old ideas of sovereignty and independence for which our Founding Fathers risked their lives, fortunes, and sacred honor? It's time to choose. Nor can the decision be put off much longer, or it will be made by default. Not to decide is to decide. . . . Unless we intervene to halt this momentum and recapture our country, America will wake up like Gulliver, tied down forever, our destiny no longer ours to decide."

—Patrick J. Buchanan on choosing our destiny.

While Buchanan advocates tariffs low enough as not to dry up revenue, one gets the distinct impression that he opposes international trade *per se* and would be happiest if it did not exist at all, preferring "self-sufficiency"—a goal which, in the end, seems more aesthetic than practical. Having quoted with approval Louis XIV's finance minister, Jean Baptiste Colbert, who described trade as "a perpetual and peaceful war of wit and energy among the nations," he opines: "in that war, free trade amounts to unilateral disarmament." Yet trade is not combat but a voluntary contract in which values, not blows, are exchanged. It is the essence not of war but of peace; not mere theory, the giddy imaginings of "cloistered intellectuals," but plain common sense. Consumers act in their own interest: this is axiomatic.

Consumer preferences must not be allowed to "shape the national destiny," Buchanan declares. (Who, then, will shape that destiny: the workers at the James River Paper Mill—or its owners?) For him, consumption itself is morally questionable, a self-indulgence permissible only after a prolonged period of self-denial: "Before an athlete becomes a champion, he must exercise, train, discipline, and deny himself: No athlete ever consumed his way to an Olympic medal." And so the Buchananite program amounts to this: the American people must hunker down, pay monopoly prices to domestic producers, and adopt a stoic asceticism.

Buchanan claims free trade to be an "alien ideology," protectionism being "America's own invention." Yet Alexander Hamilton—another of the author's protectionist heroes—did not invent the so-called American System, which was not American at all but a European import. The system of state-protected industry reached its apogee in 17th-century France during the reign of Louis XIV, under the mercantilist dictatorship of Colbert. In the name of a policy that might be described as "France First," *Colbertisme* lowered the standard of living of the French masses and retarded the development of French industry; under the pretext of preserving the linen, woolen, cloth, and silk industries, Colbert banned printed calicoes imported from India. To guard the privileges of the cartels and the guilds, he mobilized a centralized bureaucracy and sent it into the countryside to spy on consumers of this "alien" cotton textile. (In the next century, the development of innovative cotton textiles sparked the Industrial Revolution: Colbert's trade blockade is one reason why England, not France, was the cradle of that revolution.)

"The classical liberal views economics from the standpoint of the individual," writes Buchanan. "The Marxist sees things in terms of classes; the traditionalist has an organic view of society and subordinates economics to the nation." But economics cannot be "subordinated." The division of labor, the primacy of individuals as the *sole* economic actors, the necessity of trade (both foreign and domestic): these are not floating abstractions but economic facts rooted in natural law. To rebel against them is to be guilty of that "utopianism" Buchanan supposes to be confined to the free trade camp.

Clearly, Pat Buchanan has reached a turning point. His early challenge to conservative orthodoxy in respect of the Gulf War and the "isolationist" implications of "America First" revised the modern conservative credo without abandoning it. This latest ideological excursion, however, takes him further afield and leaves him stranded and scrambling to discover a "nationalist Republican" heritage whose major gods are Hamilton, Lincoln, and Teddy Roosevelt—a pantheon not likely to appeal to his conservative followers. Longtime readers of this magazine have been treated to sympathetic accounts of regionalist and secessionist movements, from Italy's Northern League to the League of the South in the United States. Both are disapprovingly singled out by Buchanan as symptoms of the "deconstruction" of the modern nation-state. On the evidence of this book, the most talented and dynamic leader of the American right is in transition. Where he will go from here is hard to say. Admirers, though—and I count myself among them—ought not to despair: his next book, reportedly on American foreign policy, may yet fulfill the author's promise as the standard-bearer of the Old Right in the new GOP.

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A Good Thing Not to Do

by Edward B. Anderson

Clone: The Road to Dolly, and the Path Ahead
by Gina Kolata
New York: William Morrow; 276 pp., $23.00

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The announcement in February 1997 that British scientists had cloned a sheep turned the medical world upside down. Ian Wilmut and his colleagues had taken cells from an adult sheep's udder and removed the nucleus from each. They then implanted this genetic material into a specially prepared sheep ovum from which the nucleus had been removed. Out of 277 ova, 13 developed into embryos and were implanted into surrogate mother ewes. Twelve miscarried, but one survived: Dolly.

Gina Kolata, a science writer for the *New York Times*, was the first to break the story of Dolly to the American public. To her, when the history of our age is written, "the creation of this little lamb will stand out." Comparing it to, say, the conquest of smallpox doesn't do it justice, she says, for "events that alter our very notion of what it means to be human are few and scattered over the centuries."

Kolata points out the ironic situation of those medical ethicists and theologians who began to examine the implications of cloning in the 1960's, long before it seemed feasible. Scientists told them to stop their frightening talk about human cloning, since it would never happen and since funding for medical research in general could be hurt. Many ethicists, cowed by the charge of impeding medical progress, lost the chance to make an early public case against cloning. George Annas, a Boston University law professor who favors legislation prohibiting human cloning and who testified at a Senate hearing following the Dolly announcement, says "we know where we are going and . . . can ask—for one of the few times in history—do we want to go there?" Yet halting the process will become increasingly difficult. Scientists can manufacture moral excuses and will have the financial motivation to proceed with developing cloning technology, ban or no ban.

We have yet to see the long-term impact of human manipulation of plant and animal genetics; it could be devastating. The scientific trail to Dolly, however, is a fascinating one. It leads through experiments on frog eggs, gene transfers in mice, attempts at making the perfect cow, and, finally, to Wilmut's project of producing whole herds of identical genetically engineered sheep whose milk will produce large quantities of human insulin, blood-clotting agents, and other protein drugs. The ethical questions, however, permeate a different world: that of "advanced assisted reproductive techniques" (infertility treatments) and abortion.

Tracing the relevant histories of molecular biology, embryology, and assisted reproduction, Kolata does a brilliant job of turning highly technical research into accurate and readable prose for the general reader. Her one mention of abortion is related to the cloning variation described by an anonymous physician who proposes to develop the technology whereby a woman incapable of producing any ova has her genes inserted into a donor egg. This cloned embryo could be implanted into her body and allowed to grow, then aborted. The ovaries could be removed from the fetus to harvest the ova (genetically identical to the woman, of course, since the fetus was a clone). One of these ova could be fertilized with her husband's sperm and the resulting embryo implanted into the woman. Both parents thus get to reproduce, overcoming the small problem of the woman's complete infertility.

Although Kolata admits that this "may seem risky and futuristic" and that, "of course, abortion opponents would object," her passing reference to this "strange" proposal is telling. She, like most Americans, fails to understand that abortion-on-demand and "advanced assisted reproductive techniques" such as surrogate mothers, sperm banks, and test-tube conceptions are two sides of the same theoretical coin of absolute reproductive freedom. In practice as in theory, creation and destruction are already entwined in assisted reproduction through the disposal of unwanted embryos in the lab, through "sex-selection" abortion, through "selective pregnancy reduction" to ensure that a woman only has one or two babies rather than octuplets, and through the abortion of genetically abnormal fetuses (which occur in higher numbers with assisted reproduction).

Kolata devotes ample space to the well-reasoned arguments of human cloning opponents. Narcissism, pride, the desire to manipulate one's children, the attempt somehow to escape death, the vanity of wanting to be one's own creator, the danger and immorality of creating cloned people someone hopes to mold and control—all are held up to the light. She even holds out the possibility that we as a society will choose not to clone humans. Yet the widespread and unthinking cultural and political acceptance of both advanced reproduction assistance and abortion makes human cloning inevitable, barring an insurmountable technical hurdle.

Theologian Paul Ramsey says "the good things that men do can be made complete only by the things they refuse to do." Though this is sound advice for our Brave New World, nothing seems more fruitless than a call for self-restraint.

Edward B. Anderson writes from Edmond, Oklahoma.

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The Political Vocation

by Paul Gottfried

Human Dignity and Contemporary Liberalism
by Brad Stetson
Westport, Connecticut: Praeger; 186 pp., $55.00

◆

In his book on declining social morality and the transformations of liberal ideology, Brad Stetson goes after deserving targets. He unmasks the liberalism that holds the media, universities, and the publishing industry in thrall and stresses the will to total domination that accompanies liberal concerns about racism, sexism, self-actualization, and the costs of low self-esteem. For Stetson, these concerns are the basis of an attack against individual responsibility and self-constraint upon which an older, authentic liberalism rested.

The new liberalism seeks to establish the state "as a highly qualified, desired, and efficient supplier of what people need, whether morally or materially." Behind this expanded state lies a "normative vision" which Stetson calls "anthropocentrism," a belief that individuals can do as they please since technology and scientific political management will make the gratification of individual desires possible without the imposition of attendant social and moral duties.

Stetson has much to say in his study that is both correctly stated and transparently true, especially in his comments regarding liberal ethical theory as an elaborate justification for its exponents' vices. It makes sense for theorists to create "universally" applicable arguments to excuse their private weaknesses and for the unrepentantly weak to be drawn to vocations that allow them to ignore and excuse their faults. Stetson's invective against those who misrepresent human dignity expresses a proper sense of moral outrage, and I found myself respecting the author in spite of his failure to break new ground.

For the major—perhaps the exclusive—source of Stetson's critical commentary is movement conservatism. Hence the tedious quotations from George Will, Robert Bork, William Bennett, Dinesh D'Souza, and other conservative celebrities, all of whom assure us that American liberalism lost its way in the 1960's and that multiculturalism, "radical feminism," and a derailed civil rights movement—not the government—are the real causes of America's undoing. Stetson quotes George Will on the danger of conservatives' "blanket disdain for government and hence for the political vocation," and adds his own gloss: "in strongly reacting against statism, [conservatism] risks disabling government, which is an important vehicle for character formation." Moreover, Stetson (again echoing Will) expresses admiration for liberals who participated in the civil rights movement. True to current conservative rhetoric, he attacks excesses and derailments without criticizing the movement itself and trots out such obligatory clichés from "Dr." King as "the content of their character, not the color of their skin."

Stetson fails to consider the *content* of the "liberalism" that he abhors. Instead, he merely provides contemporary illustrations of human depravity. Depravity, of course, is as old as sin, and it is not surprising that a depraved but literate society should create a rationale for its vices. More noteworthy is the overshadowing role played by public administrators, judges, cowed or opportunistic politicians, and their media lackeys in extending the power of the state into every human relationship. But Stetson is reluctant to blame the government for the social disintegration that disturbs him. Such criticism, when it does show up in his book, is directed specifically at the "liberal state," a creation (Stetson explains) of recent times, not to be confused with the "government," which we must not in any way "disable." Unfortunately, most of his well-intentioned distinctions are unfounded. The "liberal state" and the neoconservative "government" bear more than a slight family resemblance, and the civil rights movement of the early 60's became the statist juggernaut of the 70's without losing its base of support or abandoning the intentions of King, who favored both reparations and affirmative action for blacks. The "liberal state," moreover, did *not* begin the project of modifying social behavior in the 60's and 70's: it was moving in that direction as early as the Progressive Era and the New Deal. Though Stetson may view favorably the beginnings of this process to create a more "democratic citizenry," these may fairly be seen as preliminary stages of the "liberal state."

Like other conservative critics of contemporary liberalism, Stetson never explains why ordinary people accept bullying control over their lives. While the liberal state and the media do raise self-esteem for certain marginalized "victims," they also vilify white, Eurocentric, heterosexual Christian civilization and treat white Southerners as the descendants of bigoted sadists. Though the liberal dispensation makes occasional exceptions for repentant Southerners (in particular for a lecherous but liberal President from Arkansas), it fails as a rule to grant equal dignity, the right to collective self-expression, or even equal protection under the law to members of every group. Clearly some victims are worthier than others; for every one discovered and courted by the therapeutic state, a designated victimizer is identified and punished.

The "liberal state" is more than a perverse Santa Claus, enabling its subjects to behave like irresponsible adolescents. It also judges and damns, shakes down "sexist" and "racist" corporations for hundreds of millions of dollars, and inflicts standards of political correctness upon a disintegrating society. Whatever else it may be, the liberal state is about the exercise of unaccountable power. But why should it give back its power, particularly if it has not met formidable resistance, least of all from "conservatives" like Mr. Stetson?

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Full Circle

by Loxley F. Nichols

Landscapes of the Heart: A Memoir
by Elizabeth Spencer
New York: Random House;
346 pages, $24.00

◆

One of two epigraphs with which Elizabeth Spencer introduces her memoir of growing up in northern Mississippi is taken from the closing sentence of her story, "A Southern Landscape." The narrator, looking back on her hometown from a far remove in place and time, acknowledges her need "of a land, of a sure terrain, of a sort of permanent landscape of the heart," those "things you can count on" like the "gilded hand on the Presbyterian Church in Port Claiborne . . . still pointing to heaven and not to outer space." Miss Spencer's "terrain" is distinctly Southern in flavor. In speaking of what it means to be "Southern," she reminds us that, while a matter of chance rather than choice, it is an identity that marks one for life, no matter where one later resides. In the memoir as in the story, however, "sure terrain" is not only those landmarks or modes of behavior that remain as predictable and unchanging as compass points on the globe; it is the art of writing itself. As Spencer makes clear, writing is the act of *making connections* between the inner and outer worlds of experience, between the past and the present, between the transitory and the permanent. Writing is the constant, the link, by which experience can be made whole. Of her own childhood discovery of the wonder of writing, Spencer recalls, "I stumbled on an amazing truth, which came as a total surprise. A word, one or two or three or more, actually *connects* inner to outer. It joins what is seen to what is there within that sees it. It fixes what is felt."

Elizabeth Spencer's life is her journey from the sheltered world of Teoc, the working plantation of her mother's family, and her home in the tiny hamlet of Carrollton into ever-broadening paths and branching by-ways. Her "circled world" of family and community, which in her early years offers stability and protection, becomes in her adulthood a constricting and entrapping one. Returning home after a two-year sojourn in Italy with the intention of settling in the South for good, Spencer is greeted by the stony silence of parents who can tolerate neither her career as a writer nor her life as a single and independent woman. Although tensions are further heightened by conflicting reactions to the murder of Emmett Till, this family disagreement seems more excuse than reason for Spencer's dictatorial father to sever his tie completely with the daughter he cannot dominate. Devastated by rejection and by the sudden death of her "favored" Uncle Joe, owner of Teoc, Miss Spencer, though gravely ill and at five-foot-eight weighing only 98 pounds, takes ship once again for Rome, this time with no thought of return.

The initial break, the first taste of exile from the "circled world," comes surprisingly early, with her entrance into first grade:

> From then on, life changed in a certain way I could not define, and at home in the afternoons and on weekends I did not feel the same. I missed something but did not know what it was. . . . You can go somewhere, anywhere you want—any day now you'll be able to go to the moon—but you can't ever quite come back. Having gone up a road and entered a building at an appointed hour, I could find no way to come back out of it and feel the same way about my grandfather, ginger cakes, or a new book satchel.

Though Miss Spencer offers a number of such trenchant reflections, perhaps even more effective are her descriptions of the individuals who populate the various milieux she has inhabited. These portraits are often no more than brief tableaux, but Miss Spencer's selection of detail is so acute that the essence, if not the whole, is conveyed, as in this cameo from Spencer's graduate school days at Vanderbilt:

> I came into [Donald Davidson's] office one day, a shy, frail, dark-haired student, to ask timidly if I could request his direction for a thesis on William Butler Yeats. As we were talking, a slim, sensitive-looking man entered from the hallway through the open door of the office. He was wearing a checkered vest and a black velvet jacket. He had an extraordinary face, not at all handsome but arresting, his brow being so high that his features seemed rather minimal beneath it. Mr. Davidson introduced us: "Miss Spencer, this is Allen Tate."

The rest of the encounter is equally dramatic in its rendering of Tate's "sensual, softly slurred" voice and the subtle give-and-take between Tate and Davidson over Miss Spencer and her thesis project. Elizabeth Spencer had been drawn to Vanderbilt by her interest in the Fugitives and the Agrarians—Donald Davidson, in particular. While her profound admiration for the scope of Davidson's intellect and the excellence of his instruction never wavered, their disagreement on racial issues finally proved too deep to be ignored. It was Davidson who set Spencer up with David Clay, the editor responsible for the publication of her first book. Yet, after the publication of her third novel, based on a racial incident from her childhood, Spencer never heard from Davidson again.

Spencer was befriended by, or at least acquainted with, a host of other writers and intellectuals, including Caroline Gordon, John Crowe Ransom, Robert Penn Warren, Eleanor Clark, John Cheever, Walker Percy, William Faulkner, her cousin Stark Young, Elizabeth Bowen, Katherine Anne Porter, Ralph Ellison, and Alberto Moravia. Her most important and enduring friendship, however, continues to be with Eudora Welty, whom she met during her college days at Belhaven College in Jackson, Mississippi. Spencer's comments on such individuals, while deft

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—*from the* Louisville Courier-Journal *(April 28, 1998)*

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

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and illuminating, are often tinged with the melancholy of the loss of some of them to divergent beliefs, to circumstances, and to death.

Indeed, a bittersweet sense of loss pervades (and perhaps justifies) the entire volume. Miss Spencer displays her narrative skills to great advantage as, time and again, she recreates dramatic historical backgrounds as contexts for intimate descriptions of the old families and their old homes in and around Carrollton, often concluding with news of the death or dispersement of the members of those families and the destruction of their homes. The loss through arson of Malmaison, the grand plantation house near Carrollton that very likely served as Faulkner's model for Contalmaison in his story "Mountain Victory," is particularly painful, for author and reader alike. Thus Carrollton, though on the national historic register, is today but a specter of its former self; one resident's musings that "Carrollton is not so much a place as a state of mind" is born out in devastating detail by Spencer. Even so, these narratives sometimes end with ironic twists that are decidedly comic, as in the case of "Miss Beaurie," Carrollton's grand inquisitor in matters of abstinence and propriety, after whose death it was discovered that she had unwittingly allowed her car (while she was in it!) to be used for bootlegging and that she was herself secretly addicted to opium, as an entire closet of empty bottles of paregoric (a derivative of opium) revealed. *Landscapes of the Heart*, in presenting an historical record of a particular community, shows it to have been a microcosm of a region as well as, in a larger sense, of an entire era.

Recalling Thomas Wolfe's title *You Can't Go Home Again*, Spencer comments: "It's not that you can't go home. Rather, there isn't any home to go to." Nevertheless, after 33 years away, Elizabeth Spencer does in fact return to the South. Though Teoc has been lost, her family home in Carrollton sold and cut up into apartments and the furnishings dispersed to cousins, Miss Spencer's odyssey comes full circle when, in 1986, she and her husband John Rusher leave their home in Quebec and move to Chapel Hill, North Carolina, where they continue to make their home today.

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by Samuel Francis

Whose Modernity?

When Pat Buchanan's new book, *The Great Betrayal*, appeared in April, the hysteria that greeted it was entirely predictable. Not only does Mr. Buchanan challenge the free trade orthodoxy that is dominant among economists and policymakers in both political parties, but he also makes clear that the economic nationalism he champions is only a part of a much deeper challenge to the American power structure. His "new nationalism" is thus a bit more than a deviation from economic orthodoxy, and the hysteria that greeted the book was a bit more than the outrage that the guardians of orthodoxy always experience whenever their pet dogmas are found to have made a mess on the living room floor. Especially disturbing to Mr. Buchanan's conservative critics is that this maverick journalist still refuses to shut up and go away and that his views are beginning to blossom into a full-scale political movement with a vision of the nation and its identity radically at odds with that of the chieftains of the "mainstream right." What drove the paranoia about Pat this time was not so much fear of the consequences of his ideas as the grim realization that he and his ideas just might be on the eve of actually having consequences.

The main attack from the right on Mr. Buchanan's book appeared in *National Review* (April 20), with something like a book review by *Wall Street Journal* editor Robert Bartley, followed by a kind of review-essay by the magazine's Washington reporter, Ramesh Ponnuru, followed yet again by a largely sympathetic analysis of the Buchanan political phenomenon by the magazine's ex-editor, John O'Sullivan. The issue sported a cover photograph of Mr. Buchanan during the 1996 Arizona primary wearing a black cowboy hat, holding aloft a hunting rifle, and emitting the irrepressible grin that seems to gloat over the anticipated pleasure of blowing the heads off his adversaries. Although the magazine "tactically" endorsed Mr. Buchanan's presidential efforts in 1992, *National Review* is now edited by Mr. O'Sullivan's successor, Richard Lowry, who makes no secret of his opposition to Mr. Buchanan and his ideas on trade policy, limiting immigration, or an "America First" foreign policy. Devoting the cover story of the magazine to an attack on Buchanan may therefore be read as a declaration of principle by Mr. Lowry as well as a declaration of war against "Buchananism" by the magazine itself, despite the presence of Mr. O'Sullivan's friendly piece.

The kindest thing to say about Mr. Ponnuru's "reporting" is that it is mostly wrong. Devoted mainly to misleading or inaccurate characterizations of Mr. Buchanan's columns opposing the Persian Gulf War, the article sedulously searches out what its author imagines are elementary contradictions and bloopers in Mr. Buchanan's thinking. Seeking to discredit Mr. Buchanan's case against NATO expansion, Mr. Ponnuru smirks that "In the old days, he thought the Soviets would interpret conciliatory moves as weakness; we could help Kremlin doves only by shooting down hawks. Now that Russia is weaker, it's imperative not to provoke her nationalists by expanding NATO." Mr. Ponnuru evidently thinks he's got Mr. Buchanan by the tonsils. Someone needs to explain to him that even though Russian communists and Russian nationalists live in the same country, the former were our enemies whom it was appropriate not to conciliate while the latter are not (at least yet) our enemies, whom it is appropriate not to antagonize by needless threats like an expanded NATO. To those of Mr. Ponnuru's strategic genius, of course, the distinction between enemy and non-enemy is meaningless. What is meaningful is whether Russia and other countries on the global-democratic hit list do what we tell them. That mentality has been a main target of Buchanan and other paleoconservatives ever since the Gulf War, but Mr. Ponnuru still misses the point.

Mr. Ponnuru's piece is perhaps the magazine's concession to old-time Buchanan-bashers who can't forgive him for his wisecrack about the "amen corner" at the time of the Gulf War mass neurosis, but the magazine's *pièce de résistance* is Mr. Bartley's "review," over which old-timers as well as newcomers to Buchanan-bashery will smack their lips. Entitled "The Great Betrayal," the review is less a consideration of the merits of the book (in Mr. Bartley's mind, it has none) than a protracted accusation that Buchanan himself is the real traitor—to American conservatism.

Mr. Bartley has long been one of the main spokesmen for a version of neoconservatism that glories in unrestricted free trade, virtually unlimited immigration, and equally unlimited foreign military intervention for the purpose of "spreading democracy." During the Gulf War, his editorial page hectored the Bush administration not to stop in Kuwait but to go on to Baghdad, overthrow the regime, and establish a "MacArthur regency" that would dispense the lollipops of American democracy, capitalism, and Hollywood culture. Yet Mr. Bartley is no chauvinist. Indeed, in his review, he makes sport with a quotation attributed to him by *National Review* editor Peter Brimelow (and cited by Mr. Buchanan) that "The nation-state is finished." Mr. Bartley claims Mr. Brimelow "put this hyperbolic phrase in my mouth" and that "it bears only a passing resemblance to my views." I have no doubt that Mr. Brimelow quoted him correctly, and the resemblance between the quotation and his views is more than passing.

Mr. Bartley commences his review by recalling that "the initial manifesto of *National Review* famously declared that its posture would be that it 'stands athwart history, yelling stop,'" a posture which he believes was justified by the collapse of Soviet communism. He then rehearses the various elements in the "conservative coalition" that *National Review* built, and the triumph of that coalition in the presidency of Ronald Reagan. But now appears Pat Buchanan and his call to renounce free trade, internationalism, open immigration, and the global economy. We can see how far Mr. Buchanan has strayed by the fact that he quotes approvingly from John Sweeney of the AFL-CIO on the need for an increase in American wages. Indeed, pronounces Mr. Bartley, "Politically, it's difficult to see what Mr. Buchanan's platform has to do with conservatism, except perhaps in the sense that Mr. Sweeney's AFL-CIO is the most reactionary force in American politics

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today."

But nowhere in his book does Mr. Buchanan support the labor union hierarchy that Mr. Bartley so fears. What he does support are the interests of American workers (which the unions sometimes make noises about representing) against those of both foreign competitors and domestic free trade ideologues and the corporate elites, foreign and domestic, that sponsor them. The distinction between supporting unions and supporting the interests of their members sails quite happily past Mr. Bartley's head.

Moreover, Mr. Bartley's characterization of the "conservative coalition" bears little resemblance to what that movement actually thought and advocated. It's true that the coalition was supportive of free trade, but trade policy was never much of an issue for it at all. It's also true that the coalition was generally internationalist, but mainly because of its anti-communism, seeing in the Soviet Union a global menace that ultimately threatened American national security. The old "conservative coalition" never supported the kind of mindless and bellicose internationalism that Mr. Bartley and most neoconservatives advocate: a perpetual crusade to carry the torch of "American democracy" to every nook and cranny of the planet (complete, one might add, with the much-dreaded labor unions that Mr. Bartley's neoconservative social-democrat allies admire).

Nor does Mr. Bartley understand conservatism today. "In our time," he writes, "smaller government is the essence of what we call conservatism." That is simply not true. Conservatism is a defense of a particular way of communal life (what Mr. Buchanan calls "a moral community [that] must share values higher than economic interest"), and while the leviathan state today is certainly one of the main enemies of the American way of life, it is not the only enemy, nor is denying the state the authority to perform its legitimate functions an effective means of conserving our way of life. Restrictions on immigration and protection of national economic interests are governmental measures that can help conserve the national way of life. Moreover, the test of what is and is not "big [i.e., illegitimate] government" in the American way of life is not the ideology of classical liberalism or "anarcho-capitalism" but the U.S. Constitution, which explicitly authorizes federal regulation of foreign commerce and implicitly authorizes immigration control. Neither action lies beyond the legitimate scope of the federal government, and therefore neither constitutes "big government."

Yet despite Mr. Bartley's historical illiteracy, his tactic is a clever one. Previous attacks on Pat Buchanan came mainly from neoconservatives who never voiced any interest in the ideal of "standing athwart history and yelling stop" but who denounced him precisely because he was too much a conservative of the old school. But by associating himself with the old conservatism, Mr. Bartley is trying to deny that label to Buchanan and indeed to claim that Buchanan himself is the defector. While the neocons attack Buchanan for being "too far to the right," Mr. Bartley attacks him for having nothing to do with the right.

But this dog won't hunt. Quite aside from his misunderstanding of what the old "conservative coalition" believed, Mr. Bartley's rhetoric and beliefs betray his allegiances, which, in a word, are to liberalism. It is no accident that Mr. Bartley's editorial page (and most "mainstream" conservatives) in the last several years have devoted themselves to defending virtually every major trade and foreign policy proposal advanced by the Clinton administration. The *Journal* (and for that matter, *National Review*) has supported Clinton on NAFTA, the World Trade Organization, and sending American troops to Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. They support Bill Clinton today on NATO expansion, and Mr. Bartley has pushed for an immigration policy all but indistinguishable from that of Clinton, Ted Kennedy, and the National Lawyers Guild. Yet here he squats, squealing that the real traitor to conservatism is Pat Buchanan.

As for where Mr. Bartley stands, he makes his posture entirely clear. Denouncing Mr. Buchanan's "thumping the drum for a kind of tribal solidarity in the name of 'sovereignty,'" he writes: "We globalists view this as a rejection of modernity. Mr. Buchanan proposes to stand athwart not only the march of Communism, but also powerful trends driven by the information revolution. . . . Attempts to dam up change bear heavy costs." In short, after affirming the need for conservatives to stand athwart history and cry "stop," Mr. Bartley proceeds to excommunicate Mr. Buchanan for standing athwart history and (eek!) "rejecting modernity." Is it surprising that Mr. Bartley's flawed account of the old "conservative coalition" conveniently omitted Russell Kirk, M.E. Bradford, Richard Weaver, and other conservative thinkers whose ideas centered precisely on the rejection of modernity? He does try to conscript Whittaker Chambers, but Chambers was perhaps the most radically anti-modernist of all.

That it is a fairly conventional liberalism to which Mr. Bartley subscribes and which he has confused with conservatism is clear not only in his rejection of the nation-state and its "tribal solidarity" and in his affirmation of political and cultural universalism, but also from his reliance on the very code words and epithets by which the left has always sought to deny legitimacy to the right. Buchanan is aligned with "reactionary forces"; historical trends of which Mr. Bartley approves are irresistible; any ideas that question their irresistibility are simply dismissed with sneers as irrationalism and the product of ignorance. This is precisely the way that Arthur Schlesinger and John Kenneth Galbraith used to write about William F. Buckley. If we hear their voices echoed in Mr. Bartley's mouth, that is no accident.

On one matter, Mr. Bartley is partly right. The New Nationalism that Mr. Buchanan advocates is *not* identical to the old conservatism, for the very clear reason that the anti-communism of the old conservatism is now irrelevant. It is irrelevant not because communism has ceased to flourish, but because it is no longer located in the Soviet Union. Communism does indeed flourish, in the premises and assumptions that Mr. Bartley and his neoconservative allies at the *Journal* and *National Review* harbor, and the utopianism and universalism that creep out of those premises and assumptions are indistinguishable from what that great free-trader Karl Marx himself believed was the inevitable future of mankind. When the nation-state is abolished and "we globalists" have excommunicated everyone who resists the march of the New World Order that has replaced it, we will see whether Mr. Buchanan might have had a point after all. Until then, those American conservatives who still reject modernity and want to conserve their nation and its way of life can find no better reason for rejecting what the modern "conservative coalition" now offers than what Mr. Bartley and *National Review* have revealed about where the mainstream in which they swim will carry us.

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Letter From Poland

by Jacek Koronacki

On NATO Expansion

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The expansion of NATO has been hotly debated by American conservatives. As a conservative Catholic Pole living in Poland, I am obviously interested in this debate, not least because Poland and America are part of the same civilization. Any matter of importance to either nation has to be seen within a wider context of the cultural and civilizational challenges faced by the West.

Clearly, One-Worldism—the unholy quest for power around the globe by the anti-Christian managerial elite—has to be stopped. American conservatives, most notably in *Chronicles*, have shown that this dangerous ideology aims at replacing Christianity with the totalitarian utopia of liberal democracy. Some of them—such as Samuel Francis—even sketch a long-term strategy for recapturing America from the managerial establishment. But the basis for their opposition to NATO enlargement is more problematic.

Six years ago, watching Pat Buchanan's campaign for the Republican nomination, I thought his "isolationism" was a proper cure for American imperialism. Moreover, I considered America's withdrawal from Europe to be healthy for a continent corrupted to the core. Regardless of whatever dangers this would pose to Poland and to my family, I saw the American withdrawal as necessary for re-Christianizing the West. (Of course, "isolationism" was to be accompanied by the abolition of the welfare-warfare state in America, and a renewed interest in a strict constructionist view of the Constitution.)

But nothing like this happened. Conservatives proved incapable of (or uninterested in) changing the status quo. These same "conservatives," in a moralizing tone, then protest the expansion of NATO to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. But their opposition is based on a misreading of Russia, both past and present. They believe Russian wrongdoings stem from an unfair distrust of Russia. They allow for some nationalistic, anti-Western, and militaristic tendencies in the Russian bear, but their Russia is an essentially benign, stable, and trustworthy country with strong and vivid cultural ties to Christianity. The problem with this is that such a Russia ceased to exist in the early 13th century, when it was conquered by Mongols. True, the Khans' rule was abolished at the end of the 15th century and, thank God, both the Slavic language and the Orthodox Church survived. Unfortunately, the subjugation of the individual and of the Church to the Mongol-style political, social, and economic order took hold and continues to this day. How can American conservatives and moralists ignore the Russian imperialism of the last centuries?

Of course, a peaceful cooperation with Russia would be welcome. Cooperation is needed, but an unthoughtful appeasement is the worst possible strategy to help Russia rejoin the West. And more time is needed to see that the long period of Russian imperialism is over. NATO expansion (with more Eastern European countries admitted in the future), perhaps followed by NATO's dissolution when the new Russia proves stable and trustworthy, could bring Russia back into the European fold while stabilizing foreign affairs for everyone in the process. In fact, it is one of the necessary conditions of rebuilding the true unity of Europe—East and West—and rediscovering its common roots and cultural and religious heritage. To think that this laudable aim can be achieved by leaving Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest defenseless is preposterous.

Admittedly, whatever the needs of Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest, it does not follow that it is the United States' responsibility to meet them. Indeed, the only legitimate objection to NATO expansion is that it's not an issue for America: Poles, not Americans, should die for Poland. But if this is so, why doesn't America disengage from Europe entirely? Because this is not happening, the refusal to admit Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into NATO can only be seen as the abandonment of these countries to an historically aggressive neighbor.

I neither know nor have the right to deliberate on whether America should help my region, though I personally would consider it a blessing. Only America can decide this. Whether she is still capable (and willing) to think in terms of a wider family of Christian nations, only time will tell.

Jacek Koronacki writes from Warsaw.

Letter From London

by Derek Turner

Picking Up the Conservative Pieces

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Conservatives, with and without an upper case "c," have still not recovered from last year's electoral disaster. Even the drama of the Conservative Party leadership election, and the surprisingly comfortable Conservative victory at the subsequent Uxbridge by-election, have not removed a general feeling on the right of shock and bemusement. Even now we cannot believe that the tedious Mr. Blair is actually Prime Minister (of *Great Britain*!), and that the Cabinet is composed largely of hard-faced women or politically correct dullards, few of whom seem to have said or done anything interesting in their hard, working-class existence as barristers, social workers, teachers, local government officials, and professional feminists.

Although the feeble John Major had done his best to emasculate the philosophy which his party ostensibly represented (how was *he* ever Prime Minister, while we are on the subject?), there was an indefinable feeling which made many of us campaign for his government nonetheless, despite all the broken promises and wasted opportunities, or at least which made us feel guilty about supporting the two anti-European Union parties which took one million votes from the Tories and helped lose them

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several seats. Unfortunately, all the effort was of no use, faced with the public's restlessness, Labour's professionalism, the aura of "sleaziness" hanging over the party, and Mr. Major's own irredeemable dullness. Hundreds of thousands of life-long Conservative activists reluctantly deserted the party, fed up finally with the consistent refusal of the hierarchy to *do* something about crime, Europe, the welfare state, immigration, political correctness, etc., and with the party's general reluctance to *conserve* anything. The Conservative powers-that-were seemed interested only in the economy. Spoiled by power, they almost totally neglected the moral and national questions which interest normal people much more than "competitive tendering," which was all that John Major "wunted." The work that needed to be done was not even attempted. The Conservatives created many petty capitalists and shareholders, but these people did not necessarily—or even ordinarily, it seems—become convinced conservatives. Nobody had thought to educate them in the philosophy of conservatism, so that when Labour made its emotive, attractive appeals to "community" and "justice," few had a ready answer.

Labour's idea for a "stakeholder partnership," a civic (and nationwide, but not *national*) bond based on sub-New Testament platitudes and exulting in its "diversity," sounds good but is actually an enormous weakness. The Conservatives should have opposed this mystical mish-mash with the concept of the nation-state, and come out strongly against Labour's love for the European Union, its fondness for international moralizing and warmongering, its pandering to minorities (whether racial, sexual, religious, or physically disabled) and multiculturalism (which often strays into actual dislike of England), and its fondness for steamrolling tradition. The attempt by powerful Labourites to ban fox hunting is a case in point. It often seems as if Labour does not like anything to do with the countryside—it has already banned the sport of shooting, and it has decided to relax building restrictions in the "Green Belt" areas around our major cities.

There is plenty of scope in all of this for the Conservatives to make headway. Socially conservative, even reactionary, Labour voters in mining villages in south Wales or inner-city areas of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, to take two classic Labour-voting groups, did not vote for the age of homosexual consent to be reduced to 16, but that is what they are likely to get, if the waxing zoophyte caucus within the parliamentary Labour Party has its way. Nor do all Scots and Welsh necessarily want to be parted from England, but this is what they may get, if some powerful Labour ideologues have their way. There are millions of Labour voters who only vote Labour because the alternative party is perceived as being made up of heartless ideologues and Hayekian pedants—and there is some truth in this stereotype, as in all stereotypes. These voters could be parted from their traditional allegiance quite easily, like Southern whites were parted from the Democratic Party in the United States, if only the Conservatives went some way toward meeting them by espousing a new patriotism, a revived and spirited nation and a glorious, unashamed heritage. The Conservatives need a "Southern strategy" of their own.

But new Conservative leader William Hague, although undoubtedly Euro-skeptical, is no charismatic leader, nor are his views very well known (except about homosexual "marriage," which he supports). An MP told me bemusedly that he cannot think of any one idea or concept associated with Hague, for better or worse; this suggested to my contact that there was some essential ingredient missing. Hague is young, however, and is undoubtedly intelligent. He may be amenable to new ideas, unlike his fossiliferous predecessor. But any ideas, even if they were being espoused now, will need time to filter through into the party and then the popular subconscious, let alone into policy proposals. For the time being, the Conservatives are almost certain to focus on any examples of Labour "sleaze" to the exclusion of more important things, thus making themselves look both sour and ungentlemanly.

Who, if anyone, will organize an intellectual counter-revolution, and who will fund it, now that the gallant Sir James Goldsmith is dead? It seems unlikely that it will be anyone outside the party. Sir James's Referendum Party would probably have transformed itself into a campaigning group to work for a "No" vote in the referendum on the Single Currency. It seems unlikely that this work will now go ahead. The other anti-E.U. party which stood at the elections (even against anti-E.U. Tories), the United Kingdom Independence Party, led by an academic from the London School of Economics, appears to be imploding after its disastrous election results, a television program which claimed neo-Nazi infiltration, and an internal split, caused mostly by ideological differences within the party. Such think tanks as there are (John Redwood's Conservative 2000 Foundation has closed, the Centre for Policy Studies is too close to the party hierarchy, and the Adam Smith Institute is working with Labour) are still concentrating on welfare reform and the free market—all very well, but where are the pamphlets on family law reform and tax breaks, crime, nationalism, immigration, the environment, inequality, manners, taste, and abortion, to take just some examples?

The Conservatives must rediscover the spirit of the late 1970's and early 80's, when, as Sir Alfred Sherman put it, "we gave people the idea that ideas counted, and that there was a better way."

Derek Turner is the editor of Right Now!, *published in London.*

Letter From Inner Israel

by Jacob Neusner

Money, Money, Money

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American Jews (like other organized subgroups in American society) do some things superbly well and fail at others. Where we are strong, there is our weakness. When I consider the mistakes we American Jews make, these simple truths explain much. By "mistakes," I refer to enormous, fundamental errors of public policy: the management of Jewish community affairs. Let me point to five, in descending order of importance, all of them effects of a single cause: our excessive admiration for wealth at the expense of all other human virtues.

The greatest mistake we have made is to create a community so expensive that only rich people can play an active role. There is no space for the poor but virtuous or pious person. We have not only

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priced our community life out of the market of ordinary Jews; we also have imposed upon ourselves the dictatorship of wealth. We have built costly institutions of religion and culture. We have undertaken huge fiscal responsibilities to world Jewry and especially to the state of Israel, and we have therefore defined ourselves as financiers of world Judaism. Heavy financial commitments to overseas causes is natural to Americans who, after World War II, undertook responsibility to finance the reconstruction of much of the world and the industrialization of the rest. So the American Jewish community undertook its own Marshall Plan. The combination of expensive local institutions and a massive commitment to overseas Jewries defined the answers to all the questions of virtue and morality that people must answer for themselves. And that meant that the only Jews who would make a difference, who could realize the goals of American Jewry, would be the very richest ones.

The second greatest mistake we have made is to create a community more impressed by style than by substance, by procedure than by program. Everything flows from our generative mistake about the primacy of money. Just as, in our society, people watch out for whom they can sue or be sued by, so in our community people pay more attention to form than content. They build impressive synagogues, which stand empty most of the time. They pay rabbis more money than attention. They hold meetings to discuss holding meetings. They issue press releases and then believe every word. They do this because, in the end, what matters most is money. Given the current President, who can wonder why?

The third greatest mistake we have made is to stop arguing with one another. We paper over differences and no longer try to persuade others through reasoned discourse. Here I refer to the range of Judaisms among us and how they relate. Why make a desert of desiccated discourse and call it consensus? If all that matters is raising this year's budget and next year's increment, we cannot allow differences to intervene. We have to gloss over points subject to controversy and dispute. So within organized Jewry, we place under administrative excommunication whomever passionately believes anything other than the conventional wisdom. By contrast, the Catholic community makes a place for all kinds of people and their aspirations, from those who want to pray from dawn to dusk to those who want to engage in demonstrations on issues of public policy (on pro-life issues, for instance). American Jewry has a place for a single type only—the one who gives and gets others to give—and cannot imagine any other type. For example, if you don't like going to meetings and filling chairs, don't try to participate in American Jewry, which even defines a career in Jewish public life as "sitting in the chairs." This is the Jewish counterpart to the "national conversations" that Washington revels in.

The fourth greatest mistake we have made is to treat "being Jewish" as a personal decision, not as one's engagement and responsibility in a public enterprise. We have privatized Judaism and allowed "Jewish" to refer to merely individual traits and predilections. The "I" replaces the "we." This again derives from the tyranny of the annual campaign for money. Even while undertaking public responsibilities, the Jewish community has defined Jewish norms as personal and private—how much you choose to give—and not as public and communal. Because we do not debate public policy, there is no sense of polity and community, and, as a result, everything is treated as personal and individual. When people sign checks for the Jewish federation, they use the language of "giving," not (as with the Mormons) paying their religious taxes, their tithe; "to give" in our society is to act out of one's own volition. American Jews do not form a voluntary community at all but a collection of individuals who give money to the same causes.

The fifth greatest mistake we have made is to identify the Jewish community with issues of secular politics, so that being a Jew means adopting a certain political agenda. That is to say, when we have finished with the campaign for money, we begin writing letters to our senators and representatives in Congress and finding "Jewish issues" in matters of public policy that have no particular bearing upon our community—pro-abortion, gay rights, and other shibboleths of hard-core radicalism. To state matters differently, among all the many things we can do when we want to "do Jewish," the thing we have chosen, beyond fundraising, is political action. The list of issues to which American Jews commit themselves includes many causes without a particularly Jewish or Judaic foundation at all, and some of the issues on which Jews take positions "as Jews" contradict the commandments of the Torah.

To state the matter as clearly as I can: a far higher proportion of the Jewish community votes for the Democratic Party than observes the Sabbath of Judaism by celebrating light on Friday at sunset. So to be Jewish involves what takes place in public, and not what takes place at home or in private. At the beginning of this century a Russian Jew advised, "Be a Jew at home, and a human being away from home." We American Jews have turned it around: we are Jews in public, and undifferentiated Americans in private.

Why do I think anyone not engaged by Jewry should care about our failings? Because we form a mirror of America. The mistakes we have made are profoundly American; they are the mistakes we Americans generally make. The earliest critic of American culture, Alexis de Tocqueville, picked out the same qualities in his journey through early republican America: practicality, contentiousness in matters of law and procedure, a preference for fact over theory and consensus over contention, individualism, and a preoccupation with politics.

So make no mistake—our weaknesses point to our strengths. These contradictory yet complementary qualities form the vices of a free people working in an open society and a free economy. Quite naturally, we Jewish Americans have

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made these Jewish vices too. But the same traits stand also for our distinctively American (and particularly Jewish) virtues, the ones that we have learned in the American context. Our vices and their counterpart virtues—generosity, efficiency, practicality, initiative, organizational effectiveness—define how we are both American and Jewish. We are the Jewish species of the American genus, Jewish Americans, much more than we are the American species of the Jewish genus, American Jews.

We have made Jewish—deeply, characteristically, quintessentially Jewish—some of the finest virtues of our country and its culture. In our Jewishness and in our distinctively American Judaism, we embody America. In other words, our pathos is our power, our virtue defines our vice. And it explains why I am proud to be who and what I am: part of a free and generous nation, which knows how to change the world.

Jacob Neusner is Distinguished Research Professor at the University of South Florida and a professor of religion at Bard College.

Letter From Rome

by Andrei Navrozov

More Wine, Professor?

◆

There may not be a word for "home" in French, philosophizes Twain in *The Innocents Abroad*, but "considering that they have the article itself in such an attractive aspect, they ought to manage to get along without the word." Who has not seen semantic peculiarities insinuate themselves, with the facility of cognac taken on the terrace, into late-night arguments about ethnicity? Of course not all such revelations are up to the demands of morning logic. Just because the Russians have no word for "toes" does not mean that our foot fingers are more exquisitely shaped than yours, or that we have more of them. Still, it does seem to mean *something*.

The Germans, I am told, do not have a word for "efficient." The reason behind this oddity, as all normal lazy people would be relieved to agree, is on the whole pretty clear. The Italians most definitely do not have the word "cheap" (they say "less expensive" or "economical"), and readers of my earlier letters may reflect that in the mind of a nation that has so attentively preserved the social harmonies of its *borghesia*, from the bass to the alt, nothing in this world really comes cheap.

The Russians say, "Fate is a turkey, and life's worth a kopeck." Our toes may not be lovelier, but if one wants to use language to pinpoint a national consciousness most hostile to French domesticity, or German efficiency, or Italian prosperity, one need look no further than the Russian word *azart*. It exists in English as "hazard" and in Italian as *azzardo*, but rather than describing the danger of the risk or the risk itself, our word describes the intoxication of the man who risks, the delirious state of mind of a *giocatore d'azzardo*, the gambler's euphoria. As far as I know, no European language can express this nuance, a fact that really ought to lend some credence to the old story about Western materialism and the Russian soul.

Our intellectual attitude to material risk has not changed since Dostoyevsky. "However comical it may be that I should expect to get so much out of roulette," he writes, "the routine opinion, accepted by everybody, that it is absurd and silly to expect anything at all from gambling seems to me even funnier." Funny or chilling, but re-reading his letters recently, I was able to identify the prototype of the murder victim from *Crime and Punishment* in a German pawnbroker who offered him less for his watch than he had hoped to get. He needed the money to play, and his fantasy of killing the old hag right there and then became the spiritual engine of the novel.

Why am I saying all this? Ah, yes. Displacement. My Roman exile, gastronomy aside, is already making me see England as it never was. To put the matter more fancifully, it makes my memory paint situations and scenes which were undoubtedly episodic with the kind of improbably broad brush I have seen Italian house painters use, so that a minute into the job all that is left of a room is a Siberia of untraversed, powdery space and some moose hairs stuck to the surface. *Imbiancare* is the word, for those with an interest in comparative semantics. As in London, a half-empty bucket of whitewash is typically left behind, along with some crumpled dust-sheets.

I remember how people would ask me what I was writing, and naively I would tell them the truth. I am writing a book about chance, I would say. "What sort of chance?" they would press on, smelling blood. "Well, as in roulette," I would stammer. Here I think they knew they had me in the palm of their hand, fidgeting like a maimed sparrow. What next, my fine-feathered friend, their dimming eyes seemed to say. Research into prostitution? A study of cocaine? A fresh look at petty thieving? Navrozov, Navrozov!

The expression "Russian roulette" has lodged itself in the hypocrite's consciousness, and no sooner do I tell an American or an Englishman that I belong to Aspinalls than my dinner-party interlocutor's eyes cloud over with the belief that he knows everything there is to know about me. Yet 99 times out of 100, *he*, my interlocutor, is a stockbroker or some other, even more delusional kind of market mooch, just the sort of man Burke had in mind when he wrote, with reference to John Law's financial reformation of France:

> Your legislators, in everything new, are the very first who have founded a commonwealth upon gaming, and infused this spirit into it as its vital breath. The great object in these politics is to metamorphose France from a great kingdom into one great play-table; to turn its inhabitants into a nation of gamesters; to make speculation as extensive as life; to mix it with all its concerns and to divert the whole of the hopes and fears of the people from their usual channels into the impulses, passions, and superstitions of those who live on chances.

By contrast, here in Rome my confession is treated as a professorial whim, and a very distinguished one at that. Ah, *professore*, you would rather not have the same wine today? You would rather spend the afternoon in the country, finding new stick insects for your private collection? Oh, I understand perfectly, *professore*. You wish to spend the evening playing a game of chance on the foggy

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banks of the Thames! May I book you the journey?

Italians respect intellectuals, provided they can afford the wine. Their respect, which is truly continental, is the sort of thing that is endlessly described in Nabokov's émigré stories of Paris and Berlin: it is essentially the homage paid by an innkeeper to a guest whose eccentric ways are both valuable subjects of local gossip and welcome opportunities for enrichment in the community. The English, to say nothing of the Americans, have all but lost this notion of hospitality where intellectuals are concerned. Tell them you are writing about love, and they will think you a child molester. Say it's money, and they will decide you are dangerously poor, but if it's poverty that fascinates you, they will despise you as a shady moneybags with republican leanings. What can a writer legitimately say he is interested in, then? Small wonder there are so many biographies in the bookstores.

To escape the social consequences, one must have rank, accreditation, position. If I could announce, in an anglophone drawing-room, that I am a university professor, in all likelihood my Dangerfieldesque gripe would be no more, no matter how queer my actual or professed inclinations. Well, here in Italy nobody needs to announce that kind of thing. If you can pay for dinner, you are a professor.

Which brings me back to my feelings of displacement. Gastronomy and respect for intellectuals aside, I am obviously missing London with its 22 casinos. Rome has none. The other day, walking through a little piazza in the center of the city, I found myself in a small room packed with at least 500 people elbowing their way to happiness. "*Que casino, ma guarda que casino*!" one could hear exasperated cries here and there. With the stress on the middle syllable, unfortunately, meaning what bedlam. Bedlam, confusion, *casino* because the most unforgettable thimbleful of coffee in civilization is to be had in this room for about 60 cents, and it's a sure bet, too.

Was I happy at the famous Caffè Sant' Eustachio? No. The smoke of Tuscan cigars, the misleading semantics, the pushing crowd had awaked my appetite for the hazards of Mayfair, and I almost burst into sentimental tears from Dostoyevskian frustration. "*Portatemi sulle rive brumose del Tamigi*," I wanted to thunder, whereupon all the imaginary innkeepers of Europe past and present would duly bow and, scurrying like mice through the stage set representing a crooked street, would run to book me an overpriced flight to Heathrow. "*Stanotte voglio giocare d'azzardo*!" I would bellow after them. Nothing but respect for the hero in my Italian melodrama.

Andrei Navrozov, formerly Chronicles' *poetry editor and London correspondent, is now* Chronicles' *European correspondent.*

The Antipodean

for A. D. Hope

by Alan Sullivan

Worthy to stand with Johnson, Swift or Pope,
You offer young successors more than Hope;
But soon the work which you refused to quit
When niggling numbats deconstructed it
Must pass in trust to your unworthy heirs
Mounting their death-watch on Parnassian stairs.

Often you felt your countrymen disdained
What vestiges of culture they retained,
Preferring bards who plotted Marxist coups
Or ran with wallabies and kangaroos.
Once their descendants tire of shearing sheep,
They'll find their past securely in your keep.

We foreigners who glimpsed your Isle Of Aves
Or heard your bamboo flute across the waves
Explored the wandering islands of your mind
Where art and nascent science intertwined
As grave Casserius dissected nerves
And Herschel plotted planetary curves.

No existential vagaries for you—
You always kept Voltaire and Locke in view,
Skeptical though you never lost your faith
That somewhere in the background, like a wraith,
Hovered an esoteric Absolute—
The true numen for which we substitute
Divinities too like the human race.

Finding in grief an unimagined grace,
You blessed the tongues of all humanity,
Blessed Babel's curse—the gift which set us free
By breaking words and making them ignite
As a prism makes a rainbow of the light.
If one tongue threatens now to trump the rest,
Who would begrudge a prophet his bequest?

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MILITARY

Enemies Foreign and Domestic

by William J. Corliss

A cynic once observed that in times of peace nations make war on themselves. Nowhere is this phenomenon more manifest than in the United States military, where the onslaught of political correctness has resulted in the lowest morale in memory. As American Armed Forces recently geared up for another engagement with Iraq, a troubling consensus arose among officers in the Persian Gulf: neither the hearts and minds of the servicemen nor the material force structure were in readiness for success with a minimum of casualties.

Why was this not more widely reported? The answer lies in the modus operandi of political correctness, which demands unhesitating conformity of behavior and opinion while imposing irrational taboos on the discussion of certain subjects.

Outside of religious orders, there is no institution that demands so much in the way of obedience and conformity as the military. Precisely because the imperatives of political correctness are so frequently contrary to human nature, the effects on a comparatively closed society like the military are devastating. And even though the national defense of the republic is jeopardized thereby, many officers remain silent, as Elaine Donnelly of the Center for Military Readiness has explained, out of a well-justified fear of a career-ending mistake.

When Lt. General Victor "Brute" Krulak, USMC (Ret.) appointed me to the post of Deputy-in-Chief of *Strategic Review*, the venerable quarterly of the United States Strategic Institute (USSI), he did so because he recognized a need for a full hearing on controversial topics, particularly those falling under the heading of cultural politics. Privately exasperated officers, from all branches and all ranks right up to general, immediately rallied to our banner, telling us that the reason uppermost in everyone's mind for the current readiness crisis is the deliberate feminization of the military.

As I argued in an editorial published in our fall 1997 issue, if political correctness is to be combated in the military, Congress and the military should dispatch immediately the feminist demand that women be integrated into combat units. Contrary to popular misperceptions and the bureaucratic redefinition of combat criteria, the exclusion of women from combat remains the clear intent of the law, codified in the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948. That is why we are sometimes told that maneuver warfare and over-the-horizon weapons have rendered all members of the military "combatants." At other times we are told that certain posts which previously appeared to be involved in mortal combat do not qualify as "direct" combat postings. By one gloss or another, I argued, the Pentagon Pharisees will have their way, and "intent" be damned.

Because of this editorial, I was summarily dismissed from my post. I was told that the Institute's official position on integrating women into combat units had already been written some time ago by General Krulak. When I found this previous editorial, a weak demurrer to gender integration, I noted the by-line was not of General Krulak but of the then-deceased chairman of the USSI, Arthur G.B. Metcalf. There was no telling what might have happened inside the Beltway should someone have suspected that the opinion of General Victor Krulak was also that of his son—General Charles Krulak, the current Commandant of the Marine Corps.

That incident merely hints at what is taking place inside the military and the dark night of self-censorship concealing it. It is no coincidence that when ABC's *Nightline* (February 10, 1998) chose to explore the new rules of "men, women and sex in the workplace," the lead segment by Dave Marash zeroed in on the military. Speaking from the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI), which *Nightline* incorrectly identified by the less charged name of the "Military Management Institute," Marash briefly let slip the truth: "But when talk moves from what should be to what is, in today's American armed services, the word you hear again and again from these military managers is 'scared.'" A male officer is then shown worrying aloud, "I feel scared sometimes because I'm afraid that I might do something that I'm going to regret, and then next thing I know I'll have a report against me for sexual harassment." Apart from that glimpse of reality, ABC delivered cover-up coverage designed to inflame the public against seemingly irrational males.

Here, in contrast, is how feminist activist Linda Bird Francke describes the mission of the same institute in her book *Ground Zero*:

> The DEOMI subjected male students to sexual harassment in a role reversal exercise known as Meat Market. "Bend over. Touch your ankles. Hmmm, good pair of buns," female students murmured about a male student in one classroom. In another, a female student ordered a male to lie down on his back and hold his legs open in the ongoing tradition of the "leg-spreader." "We want the males to feel truly uncomfortable," says one of the trainers watching the exercise approvingly from the central, one-way glass control booth. . . . At DEOMI the simple answer to gender discrimination was the elimination of the combat exclusionary laws. The complex answer lay in the purging of biases and stereotypes ingrained in the white male Christian heterosexual culture.

The complete portrait sketched by Francke resembles nothing so much as a remake of *The Manchurian Candidate*.

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Officers like the one on *Nightline* have a lot more to fear than fear itself. In the opening section of Department of Defense Instruction No. 1320.4, which redefined the necessary components of officer promotion packages in the wake of the Tailhook scandal, we encounter Definition 2:

> *Alleged Adverse Information.* Any allegation of conflict of interest, failure to adhere to required standards of conduct, abuse of authority, misconduct or information serving as the basis for an incomplete or unresolved official investigation or inquiry into a possible conflict of interest or failure to adhere to standards of conduct or misconduct.

Anyone who does not understand the requirements on reporting "alleged adverse information," strategically placed throughout the instruction, as referring to crimes against political correctness is out of touch with the legitimate fear and suspicion of today's officer class.

The current process of vetting candidates for promotion cannot even be compared to the Inquisition, since one never gets to face the accuser or defend against the accusation. By a kind of weird poetic justice, it almost makes sense when agitated Senate Republicans order a Commission on Military Training and Gender-related Issues to ferret out the truth by September, and then appoint Mr. Frederick Pang to the panel. In his capacity as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy, Mr. Pang gushed in a letter on October 17, 1995, to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the reporting of "Alleged Adverse Information" on the attendees of Tailhook had gone so well that "We want to apply the Department's normal adverse information reporting requirements to all officers."

As a consequence, there exists a thin crust of officers at the very top who are there because they have shown themselves willing to carry out the directives of the civilian culture warriors. Serving below them is a vast sea of disgust, complemented by highly trained professionals who have retired in droves citing morale, a changed culture, and lowered standards of every sort. They know that Navy Secretary John Dalton demonstrably lied in 1995 when he denied the use of race and gender quotas. They know it is madness for the Army to bunk men and women, including military chaplains, together. And they know that the purpose of the military as an institution—to win the nation's wars—had to be qualified publicly by Army Secretary Togo West as on a par with "an equal opportunity to serve" in order to justify this dangerous and costly transformation.

The eerie thing about the present state of affairs is that one must now read American press accounts in roughly the same way that Sovietologists used to read *Pravda*, scouring articles for little tell-tale facts buried deep within. In March, newspapers nationwide carried a dispatch by Associated Press writer John Diamond on the alarming number of pilots unceremoniously departing from the Air Force and Navy. Less than 30 percent of nine-year veteran pilots in the Air Force are accepting an extended tour of five years, even when offered a $110,000 signing bonus. As for the Navy, this year only 27 out of 261 carrier pilots have opted for another tour of duty, again despite generous offers of bonus pay. A variety of reasons are offered, none of which makes perfect sense, until the reader notices that many of the officers cite as an explanation "difficulties with the promotion process." Everyone in the military knows that what this phrase really refers to: the process of weeding out enemies of the new order.

Meanwhile, as President Clinton was preparing another massive air campaign against Iraq, the defense of our crucial ground position in Kuwait was in the hands of a reinforced armor battalion and a Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit—hardly a division. Highly placed officers from Central Command in the Gulf warned their former colleague Joshua Cohen, editorial manager of the influential Periscope military news service, that in the event of a ground-based Iraqi counter-attack key bases such as Al Jabar, from which many of the American sorties were to be flown, would not be defended. What would we have done had the Iraqis captured a significant number of Americans on the ground as prisoners of war?

The fact that the Clinton administration was persuaded that it could compel the behavior of a nation the size of Iraq with over-the-horizon and stand-off weapons alone is significant on a number of levels. It can be read as support for a point made by William Lind: "There is a direct connection between the feminization of our armed forces and the fantasy of 'push button warfare,' because that's the only kind of war women can fight (and it doesn't work)." As the troops see it, what began as social experimentation with the intangibles of good order, morale, and discipline has finally matured into a criminal neglect of the concrete exigencies of war-fighting.

The ultimate and more ominous significance of these phenomena can be derived by simple logic. The inclusion of any element which, by its nature, is incommensurate with a principal end of action affects performance as a whole. Even advocates of gender integration know that it reduces military readiness, but they forge ahead because they view androgyny as a cultural imperative. While a patriotic soldier fights for victory and is prepared to sacrifice himself for his country, postmodernists are prepared to sacrifice countrymen and victory to the perverse ideal of a community homogeneous in feeling, thought, and activity.

Such being the gravity of the matter, a portion of my *Strategic Review* editorial that feminists found particularly infuriating bears repeating: "If Congress and the Pentagon will not act, officers en masse should simply refuse to implement integration further." If some view that recommendation as a scary call to mutiny, they should realize there are many ways of saying *Non serviam*. Officers are saying as much by simply walking away.

William J. Corliss is an associate at the Boston University Center for Defense Journalism.

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FOREIGN POLICY

Lest We Forget the Evil Empire

by Charles Maurice and Svetozar Pejovich

As long as the Soviet Union existed, voices were heard in the United States favoring peaceful co-existence with the socialist bloc, pushing for unilateral reduction in the country's defense expenditures, and protesting the development of nuclear weapons. Some of those voices were well-meaning and naive, while others were serving a "higher" purpose. Seeking to replace individual liberty with collective action, all of them were blind to the gulags, murder, plunder, absence of liberty, and economic deprivations that defined the socialist landscape for most of this century.

In the early 1980's, a television show about a nuclear holocaust, *The Day After*, captured the essence of this movement which believed in the good intentions of socialist leaders, legislated outcomes, and unilateral disarmament. In response to that show, we published the following short story in 1984 in *Pathfinder*, a bimonthly magazine published by the Center for Free Enterprise at Texas A&M University. It was republished in dozens of newspapers, student publications, bulletins, pamphlets, and newsletters. The story caught fire because it made the difference between the freedom of choice and the sanctity of law on the one hand and social engineering and totalitarian rule on the other understandable (and observable) to an American audience—especially an audience of young people.

Today, the consequences of the socialist experiment, perhaps the costliest experiment in human history, are fading from our memories. For university students in the West, the socialist rule in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is fast becoming ancient history, something that could not possibly happen again. Young men and women are busy with their careers in competitive markets. Baby-boomers in the United States are focusing on the value of retirement annuities.

Memories are in short supply in the East as well. In Serbia and Bosnia, people are talking about the good old days under Tito. They forget that the leaders of Bosnia and Serbia today, whatever we might think of them, have been elected by the population at large, while Tito imposed his rule by force. They forget that Tito's "war of liberation" (1944-1945), which was very costly in terms of the number of people killed and property destroyed, freed Yugoslavia from the German occupation not a day sooner than would have happened anyhow. To seal his victory over the opponents of communism in 1945, Tito murdered over 30,000 Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes. In the early 1950's, Tito organized concentration camps which were probably worse than Stalin's gulags. As late as the 1970's, Tito conducted a major purge that condemned thousands of people to unemployment and jail sentences.

But appearances are often deceptive. The ugly head of socialism is in hiding but not dead. Some people are clearly unhappy with the fact that the private-property, free-market economy has proved its superiority over socialism. Consumer advocates, labor unions, pressure groups, and all sorts of public interest defenders are pushing for more public spending and more governmental controls. Apologists for socialism argue that by pursuing their own ends, the political leaders in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Cuba, and elsewhere ruined the chance for socialism to prove itself as a viable alternative to capitalism. We think they have a point. In order to explain the performance of socialist economies, analysis has to assume that the leaders did indeed pursue their own private ends; of course, they pursued their private ends within the system of incentives embedded in socialist institutions.

Collectivism and welfarism are very much alive in the world today. President Clinton almost succeeded in socializing health care in the United States, and he continues to develop and push new public programs. A huge bureaucracy is being created in Brussels, which will slowly but surely replace national sovereignty and the freedom of choice in Western Europe with continentally legislated outcomes. Even the recent trip of Pope John Paul II to Cuba gave a helping hand to one of the greatest opponents of liberty.

That is why the story we wrote in 1984 is worth reprinting at this time. It reminds us that what was indeed happening in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union before 1990, and is still happening in China, North Korea, Cuba, and other socialist states today, must be remembered so that it does not happen again. "The Day After 'The Day After'" is based in fact. Anyone who lived in an Eastern European country during the socialist rule, as one of us did, can tell many stories about the consequences of the institutions of socialism. Here is our story.

The Day After "The Day After"

It was a strange day in Lawrence, Kansas. There was a stillness in the crisp fall air. People felt something was about to happen, but they didn't know what. Radio stations played only music and TV stations showed old movies, and both made frequent announcements that the President of the United States would make an important speech that night at seven. All around the nation was the same. People speculated, worried, and waited.

The mayor of Lawrence was home for lunch, playing with his new baby. His wife asked him if he knew what was wrong, and he said he didn't. So they talked about the baby during lunch.

At 7 P.M., TV sets across the entire nation were tuned in when the President came on. He was followed by the secretary of the Communist Party of the United States and the widely recognized Soviet ambassador. The President spoke grimly:

> My dear fellow Americans, I am deeply sorry to have to inform you that the Soviet Union has requested a change in the government of the United States. The elected government has resigned. Your new President will be the secretary of the Communist Party of the United States. We had no choice. The alternative would have been the nuclear destruction of our beloved country. We had neither the weapons to resist nor the retaliatory capacity to offset the threat.

As two soldiers pulled him from the chair, he kept saying, "We had no choice. We had no choice. We had no choice. . ." The party secretary sat down

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and spoke.

> Comrades, this is the greatest day in the history of our nation. It is the day when the working people of this country have finally been able to throw off the chains of oppression forged by the capitalist class. I am proud to tell you that as of today, instead of the United States of America, we have a country that we can proudly call the People's Republic of America. We are going to be ruthless toward those who have oppressed us for so long. The former President is now joining members of his Cabinet along with the military and business leaders of yesterday in a detention camp where their crimes will be investigated by the people's authority. Public trials will be held to expose their crimes to the nation. This is the beginning of a new era.

Then the screen went blank. The TV stations started playing classical music the rest of the night. In Lawrence, the mayor's wife turned to her husband. "What do you think happened?" "I don't know," he said. "We wanted peace. We wanted to save the world from a nuclear holocaust. Our President promised nuclear disarmament, and we elected him and his Congress. We got what we wanted . . . but I guess we may have been wrong. Now there is nothing to do but wait and hope for the best. There is nothing else we can do."

The phone rang. When the mayor answered, the caller said: "Mayor, I represent the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Tomorrow at 9 A.M. we expect you to have everyone in the city assembled in the football stadium on the campus." The mayor began to protest that he couldn't possibly have everyone there on such short notice, but the caller stopped him. "That is your problem. Make sure everyone is there." And he hung up.

The mayor and his staff began phoning people, who in turn phoned others. Speaker trucks were sent through the city all night to announce the meeting next morning. The word got around and by nine the population had assembled in the stadium.

At 9:15, a car occupied by a driver and three other men entered the stadium, followed by two trucks of Russian soldiers. The three men were Sam Cunningham, a member of the U.S. Communist Party, Vasja Stronovich, representing the Ministry of Information, and an officer of the KGB. The KGB officer had used many names.

Stronovich spoke into a hastily assembled microphone, telling the people that their exploiters were finished. He called for the mayor, who joined them and was immediately shot by a soldier. Stronovich then spoke to the people of Lawrence: "We are going to punish all capitalists and avenge you for all those years of exploitation at their hands. I want all people who own property to go to the parking lot. There will be no exceptions. All others, the working people, stay here."

After an hour of confusion, two groups of about equal size had formed, one outside the stadium and one inside. Sam Cunningham then spoke to the people in the stadium:

> We are going to have a parade tonight. Every man, woman and child will march. We will demonstrate how happy we are to see this change in government. We will show the world that this change has been requested—no, demanded—by the people, to free them from the capitalist yoke. This parade, and the others that will go on throughout the country, will show that we are merely carrying out the people's will.

Meanwhile, the KGB officer spoke to the people in the parking lot. "You will be questioned and investigated by me and members of my staff. A temporary office has been set up in the student union next door. You line up and wait." The capitalists lined up and waited. The investigation lasted all day. As each person or family came to a desk, an officer asked the same question: "What kind of property do you own?"

When an older couple was questioned the man answered, "I am a retired teacher. We saved some money while I was working and opened a small convenience store." When he was asked if he ever worked for profit, the man answered, "Well, if that's what you want to call what is left over after we paid all of our expenses, yes." "Then you have exploited the people. You are a member of the blood-sucking capitalist class. The property you stole from the people is now returned to the people. You will be sent to a detention camp for re-education." The wife said, "We have done nothing. Why can't we just go home?" "You have no home. Your house was built on the profits you stole from others. It now belongs to the people. You and all other capitalists will do hard labor eight hours a day to pay back the country for all you stole. You will have political education four hours a day, and the rest of the time will be your own." The wife cried, "But what about our grandchildren? They live with us." She was told, "If they denounce you publicly the people's government will take care of them. If not they go with you." The couple was taken away.

It was the same thing as person after person came to one of the desks in the union. One man asked if he could go and get some personal property from the sporting goods store he owned. When he was told that he had no right to the property because it was purchased from money extracted from the working people, the man shouted, "This is nonsense. If I can't get my personal property, I refuse to leave." The questioning KGB man nodded to a soldier; the former capitalist was shot and dragged off. The KGB man shouted at the waiting people, "Stupidity! Does any one else have any objections?" No one answered. He went on:

> Look, it doesn't matter whether you own a small business or a big business. It doesn't matter whether you are a stockholder or work in your own business. Even if you have a horse and rent it out to people, you have been living off the work of others. You have been infected by ownership, which is dangerous.

A voice came from the crowd, protesting that more than half of Americans own something—investments, real estate, stocks, a store, or something. The KGB man replied, "They did yesterday. Today it belongs to the people."

By the end of the day, all the people who had assembled on the parking lot had been taken to freight cars, which transported them to detention camps. Few were ever seen again.

During the afternoon, Vasja Stronovich finished speaking to the people in the stadium:

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> It is important that everyone joins the parade tonight. You must all laugh, smile, and show how happy you are that after more than 200 years of capitalist exploitation in America, you have your own country, your own government. You are the government. Wives and children will march also. We must show to the world we are united; we are all enjoying the happiness of the new regime.

A voice came from the crowd: "What if we don't want to march? Will you take us to court?" Stronovich answered calmly: "If you want to be an enemy of the people that is your choice, but you will join the exploiters in detention camps. The people decide everything, and we represent the people." A student asked, "But who elected you?" The student was quickly taken away. There were no more questions.

Beginning at seven that night half of the people of Lawrence, Kansas, marched through the streets to show how much they loved their new government. They shouted and displayed big signs that said: "Long live the People's Republic," "Down with the exploiters of the People." Half of the people of Lawrence never got the chance to march. They were riding freight cars.

All over the globe people watched on TV as the people of Lawrence and other American cities marched, seeing how citizens of the United States welcomed the new government. They did not know that half of the population had been arrested, and they did not see the armed Russian soldiers standing in the side streets. So people said: "If the communists were so bad, so many people wouldn't be happy. The Americans were smart. They stopped spending money on defense. Now they have united with the Russian people under a new government. At long last the world is safe." Of course, socialist leaders in the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist states were joking about the stupid, naive capitalists who were so worried about the chances of nuclear destruction that they would not defend themselves.

Charles Maurice and Svetozar Pejovich are professors of economics at Texas A&M University.

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by Chilton Williamson, Jr.

The Wind Listeth

Some say the world will end in fire, some say in ice. Speaking from experience, rather than poetic frenzy, I say both. The spring winds blowing white at home in Wyoming blow red down here in New Mexico, a howling gale that seems to be returning to the Dustbowl the errant Oklahoma, Kansas, and Texas dusts that have been sojourning in Southern California for 60 years. They might be winds from Hell, though on this Easter weekend tongues of heavenly fire is plainly a more appropriate metaphor.

The storms make their first appearance as skirmishing clouds of pink dust on the western landline, blotting the Florida Mountains and sweeping on across the endless flats toward the Rio Grande. Hot winds lift the dust to an even height beneath a clear blue sky, a dry and scouring fog rolling in from an ocean of red desert upon the springtime valley of green fields and blossoming fruit trees and the East Mesa, where the Organ Mountains vanish behind the blowing dust raised by 60-mile-an-hour winds and the houses around blur to reddish, indistinct shapes. Sheets and ribbons of dust race across the roads, and dust like red talcum powder works its way in under doors and around windows, sifting through the skylight and drafting down the chimney. The parching, hot, and suffocating air inside the closed-up house has a claustrophobic effect which, added to the nervous bombardment of positive ions, produces a feeling of mild panic arising from a sense of entrapment from which there is no escape. Around sundown the storm abates; the sun's reddened eye appears above the horizon through separating clouds of dust, and the wind dies by degrees, in fits and gusts, leaving small piles of sand against the house and in the angles of the stone wall.

The dust storms blew up for Palm Sunday and banged around during the first part of Holy Week before ceasing abruptly on Good Friday. I emerged from the house before sunset, swept the dust off the truck, and drove across town to Mesilla. Behind a sign posted on the front doors to keep the tourists out, San



Albino was crowded beyond its seating capacity. I heard the service from the back of the church, Father Conrad alternating between Spanish and English as he proceeded. The Spanish ladies' choir in their white dresses and *mantillas* sang from the choir loft, and at Communion their steps were heard on the wooden stairs at the back of the church as they descended, still singing their melodious repetitive chants, for the Eucharist. Following the service a procession, beginning inside the church and led by two men bearing a tortured-looking cadaver carved from a tough-looking, dark-colored wood and lying in a sort of crib, filed out and around the plaza, past the wide-open shops and the marveling tourists, each member of the procession carrying a lighted candle while the church bell tolled with a stark and tragic solemnity on the stroke of every minute. New Mexico has its drawbacks, but it *is* nice to live in a Catholic country, especially during Holy Week.

As Easter weekend inaugurates the bullfight season across the river in Ciudad Juárez, I had spent the proceeding week alternating religious devotion with attempts to obtain tickets to the upcoming *gran corrida mixta* at the Plaza Monumental. In addition to two highly regarded *matadores*, Señor Hurtado's program featured a *novillero* 15 years old, Julian Lopez from Madrid, who was the talk of the local *aficionados*. On the Saturday before the fight I drove down to El Paso through the Mesilla Valley where the cottonwoods were in leaf and the pecan orchards stood under several inches of soaking water and walked across the Rio Grande under a hot sun to the Kentucky Bar in search of good tickets and a cold drink.

"*Quiero dos boletos por la corrida el domingo que viene in el primera fila*," I told the barman.

"We don't have the tickets yet," the barman said in perfect English. "Monday, maybe, or Tuesday. Tuesday could be better. Come again on Tuesday for the tickets."

The barman took a *calendario* from the end of the bar and gave it to me. I read it and saw that the fight was scheduled for April the 11th.

"The *corrida* is Saturday?"

The barman nodded. "They could not arrange for Lopez to be here Sunday. So he will fight on Saturday instead."

The gentleman standing next to me at the bar leaned over and tapped the program with his finger.

"This El Juli is a superb bullfighter," he said, also in English. "If you want to see a real *torero*, go see El Juli next Saturday."

I bought a big Cuban cigar and smoked it while I had another beer, partly because it tasted wonderful and partly to keep the CIA on its toes. The barman brought me a bullfight poster carefully rolled, and afterward went back for a rubber band to keep it that way. Conversing about the *corrida* in the Kentucky Bar, I found it easy to forget that Juárez is a place where over a hundred people, Americans and Mexicans, have disappeared in the last couple of years and nearly 120 young *maquiladora* workers are thought to have been raped and slain since 1993 by a serial killer. I bought another Cuban stogie when I left and wandered around in the adjacent neighborhood to smoke it. Nobody paid me any attention in my pointy-toed boots and wide straw hat until, when I was getting rid of the cigar, a peddler, penetrating my disguise, thrust a piece of coiled lariat, patriotically decorated in the colors of the Mexican Republic and a tiny leather saddle—the kind of thing you hang on the rear-view mirror of your pickup truck—into my hand.

"*Gracias señor, pero no.*"

I tried giving the thing back to the man, but he refused to take it.

"*Cinco dolares, señor.*"

You hate to tell them no. I opened my

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wallet and looked into it: three ones, a ten, a couple of twenties. Of course he had no change. I drew out the singles and showed him them.

"*Cuatro dolares, señor. Uno mas*!"

In among some bank receipts I spotted a five dollar bill. I drew it out and gave it to the man.

"*Seis dolares, señor*!"

"*No-o-o-o-o.*"

He took the money from me and was gone without another word.

Jim Rauen picked me up around noon Saturday on his way from Belen, and we rode down to Juárez together in his new Buick. Arriving at the ring too late for the *sorteo* we crossed the street to Paco, formerly Max-Fim, for lunch, and found the place almost unrecognizable under a face lift and a new coat of paint. It was also permanently closed, and so was Geronimo's next door. There is scarcely a decent Italian restaurant below Canal Street in New York City which is not the site of at least one gangland killing, but the citizens of Juárez are apparently less blasé than New Yorkers, Paco's owners having closed down the restaurant and sold the building following the shootings last August and September.

Being among the first to enter the ring after the gates opened, we escaped the inconvenience of a body search performed on all later arrivals as Juárez's finest were suddenly everywhere, while walkie-talkies crackled and red lights swirled. It was a well-meant gesture, no doubt initiated by Hurtado himself, and we worked hard not to notice that anyone toting a bomb or packing a semi-automatic weapon had had a full quarter of an hour before the arrival of the police to sneak himself and his contraband past the gate and take up a strategic position inside the ring. Besides the cops there were a considerable number of TV cameramen. We walked around three of them trying to get the perfect angle on a pair of girls in tight shorts and haltertops to the refreshment stand and drank a couple of beers as the crowd passed by slowly into the *arena*.

With bullfighting making a comeback in northern Mexico and along the border, the patrons of the Plaza Monumental are more enthusiastic and at the same time more serious than they were six, seven, or eight years ago, when Hurtado *padre* was still alive and the *temporada* was three *corridas* a season. The *calendario* for 1998 lists ten events: the Easter *corrida mixta*, in which a *novillero*, or novice who has yet to make his *alternativa*, performs with one or more *matadores* in the course of the afternoon; five *novilladas*, all of whose *toreros* are *novilleros*; and four *corridas*, restricted solely to *matadores*. This afternoon the ring, though half empty as always on the sunny side, was more crowded than we had seen it yet, and the crowd itself less full of idle chatter.

From our third-row seats immediately to the right of the president's box, we could watch the *entrada* forming for the entry and then, when the *cuadrilla* was in place for the first fight, look straight up the tunnel as the bull came charging out. Bulls fought by the *novilleros* are called *novillos*, smaller and lighter than the *toros*—big fighting bulls—but there wasn't any difference between them that I could see, unless it was that El Juli's animals were faster and more furious than those Antonio Urrutia and Carlos Rondero faced: all of them magnificent grey bulls with perfectly symmetrical horns from the breeding ranch of Cerro Viejo. El Juli himself was a beautiful boy who would have been perfectly cast in an episode of *Brideshead Revisited* and who possessed the aplomb, stage-presence, and panache of a man of 40 who had been fighting bulls all his life. In spite of the slight uncooperativeness of his first *novillo*, El Juli performed brilliantly, planting his own *banderillas* with a style and accuracy that challenged the older men who followed to call off their *banderilleros* and match the performance. Watching him in the *faena*, passing the bull so close to his body that he was bumped twice by the horn, I felt not only that I truly understood the bullfight for the first time, but that this was also the first occasion when I was actually seeing it—or being made to see it. On the afternoon of April 11, the separate *faenas*—Urrutia's and Rondero's as well as El Juli's—unfolded in a fluid series of perfectly executed passes, to which the only possible response was: "Yes. That is how it is supposed to be always, you have never seen it quite this good before, and now that you have seen it you will never forget what good looks like, how everything really is supposed to be, and now you have a standard of perfection by which to judge every fight that you will ever see between this afternoon and the end of your life."

The second half of the *corrida* was disfigured by a drunk who tossed a plastic bottle filled with branch water at one of the *picadores* (always the most unpopular of the *cuadrilla*), hitting him in the side of the head and nearly knocking his cap off. The *picador*, who at the moment of impact was leaning on his lance to press the steel point deeper into the bull's shoulder hump, shot a killing look into the crowd which, rising simultaneously to its feet, shouted, "*Fuera*! *Fuera*! *Fuera*!" in unison as the police moved in to apprehend the culprit and Rondero, shrugging, seated himself across the ring to await the restoration of order. But the wind, which got up just after he had killed his first bull, though it scoured the faces of everyone sitting on the *sombra* side of the *arena*, allowed the three *toreros* to show what they were capable of in the most dangerous conditions that a bullfighter can know in the ring. El Juli, concerned but not in the least intimidated or flustered, gestured to his *cuadrilla* as he stepped out to take the bull from them. Following the *faena* that ensued he killed beautifully by a perfectly placed *estocada* and was awarded an ear by the president, which he afterwards tossed to the *arena's* equivalent of the peanut gallery as he exited the ring.

After the *corrida* we washed up at the hotel and then went for dinner at La Fogata on the Avenida 17 septiembre. The restaurant wasn't there—not just closed but the building removed down to the foundation with that sudden and final dispensation that awaits so many things in Mexico, including bulls. We found a fish place and dined there for 20 dollars for the two of us, while in the Catedral de Nuestra Señora the Easter Vigil went on and on and, in the wide streets, a hot wind blew. C

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

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Trevor Colbourn is President Emeritus of the University of Central Florida.

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